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This practice-based PhD critically investigates the complex imbrications of political violence and 
environmental processes resulting in the construction of so-called “natural” borders: national 
boundaries where nature is understood to delimit and fortify the nation-state. Taking the frontiers of 
Greece as a case study, the thesis seeks to demonstrate that, contrary to conceptions of natural borders 
as spaces that operate devoid of human intervention, their materiality and natural processes are in fact 
hybridized and engineered by states to perform the specific, deadly tasks of deterrence, exclusion and 
erasure. Part I (Ghost Habitats) explores the mountainous, trilateral border area of the 
Prespa/Prespa/Prespës lakes between Greece, North Macedonia, and Albania, to consider how the 
delineation and enforcement of the border reconfigures regional ecosystems to render them into “wild” 
frontiers, subject to different legal orders than the remainder of sovereign territory. Part II (Anáchoma), 
co-researched with colleague Ifor Duncan (PhD, CRΑ/Post-doctoral fellow at Ca’ Foscari University, 
Venice) considers the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa river between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria as an apparatus 
of border violence and obfuscation, as well as a body which records, stores, and occasionally reveals 
this violence through seasonal shifts in its hydrological cycle. Part III (Grey Rocks, Black Waves) 
examines the archipelagic border of the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey, to discuss how its 
geographically and historically dense materiality is mobilized as a defensive infrastructure against 
contemporary migration at sea, and to reflect on a spatial and visual practice that attempts to decode 
this matter to reveal traces of state violence. In each case sovereign power organises, and is organised 
around, specific ecological processes to disperse the causal agencies of violence enacted against 
disempowered border subjects, and aspiring crossers. Incorporating a methodology that borrows from 
disciplines as diverse as forensics, filmmaking, archaeology, botany, and oceanography, the thesis 
contests commonplace understandings of territorial limits as lines that are simply scripted over natural 
backdrops, to critically include the multiple human agencies and their insidious use of ecological 
dynamics for the work of border defence. To describe these hybrid boundary environments, and the 
complex causal relationships they engender, the thesis introduces the operative concept of “border 
natures”: a synthesis of nature, space, technology and law, and connecting actors as diverse as border 
authorities, fences, technologies of surveillance, political and legal orders, human and more-than-
human forms of life - rivers, waves, and mountains.
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From Natural Borders to Border Natures
 
“The lie of the mountains, seas, and rivers [in Europe], which serve as boundaries of the 
various nations which people it, seems to have fixed forever their number and size. We may 
fairly say that the political order of the Continent is in some sense the work of nature.” 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de l'Abbé de Saint Pierre. 
 
 
“But aren't we forgetting the world of things themselves, the sand, the water, the mud, the 
reeds of the marsh?” 
Michel Serres, The Natural Contract. 
 
 
The border between Greece and Albania along the ridge of Grammos/Gramoz mountain (top), the Greek-Turkish Evros/Meriç 
river border (middle), and a military base on the Greek island of Pserimos, in the SE Aegean Sea (bottom).
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i. Natural Borders: Bounding Greece 
 
“South of Albania, more mountains are the norm. The Pindus Range parallels the Ionian 
seacoast from the (Greek) island of Corfu to near the southern tip of the Greek Peloponnisos. 
In addition to its territory on the peninsula mainland, Greece also currently lays claim to 2,000 
islands in the Ionian, Mediterranean, and Aegean Seas. Many of Greece’s Aegean island 
holdings lie only a few miles off the coast of Turkey. Further south, Greece’s Aegean seacoast 
is rocky and irregular and uninviting.” 
U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.1 
 
 
The borderline delineating the Greek territory has been drawn, erased, and redrawn several times over 
since the collapse of the empires in the early 20th century. In the South, East and West, the border cuts 
over seas (the Libyan, Aegean and Ionian Sea respectively) and winds through archipelagos. In the 
North, it zig-zags along mountain crests, gorges, lakes, and a handful of valleys, where the six official 
crossing points to Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria, are located. In the North-East, it meanders 
along the river Evros/Meriç/Maritsa. With the exception of a newly erected “technical obstacle”2 - the 12 
km-long fence in the Evros region - the entire length of the Greek border coincides with what could be 
described as naturally determined barriers, or “natural borders”. Over 60 percent3 of lands (and waters 
- lakes and rivers) along the northern border are designated as National Forests, National Parks, or 
Protected Wetlands, areas which – for the most part - are sparsely inhabited and owned and managed 
by the state. At places, these nature reserves overlap and alternate with military zones spanning the 
border, to an an extent where, I will argue, one is often constitutive of the other. 
In Greece, as elsewhere, placing borders along natural markers has historically helped construct the 
idea of a unified and bounded space within which the politics of purity, nation, and history can unfold. 
Scripted over uninviting, and seemingly impenetrable terrains, these natural boundaries are thought to 
seal the nation – and, by extension, Europe’s south-eastern extremities - from outside threat, and have 
historically performed as landscapes along which nationalist imaginaries of “Greekness” are inscribed. 
Fertile with antiquities4, and charged with historical references, the landscapes and seascapes 
                                                   
1 Dawn Stram Statham, Monte Smith, Ric Holmes, Cultural Landmines in the Balkans: How the Land and Its History Have Kept 
a People At War, (Washington DC: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2001). 
2 As I will discuss in part two, Anáchoma, both the Greek and European border guard agencies refer to the fence in Evros as a 
“Techincal Obstacle”.  
3 Approximately 942 kilometres of the 1485-kilometre-long boundary between Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, the Republic of 
Northern Macedonia, and Albania, fall within nature reserves. Calculated by author, based on information provided upon 
request in the form of GIS files by the Geographic Society of the Hellenic Military. 
4 The Greek anthropologist Eleana Yalouri describes how, in the Greek imaginary “The Greek earth is blessed because it is 
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contained within these borders offer themselves as canvases over which the dominant narrative 
establishes continuums between pre-classical and contemporary Greece; Ancient Greeks it is said, 
inhabited the same space that modern Greeks inhabit today, as did the empires of Alexander the 
Great, and the Byzantium5. It was over this same sea, the narrative goes, that the thalassocracy of 
classical Athens ruled, and it was from these mountains that the rebellion that ousted the Ottoman 
empire was launched, that the invading Italian forces were repelled in 1940, and the communist 
partisans were defeated in 1949. As I will discuss, “the mountains” or “the dry islands” are not only 
materially complex, and powerful, terrains, but also potent spaces within the Greek imaginary. To 
evoke them in domestic political discourse strikes sensitive chords, resonant with the troubled 
histories of the modern Greek nation. It is through such discourses, tangling history with myth, and the 
politics of the sublime, that natural landmarks are used to establish “essential links between politics, 
people, and the natural setting”6 and become technologies of territory in their own right. Ultimately, 
“natural borders” birth “natural subjects”7, ones that have a natural right over the territory, before 
others. To transgress these borders is an unnatural act undertaken by “aliens”.  
This thesis will seek to trouble such naturalised understandings of borders and nationhood. Focusing 
on three sites along the “natural borders” of Greece - the mountainous, trilateral, lake borders of 
Prespa/Prespa/Prespës with North Macedonia and Albania; the river border of Evros/Meriç/Maritsa 
separating Greece from Bulgaria and Turkey, and the maritime border of the Aegean Sea with Turkey 
- I will think through border landscapes to explore the contestations and troubled histories these contain 
and sustain, and to interrogate emerging and past orders of state power. I will ask: how should “natural 
borders” be theorized and researched today, and how can a more capacitous understanding of the 
seemingly stable, and opposing, ontologies of borders and nature, re-inform our understandings of 
agency, causality, and violence at the edges of nation-states? Ultimately, how can we sense, visualise, 
and challenge, these agentive forces and the violence these unleash on those who inhabit or attempt 
to cross it unauthorized. How do they register on the earth and sea’s body? 
 
                                                   
fertile, its fertility lying in its richness in antiquities. Antiquities are depicted as natural products of the Greek land” Eleana 
Yalouri, The Acropolis: Local fame, global claim. (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2001), 65-66.  Drawing from Yalouri, the 
anthropologist David Sutton notes how antiquities as “natural products” of the land “ground the political body of the nation by 
demonstrating its emergence from that territory and its “natural” endowments”4 David Sutton, “The Concealed and the 
Revealed. Looking to the Hidden Bounty of the Land in Crisis Times”, in Critical Times in Greece. Anthropological 
Engagements with the Crisis, ed. Dimitris Dalakoglou and Georgios Agelopoulos, (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 
86-101, 100.  
5 To be sure, such imagined continuums cannot be contained within these rigid, and limited, boundaries. Irredentist imaginaries 
still speak of a larger Greece, from the Euphrates, to the “Pillars of Hercules” (the straits of Gibraltar), along the traces of Greeces 
past. 
6 Jean Gottman, The Significance of Territory, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press 1973),63-65, quoted in Stuart 
Elden, “The Significance of Territory”, Geographica Helvetica 68, no.1 (2013): 65–68. 
7 This is by no means unique to the Greek national imaginary, and persists among settler colonial contexts, most notorious among 
which is the American imaginary of “nature’s nation”, whose citizens, according to Donald Pease, “believe, by way of the supreme 
fiction called natural law, that the ruling assumptions of their national compact […] could be understood as indistinguishable from 
the sovereign power creative of nature.” Donald E. Pease, “National Identities, Postmodern Artifacts, and Postnational 
Narratives”, in National Identities and Post-Americanist Narratives, ed. Donald E. Pease (Durham, NC:  Duke University Press, 
1994). 
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These are places that I know well. Growing up in Greece, I have hiked, sailed, or driven through all of 
these border landscapes, several times. However, my choice to focus on the Greek borders is not 
simply based on my familiarity, or proximity, to these terrains. Rather, it is dictated by their recent 
emergence as central nodes to a world-wide corridor of sovereign violence. As I will argue below, this 
is the result of a sudden, global shift that endowed these spaces with explicit powers. To be sure, this 
is not a potency that lies in their aforementioned mythic endowment alone, or, indeed, their sheer scale; 
seas here are not rougher than elsewhere, rivers are not wider or more rapid, mountains are not higher, 
steeper, or colder. Quite the opposite, the enclosed Aegean waters are significantly more tranquil than 
those of the open ocean or even the central Mediterranean; the Evros/Meriç pales in comparison to 
larger transboundary rivers like the Rio Grande in the US - Mexico border, the Mekong river separating 
Laos from Thailand and Myanmar, or the Ganges, emptying its waters in the Bay of Bengal and 
constantly reconfiguring the border between India and Bangladesh; the mountains of Prespa reach a 
maximum altitude of 2601 metres and are accessible with minimal equipment for several months of the 
year, significantly less rugged or hostile than other notorious border ridges like the contested Karakoram 
range in Kashmir, or the Alps, increasingly crossed by migrants on their way from Italy to France. 
Augmenting the capacity of these borders as impediments to movement, however, is the proximity at 
which these different terrains are located. Often, a border crosser has to intersect sea, river, and 
mountain, within the space a few kilometres. “In Greece” notes the French historian Fernand Braudel, 
“it is often possible to climb up above the belt of orange and olive trees, pass through all the European 
zones of vegetation and arrive practically at the point of all-year-round snow”8.  
 
But, crucially, what makes these borders particularly powerful, and relevant to my research, is their 
location on the intersection of three continents - Europe, Africa and Asia - which places them at the 
nexus of various mobilities, and geopolitical contestations. When researching these borderlands, one 
never only interrogates isolated sites. Rather, planetary patterns of governance emerge, which speak 
to logistical routes and tropes of displacement that are intimately tied to armed conflict, environmental 
degradation, or financial collapse across different continents. Recent examples include planetary 
infrastructural projects such as the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative and new pipelines for 
hydrocarbons9, and, importantly, what in 2015-16 came to be called the “refugee crisis”, or, more 
optimistically, the “long summer of migration”10, which saw more than a million people cross these 
borders into Europe, and several thousand more dying in their attempt to do so. These mass 
                                                   
8 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, (Oakland: University of California 
Press 1992), 25. Braudel uses the term “vertical norths” to describe this steep topography where mountain ranges rise up from 
the sea, a condition which he, reductively, identifies as particular to the Mediterranean region. 
9 Namely, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, 99 percent complete at the time of writing, which will transport Natural Gas from the Caspian 
Sea to Central Europe, and the Eastern-Mediterranean pipeline, which is planned to span from the Levantine oil fields off the 
shores of Cyprus and Israel, through Greece to Italy. The port of Piraeus, the biggest in Greece and one of the biggest in the 
Mediterranean was leased to China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in 2009, and then privatised and sold in to COSCO in 
2016. Close to the port, a large railway terminal is being constructed, transforming the area in a major logistical hub of the “Belt 
and Road” initiative. 
10 Bernd Kasparek, Marc Speer, “Of Hope, Hungary and the Long Summer of Migration”, Border monitoring, September 9 2015.  
available at: https://bordermonitoring.eu/ungarn/2015/09/of-hope-en/, (accessed April 2019). 
 14 
movements re-activated these borders that had for years been hibernating in a state of low intensity 




ii. Intersecting Temporalities 
A Decade of Crises/One Hundred Years of State-Building/Border Tectonics 
 
Upon their crossing of these borders, such intertwining global trajectories crosscut a series of layering 
temporalities. A few years before the “long summer” of 2015, these borders had garnered global 
attention due to another “crisis”: the global “financial” or “debt crisis”12 of the late 2000s, for which 
Greece was one of the epicentres, and which has been dictating internal fiscal and social policy since13. 
These successive, and intersecting, “crises” amplified the existing internal divisions between the 
European core and its periphery, and confirmed the country’s position as Europe’s “Other within”14. 
Both were followed by a third crisis (this time without quotation marks), the global health crisis of the 
2020 Covid-19 pandemic, which all but sealed the border. Following these crises, Greece, like many 
other countries along the European Southern periphery, is now a borderland: a liminal place between 
continents and vectors of movement; a testing ground for sovereign power; a post-colonial frontier15, 
for what has –not without debate- come to be called “Fortress Europe”. It is here, at the southern tip of 
the Balkan peninsula, that the threshold shoring up cultural-geographic binary divisions of West/East, 
North/South is most strenuously remembered and defended. It is also here that it is most permeable, 
and that borders are most volatile.  
 
                                                   
11 The increasing securitization and lethality of the world’s borders can be described as a form of shadow conflict. Critical migration 
scholars such as Nicholas De Genova and Frances Webber have described this contemporary condition as a “war on migration”. 
Francis Webber, “The War on Migration”, in Beyond Criminology: Taking Harm Seriously, ed. Paddy Hillyard (Ann Arbor MI: Pluto 
Press 2004). Similarly, Sandro Mezzadra and Maurice Stierl write of a “Mediterranean battlefield of migration”. Sandro Mezzadra, 
Maurice Stierl. “The Mediterranean Battlefield of Migration”, Open Democracy, April 2019, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/mediterranean-battlefield-migration/, accessed April 2019). 
12 I use quotation marks because this is a term which will not be taken for granted throughout this thesis, particularly when used 
to describe the movements of people fleeing conflict, poverty, or environmental degradation, or the structural, selective, recession 
of neoliberal capitalism. 
13 The struggles against austerity imposed by a “troika” of International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the 
European Commission, have been called “the Greek Spring”.  See Sandro Mezzadra “In the Wake of the Greek Spring and the 
Summer of Migration” South Atlantic Quarterly 117, no.4, (October 2018): 925–933. 
14 Stathis Kouvelakis, “Borderland, Greece and the EU’s Southern Question”, New Left Review, March-April, 2018, 
newleftreview.org/issues/II110/articles/stathis-kouvelakis-borderland, (accessed September 2018) 
15 Despite the two often being used interchangeably, the frontier is a radically different concept and spatial regime to that of the 
border. As the anthropologist Elizabeth Povinelli points out, “the frontier is a concept, not a place. It is a way of imagining space 
so that various things can be done there. It attempts to govern action and things therein by describing the nature of the region as 
the limit to settled law, sociality, and meaning.” On the frontier, Povinelli notes, “ruthless tactics are justified; the law can be 
suspended in relation to them”. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “Three Imaginaries of the Frontier with Illustrations”, Frontiers Imaginaries, 
http://www.frontierimaginaries.org/organisation/essays/the-imaginaries-of-the-frontier-with-illustrations, (accessed November 
2017). 
 15 
During the writing of this thesis alone, from 2016 to 2020, the border in question has undergone several 
transformations, and displacements. The signing of the infamous EU-Turkey deal in March 201616 
extended the border outwards – or “externalized” it - into Turkey, as it did inwards, to the numerous 
camps that were built in the Greek islands and mainland. In early 2019, the deployment of the first 
mission of the European Border and Coastguard Agency, Frontex, on non-EU soil, at the Albanian-
Greek border, with the purpose of preventing migrants from fleeing Greece via the western Balkan 
route, furthered this double bind. Months later, in February and March 2020, the deteriorating relations 
between the EU and Turkey over their mutual involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, and the long 
standing Greek-Turkish dispute over their territorial waters and contiguous zones at the Aegean Sea, 
led to a standoff between the two countries. Turkey declared the EU-Turkey deal defunct, opened its 
borders, and assisted asylum seekers to cross into Greece, therefore overtly instrumentalising them as 
pawns to a geopolitical tug-of-war. Greece, backed by the EU, declared this a “hybrid invasion” and 
deployed large numbers of police and military along the border. This confrontation lasted for several 
days, leading to ever more violent practices of border defence, which, as I will discuss, culminated with 
the killings of border crossers by the Greek armed forces. Hot on the heels of this standoff came the 
first wave of the coronavirus pandemic to effectively seal the border and render the state of emergency 
all but permanent; migrants were now a threat to public hygiene and were to be prevented from reaching 
Greek soil at all cost. As I write these lines, in late 2020, a new border fence is being erected on the 
Greek banks of Evros, a floating barrier is being designed to be installed in the Aegean, several new 
detention facilities are being built in the islands, and asylum seekers who arrive in Greek islands are 
being arrested by the Greek Coast Guard, put on life rafts and left in mid-sea to drift back to Turkey17.  
Like the virus, over these four years, the Greek borders have gradually mutated into a more deadly 
configuration: in the words of the EU commissioner Ursula von der Leyen, they are now Europe’s 
“shield”18.  
 
These successive, if accelerated, deformations of what is both the site and the subject of my research 
are not uncommon to scholars working on the consistently uneasy border areas. Interestingly, I found 
that even when I failed to wholly address these rapid changes in my writing, these usually came to 
corroborate the thesis, rather than throw it off balance. They emerged as instantiations of calculated 
power asymmetries that are deeply rooted in the histories and geographies of the region, ones that are, 
sadly, less contested than confirmed, and amplified, in times of emergency. This realisation called for 
an equally flexible approach to doing research, one that would be able to adapt along with the border 
                                                   
16 Under this deal, Turkey agreed to implement stricter border controls, in return for money in humanitarian aid and a promise to 
reopen talks of EU accession. Greece, in turn, was to accommodate the migrants that were -and still to this day are- stranded in 
its territory in camps (hotspots), and begin deportations to Turkey, which it thereby would recognise as a “safe third country”. See 
“EU-Turkey statement”, European council, March 18, 2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (accessed March 2016). 
17 I call these pushbacks-by-proxy “drift-backs”. 




and recalibrate its gaze to respond to constant shifts in focus, geographical but also temporal. 
 
To this effect, in this study, the social temporalities of the three aforementioned, recent and ongoing, 
“crises” of the past decade, are examined against the broader historical context of the last 100 years 
since the borders in question were demarcated, within which they are nested. I argue that the originary 
violence of border demarcation, and the equally violent practices that were subsequently deployed in 
order to foster cultural and ethnic homogeneity in border areas, contribute to the rendering of 
contemporary border environments into lethal frontier spaces. To theorize the residual effects of such 
unpast histories of state violence, I turn to the operative concept of “haunting”, or “ghosting”. In so doing, 
I follow the sociologist Avery Gordon, who uses the term to describe the way in which “abusive systems 
of power make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday life, especially when they are 
supposedly over and done with […] or when their oppressive nature is continuously denied”19.  
 
Both the contemporary and historical, in turn, exist within the wider geological, telluric, botanical, and 
marine times of the respective natural environments that host them: if a long enough temporal 
perspective is taken, what is known as ‘geological time’ or what Fernand Braudel would describe as the 
“longue durée”20 – an extended historical perspective that includes “the environment, topography, 
climate, and wind over centuries”21 –  land itself changes, and along with it, so do border lines.  
 
Scripted over mountain peaks, rivers and archipelagos, natural borders are therefore here understood 
not as immutable but in a state of continual becoming and transformation, constantly deforming, 
eroding, faulting, thrusting, subducting, moving laterally and vertically; folding. Some move faster, like 
the flow of Evros/Meriç river that carries sediment downstream, altering the banks and creating 
interstitial (is)lands over which Greece and Turkey lay equal claims and where migrants often find 
themselves abandoned by both border authorities. Some move slower, like the tectonic plates of Adria, 
Eurasia and Africa that collide under the Albanian-Pindos cordillera and the Aegean seabed, causing 
the mountains of Prespa to rise22, the landmasses of the Greek and Anatolian peninsulas to converge, 
and the island of Crete to drift South across the Libyan Sea and towards Africa at a pace of 4-5 
cm/year23. Others, like the liquid body of the Aegean Sea are in permanent periodical motion while 
rising, slowly but surely, along with the temperature of the planet. Excluding punctual geologic events, 
like volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and landslides, these movements leave little trace and are too slow 
for humans to perceive. Like the movements of the people that cross them, however, kinematics (as 
                                                   
19 Avery F. Gordon, “Some Thoughts on Haunting and Futurity” Borderlands 10 no. 2, (October 2011): 3. See also Avery Gordon, 
Ghostly matters: Haunting and the sociological imagination, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
20 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean.   
21 Eyal Weizman, Forensic Architecture, 253. 
22 Markos D. Tranos, et al, “Faulting Deformation of the Mesohellenic Trough in the Kastoria-Nestorion Region” Bulletin of the 
Geological Society of Greece 43, no.1, (January 2010).  
23 Crete is expected to touch the Cyrenaica in 5 to 6 million years. See Athanasios Ganas et al, “NOA faults: a digital database 
for active faults in Greece”, Bulletin of the Geological Society of Greece 47, no.2, (2013): 518-530.  
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geologists call them24) are accelerated by anthropogenic climate change. Increasingly nervous, these 
movements of the earth’s mantle put into question traditional “cartographic reason”25, unsettling notions 
of place, localness, territory26, and the very idea of “natural borders” as impermanent and immobile, as 
expressed by Rousseau in the opening quote of this introduction27.  
 
These different temporal scales and speeds of the border are “interrelated and convertible to one 
another”28, as violence. When they fold, I will show, borders produce events as slow as mountains, or 
as fleeting as waves, enforced disappearances, and shootings. 
 
 
iii. Border Agency: De-naturalizing Violence 
 
In response to such cross scalar and sequential expansions of contemporary borders, recent critical 
border scholarship has meticulously mapped the ways in which national boundaries bleed away from 
the demarcation “line”, or from the infrastructures – border markers, walls, fences, and checkpoints – 
that are used to enforce it. To be sure, the gesture of drawing a border line on a map remains a gesture 
of power and violence. However, lines - scholars propose - “convey a certitude not quite consonant with 
the messy reality of borderlands”29. National boundaries should instead be understood as porous and 
permeable “border zones”30, as “mobile, perspectival, and relational borderscapes”31, or as “regimes”: 
contested spatialities that are the result of “more or less ordered ensemble[s] of practices and 
knowledge-power complexes”32. Increasingly, the border is also understood to be produced in digital 
space. It inhabits the “cloud” as much as it inhabits the ground33, it becomes diffuse, invisible and 
portable - no longer localizable in one place of passage only but produced within urban and digital 
                                                   
24 Tranos et al, Faulting Deformation. 
25 Denis Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination. (Baltimore,MD:Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003)  
26 Doreen Massey, “Landscape as Provocation: Reflections on Moving Mountains”, Journal of Material Culture, 11 no.1-2, (July 
2006): 33-48. 
27 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de l'Abbé de Saint Pierre (1756), quoted in Peter Sahlins. 
“Natural Frontiers Revisited: France’s Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century”, The American Historical Review 95, no. 5 
(December 1990): 1423-1451. 
28 Weizman, Forensic Architecture, 114. 
29 Bhaskar Sarkar, “On no man’s (Is)land: futurities at the border”, Transnational Cinemas, 9 no.1, (June 2018): 47-67. 
30 Vassilis Tsianos et al.,” Transnational migration Theory and method of an ethnographic analysis of border regimes”, University 
of Sussex, Centre for Migration Research 55, (April 2009). 
31 Prem Kumar Rajaram & Carl Grundy-Warr, Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge, (Minneapolis 
MN: University of Minnesota press, 2007),10. 
32 Serhat Karakayali & Vassilis Tsianos “Border Regimes on the south-eastern border of Europe”, Melting Pot Europa, March 3, 
2005. www.meltingpot.org/Border-regimes-on-the-south-eastern-border-of-Europe.html#.X8kpSi2Q2K4, (accessed November 
2020) 
33 Louise Amoore, Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others, (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2020). 
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spaces through daily, mundane discourses and practices. Such a border is porous and elastic, it 
multiplies, and seeps into the performances and intimacies of daily life. It is through these increasingly 
flexible bordering processes, not lines, that bodies are excluded - stopped, delayed, detained, deported, 
made to die, or killed - on the world’s borders. And it is through these same processes that some, and 
not others, are often also included, yet always under specific conditions and subject to various 
hierarchies of power. While this critical scholarship offers a powerful ally and an invaluable point of 
departure for my thesis, it often overlooks, I argue, important questions regarding the physical 
experience of border crossings, and the material production (and deduction) of life on the edge of the 
nation state. 
 
Increasingly, borders are “implemented within a complex set of relations with “nature””34. Beyond 
shoring states off, border lines and fences assert a form of spatio-temporal control on mobility by making 
it “run through conduits”35 - chosen routes and environments whereby movement can be regulated and 
subjected to varying, designed, interactions with the natural elements. Long known, and felt, by border 
crossers, and operationalised by agencies tasked with border security, the materialities of border zones 
remain vastly less explored by academics and, to a degree, activists. As several operational documents 
show, most prominent among which is the US Border Patrol’s “Prevention Through Deterrence” policy36, 
border agencies meticulously study and mobilize the agency inherent in the natural elements at the 
border: the cold, choppy waves of the Aegean Sea; the fast-flowing waters of Evros; and the thick 
foliage, the beasts, the steep ridges of the Prespa mountains; or, beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
scorching heat of the Sahara and Sonora deserts and the punishing cold of the Balkan route, the Alps, 
and the Anatolian plateau between Turkey and Iran, to name a few. As the unfathomable (and 
underrepresentative) statistics of people dying of “natural causes” (such as drowning, exhaustion or 
hypothermia) in borders suggest, here, the spatial “relationship between politics and death”37 is 
reconfigured as a deep entanglement, whereby law, technology, military contingency planning and 
nature are drawn into violent, intentional assemblages, specifically designed to administer physical and 
mental harm at the border, and to hide its traces. 
Mediated by the natural elements, this is a violence that is often indirect. As the American 
anthropologist Jason De León notes within the context of his research in the Sonoran borderlands: 
“No one individual is responsible for it. Moreover, it often occurs out of sight, many portray it as 
                                                   
34 Hillary Cunningham, “Permeabilities, Ecology and Geopolitical Boundaries” in A Companion to Border Studies, ed. Thomas 
M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, (Hoboken NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2012), 371-384. 
35 Timothy Cresswell, On the move: Mobility in the modern western world, (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 49. 
36 the “Prevention Through Deterrence” programme makes explicit use of the harsh Sonora border terrain to deter migrants 
from crossing into US territory. The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), established in 2013, fuses 
meteorological, satellite and other cartographic data in order to ‘enhance situational awareness and improve the reaction 
capability of the Member States’. 
37 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics”, Public Culture 15, no.1, (January 2003): 11-40.  
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‘natural’ and it can easily be denied by state actors and erased by the (…) environment”38. In order to 
discuss, and de-naturalize, this violence, we need to take into account the different beings and 
processes through which it is articulated, but also the various velocities and rhythms it might be 
operating in. It requires that we broaden our spatio-temporal horizon and, as Shela Sheikh points out,  
that we reposition ourselves, philosophically, legally, politically and ethically, in the space between certain 
extremes, themselves built upon violent historical categorisations and exclusions: human/nonhuman, 
subject/object, culture/nature, physis/tekhnē, active/passive; the list goes on.39  
 
Such an undertaking requires that we reject dialectical boundaries and instead begin to think of power, 
and agency, as the product of lateral relations and collaborations between diverse human actors, forces, 
and discourses40, as well as what the French theorist Bruno Latour describes as actants, “sources of 
action that can be either human or nonhuman”41, such as geological formations, waves, plants, insects, 
animal species, or selves. As I will discuss in the thesis, when it comes to border death, very rarely is 
there a visible thread tying victim to perpetrator.  Consequently, border agency cannot be understood 
in linear terms. Instead, it must be theorized as a distributive, and spatially and temporally deep process, 
whereby “indirect forms of causality, multidimensional and distributed over extended spaces and time 
durations”42 act on border subjects, and crossers. Causality is here “more emergent than efficient, more 
fractal than linear. Instead of an effect obedient to a determinant, one finds circuits in which effect and 
cause alternate position and rebound on each other.”43 To account for such complex causal structures, 
the British/Israeli architect Eyal Weizman, before me, has proposed the term “field causality”: “an 
inherently spatial form of causality whose employment seeks to reconnect the multiple threads that 
linear juridical protocols have torn apart.” Such an understanding of causality is extremely relevant to 
my work. 
 
Saying that, I will also be conscious not to reproduce the dangerous argument that paints the border as 
a space of wilderness. No matter how non-hierarchical, cross-border movement is always subject to 
some degree of planning: neither border, nor nature operate independently. Border violence is therefore 
understood in this thesis not simply as an emergent effect of heterogeneous interactions, but also as 
the product of “deliberate efforts to endow things with new properties.”44, that is, the result of design. I 
                                                   
38 Jason De León, The Land of Open Graves, Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail, (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2015),16. 
39 Shela Sheikh, “Violence”, in Postuman Glossary, eds., Rosi Braidotti & Maria Hlavajova, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2018).  
40 Michel Foucault, “The subject and power”, Critical Inquiry 8, no.4, (Summer, 1982): 777-795. 
41  Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 232. 
42 Weizman, Forensic Architecture.  
43 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 33. 
44 Noortje Marres, ”Why Political Ontology Must Be Experimentalized: On Eco-Homes as Devices of Participation", Social Studies 
of Science 43, no.3, (April 2013): 417-43.  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will therefore discuss natural borders as “explicit contracts concluded with the natural world”45: nature 
here furthers the capacity for border patrol while deflecting culpability from the institutional and military 
bodies responsible.  
 
 
iv. Border Natures 
 
It is only through a small and emerging subfield within border studies (which the Canadian 
anthropologist Hilary Cunningham has called the “ecology-border nexus”46) that border and migration 
scholars have recently began to consider the involvement of more-than-humans in bordering processes. 
These scholars have brought environmental thinking in a productive dialogue with border studies, 
introducing terms such as “hybrid geography”47, “hybrid collectif”48, “border enforcement collective” or 
“nature-inclusive collective”49, “hostile terrain”50, “hostile environments”51, “landscape as space of moral 
alibi”52, “border ecologies”53, and “ecologies of power”54 to describe the geo-political agency of natural 
environments and their hybridisation and weaponisation (not exclusively) in border contexts. It is within 
this scholarship that I position my own enquiry. 
 
In my research, these hybrid boundary environments will be theorised as border natures. Crafted 
as a synthesis of nature, space, technology and law, and connecting actors as diverse as border 
authorities, fences, technologies of surveillance, political and legal orders, human and non-human forms 
of life - rivers, waves, mountains – border natures occupy a liminal position between states, mobilities, 
and species. They are the turning inside-out of natural borders; an inversal of the well-established socio-
military concept, to critically include the multiple human agencies, and their insidious use of ecological 
dynamics for the work of border defence. The change in order here is not incidental. Border comes 
                                                   
45 Michel Serres, The Natural Contract, translated by Elizabeth MacArthur and William Paulson (Ann Arbor MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1995), 44. Serres calls this “geopolitics in the sense of the real Earth”, physopolitics (from Greek word for nature, 
“physis”). 
46 Cunningham, “Permeabilities”. 
47 Sarah Whatmore “Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces”, Thousand Oaks 56, no.1, (CA: SAGE, 2002).  
48 Michel Callon, et al., “Agency and the Hybrid Collectif”, South Atlantic Quarterly 94, no. 2, (1995): 481–507.  
49 Juanita Sundberg, “Diabolic Caminos in the Desert and Cat Fights on the Río: A Posthumanist Political Ecology of Boundary 
Enforcement in the United States–Mexico Borderlands”. Annals of the American Association of Geographers 101, no.2, 
 (March 2011).   
50 De León, Open Graves. 
51 Lorenzo Pezzani, “Hostile Environments”, www.hostileenvironments.eu/hostile-environments/ (accessed October 2020) 
52 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Bare life: border-crossing deaths and spaces of moral alibi”, Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 29, no.4, (January 2011), 599-612. 
53 Joshua Bolchover and Peter Hasdell, Border Ecologies, Hong Kong's Mainland Frontier, (Basil: Birkhäuser 2016). 
54 Pierre Belanger, Alexander Arroyo, Ecologies of Power Countermapping the Logistical Landscapes & Military Geographies of 
the U.S. Department of Defence, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2016). 
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before nature, precisely to render audible and emphasise the ways in which bordering processes 
actively reconfigure natural environments. Rather than describing territorial limits as simply scripted 
over natural backdrops, border natures refer to the agency of nature in border assemblages but also, 
inversely, to the agency of borders in shaping natural worlds, and in affecting both human and non-
human forms of life, both directly and indirectly. When set next to each other, the two cross-pollinate to 
produce a potentially lethal hybrid. 
Border natures go against anthropocentric approaches that understand nature as passive or inert matter 
– “merely the receptacle for human strivings”55, but also sit uneasily with ecocentrist concepts that posit 
it as a separate realm that is entirely “external” to human society. Instead, with this term I propose a 
theoretical device that operates transversally across the natural and cultural domains56 to place human 
worlds and constructs - like borders - within nature, but “as one of its constituent parts, rather than 
subject to its transcendental laws”57. Returning to Rousseau with a critical attitude, therefore, 
boundaries scripted along geophysical features, and the “political orders” they engender, are here 
understood as never solely “the work of nature”. Rather, they form part of a collective within which both 
human and nonhuman communities intersect and interact. Borders are not “the work of”, but part of, 
nature.  
Border natures are complex, variegated socio-material assemblages. The nature nested within them is, 
as the American ecofeminist scholar Donna Harraway suggests, an intricate mesh where political, 
economic, technical, cultural, mythic and organic dimensions “collapse into each other in a knot of 
extraordinary density”58. Nevertheless, they inhabit a different kind of kinship to the one Harraway 
envisions. Border nature is “artifactual”59, to be sure, albeit one that includes more-than-humans in 
human configurations, only to integrate them into systems of spatial exclusion. Therefore, while 
recognizing the value of posthumanist and neo-materialist thought in conceptualising border agency as 
immanentist, rather than strictly dialectical, I am conscious not to lose sight of the human inputs and 
underlying logics and orders that, actively and purposefully, shape border environments.  
Coining the term, therefore, I argue for a wider, more inclusive and reflexive understanding of nature, 
one that accommodates the technological, the historical, the spatial, the biological and the socio-
atmospheric under the same operative concept. This is not a nature that is passive, but one which has 
the capacity to act within the border assemblage, and to record and represent these actions, and the 
                                                   
55 Bruce Braun, “Environmental Issues: Inventive Life”, Progress in Human Geography 32, no.5, (October 2018): 668. 
56 Felix Guattari, The Three Ecologies, (London: Continuum, 2007), 43. 
57 Bruce Braun, “Towards a New Earth and a New Humanity: Nature, Ontology, Politics” in A Critical Reader: David Harvey, ed. 
Noel Castree, Derek Gregory, (Hoboken NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 195.  
58 Haraway, “A Game of Cat’s Cradle: Science Studies, Feminist Theory, Cultural Studies”, Configurations 2, no.1, (Winter 1994): 
63.  
59 Donna Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Social Feminism in the 1980s”, in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed., Linda J. Nicholson, (London: Routledge 1990), 190–233. Harraway argues for a disaffiliation from 
human/non-human manichaeist divisions, and instead proposes forms of kinship that construct an “artifactual nature”, or 
“natureculture”. 
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routes that sovereign power takes along different frontier landscapes. In order to intercept these 
recordings, I employed a methodology that is equally polyperspectival and flexible, and is attuned to 
more-than-human border dwellers60, as it is to human stories and archives. Such a cross disciplinary 
and methodologically wide approach allowed me to engage with the spatial complexities that are 
involved in making and maintaining a border nature, and provided the tools to sense, and to represent, 
the violence it engenders. 
 
 
v. Methodology: Border Matters 
 
“There are lines of sedimentation, Foucault says, but also lines of ‘fissure’ and ‘fracture’. 
Untangling the lines of an apparatus means, in each case, preparing a map, a cartography, a 
survey of unexplored lands - this is what he calls ‘field work’. One has to be positioned on the 
lines themselves; and these lines do not merely compose an apparatus but pass through it 




The thesis is written from the “field” outwards. Standing on the Greek borders/European frontiers, a 
space that, as I have established, is located on the nexus of geopolitical vectors, and subject to constant 
and unannounced changes, I position myself “on the lines themselves”61: both those that demarcate 
the border, and those that cross and contest it. While located on specific ground (of water, for that 
matter), this is a research that is never simply local - it is only ever “hereish”62 - interrogating both the 
field itself, and the global dynamics that crush against it. In order to stay close to my research sites 
while, at the same time, remaining attuned to the leakages of power from, and through these sites, the 
research necessitated a constant shift between local and global scales, between current events and 
past histories, as well as between disciplines.  
 
My cross-border field research took me wherever the border reaches. My field practice therefore 
included experiences as diverse as trekking rocky cliffs littered with the remains of vessels in the 
                                                   
60 The American anthropologist Juanita Sundberg calls this a “more-than-human-methodology” Sundberg, 
“Diabolic Caminos in the Desert”, 2011.  
61 Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi, (London: Continuum, 2004), 338. 
62 In Povinelli’s words, “As we stretch the local across (…) seeping transits we need not scale up to the Human or the global, but 
we cannot remain in the local. We can only remain hereish”. Elizabeth Povinelli, Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism, 
(London and Durham: Duke University Press, 2016),13. 
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Aegean; driving through muddy dirt-roads to reach off-limits minefields and ad-hoc cemeteries along 
the Evros/Meriç river banks; scaling peaks, setting trap cameras along disused trails, and collecting 
botanical samples from abandoned villages in Prespa; visiting courtrooms, state archives, lawyers’ 
offices and flats in which migrants had temporarily settled in Athens. Naturally, it also involved crossing 
these borders several times to understand them in their full, cross-cultural complexity. These, it should 
be noted, are sites that I have known well, long before engaging in this research project. As many 
compatriots of mine, I have grown up sailing the Aegean Sea, and am well versed to its materialities 
and territorial complexities. I am also lucky enough to own a house in a village of Prespa by the Greek 
border with Albania, called Oxia. It is there that my interest in borders, and my dislike towards their 
enforcement, was first manifest - their presence, behind the ridge, always eminent-  and where this 
PhD was primarily written. My later involvement in social initiatives solidary with migrants arriving in 
Greece through the Aegean in 2015-16 furthered my understanding of the border regime and 
cemented this interest. Evros was somewhat more foreign to me, but even there I had travelled several 
times in the past. This research certainly drew from these past experiences, and it reconfigured my 





 between Greece and North Macedonia, at 2334 metres altitude. Photo by author, July 2020. 
 
Such an approach involves a physical encounter with the border which should, however, not be 
confused with the perils reserved for people who cross it forcefully and in conditions of utmost 
precarity. Nevertheless, it has frictions of its own. Despite my advantageous position as a Greek 
researcher, mostly placed on the “correct” side of the border, my physical presence in my sites of 
research was not always possible. I was often denied access to detention centres, police and border 
guard stations, or construction sites63. The shipwrecks that I research happened in waters that are off-
limits for civilian navigation and, for all my efforts, I was never permitted to visit one of the key locations 
                                                   
63 Tellingly, in my last visit in Evros region I was –reluctantly- granted entry to the migrant detention centre in Fylakio but was not 
allowed to enter the construction site of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline compression station in Kipoi, on the basis of safety concerns. 
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of my research in the Aegean, the island of Farmakonissi. The entire length of the Evros’s banks are 
inaccessible from the Greek side of the border, one only ever catches glimpses of the river while driving 
on the main road. During several of my field trips to these border zones, I was looked at with suspicion 
both by authorities and, sometimes, locals. One is not supposed to wander around in border zones 
(“here, it’s the border” I was constantly reminded), much less in a black 4x4 that I happen to be driving. 
This urged me to find alternative entry points. Entanglements of borders with nature often offered a 
way in. Parts of the Evros Delta, a designated wetland and famous bird watching site, are tentatively 
accessible to naturalists. There, bird watching towers and military lookout points emerge from the 
trees. It is also not uncommon for bird watchers or hunters to stumble upon migrants’ decomposed 
bodies. Similarly, in Prespa, trails that lead to the border are frequented by hikers, botanists, 
ornithologists, migrants and border guards alike. The few times I met border patrols in both sites, I 
pretended to be photographing wildlife and, for the most part, I was telling the truth. There was never 
much else to photograph. To respond to this disproportionate abundance of non-human life at the 
border, I explored means of gathering testimony that range beyond language, which I found that, when 
not altogether absent, can be malleable in border contexts, often skewed in media and historical 
portrayals of events, and undermined in legal and political forums. Similarly, built border architectures, 
like walls and barracks, were often relegated to the back of my visual practice, while in the foreground 
were precisely the natural elements that are harvested for their ability to turn border zones into death 
fields.  
 
To this effect, along with the research work I conducted with migrants, lawyers, and human rights 
organizations I also formed alliances with organizations and scientists64 that study the environment, 
and consulted relevant studies, in order to understand the physical processes (such as flood, river 
flow, vegetal growth, wave and current behaviour) that are involved in the making of each of the 
different border natures I am investigating. These collaborations also allowed me to gain access, both 
physically and digitally (through cartographic material, transboundary environmental legislation, data 
on animals’ migratory routes and vegetation patterns etc.), into less visible areas of my sites. Last, and 
perhaps most important, they informed my understanding of border matters –plants, alluvial sediment, 
waves- as evidence.  
 
I also pursued more traditional forms of historical, archival and ethnographic work, drawing from an 
extensive scholarship, and conducting semi-structured, both formal and informal, interviews with 
governmental and non-governmental institutional employees, border crossers, local inhabitants, 
attorneys, journalists, and fellow activists and scholars. During these interviews, I focused as much on 
the ‘hard’ information and situated knowledges that were provided by interviewees, as I did on the 
more nuanced kinds of information, that which is often not said, and which I tried to unearth and 
                                                   
64 I am particularly indebted to the Oceanographer Dr Richard Limeburner, for his drift analysis of the Agathonissi shipwreck, and 
Bottanist Fanourios-Nikolaos Sakellarakis, for joining me in the botanic survey of the ruins of Sfika/Besfina village, in Prespa. 
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triangulate through other areas in my fieldwork. My archival research involved obtaining and engaging 
a rich body of literature and imagery which was produced for operational purposes. These include 
protocols of territorial organisation (such as international and bilateral treaties, legislations for land use 
and civilian access) military reports, as well cartographic information, photographs, operational plans, 
contracts and tenders, most of which I obtained through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests.  
 
I intended for my critical spatial to be equally broad. This is a practice that is concerned with the spatial 
imaging of traces of state violence as this registers on the non-built border environment. For each part 
of the thesis, I adopted a different approach that corresponds to the requirements, and limitations, of 
each site. In my enquiry into the borders of Prespa, the practice takes the form of documentary 
filmmaking, camera trapping, archaeology, three-dimensional imaging, and botany. Faced with the 
erasure of historical traces and human witnesses, I turn to the natural environment to narrate the 
troubled border histories of the region. For my work in Evros/Meriç, I consider tools through which to 
circumvent the limitations to visual representation imposed by the border regime. With a military buffer 
zone restricting access to the river border for academics far and wide, including conservation 
scientists, I consider oblique ways of sensing the border without ever accessing it. These include 
practices as diverse as collecting sound recordings of the river’s ambient, militarized, acoustics, as 
well as hydrophone recordings of its tributaries65, recorded interviews with locals who, in one way or 
another, are involved in the maintenance of the border regime, and slow-motion drive-by videos 
documenting border infrastructures. I also draw heavily from the practice of Forensic Architecture, 
where I am leading a series of investigations into incidents of profound border violence in the region. 
These collaborative investigations, which are, in turn, informed by my personal research, are not 
submitted here as part of my practice. For my last research site, I fuse archival and field research, 
documentary filmmaking, remote sensing technologies, and cartography, to produce a report which 
reconstructs the events that preceded and followed the deadly shipwreck of a vessel carrying migrants 
in the Aegean Sea. In keeping with techniques developed by the Forensic Oceanography research 
project, I develop a “disobedient gaze”66 to monitor the remote workings of border agencies patrolling 
the maritime border, and to produce visual and cartographic evidence around which to forge legal claims 
in support of survivors.  
 
These different approaches are all connected by a common thread: The subverting of border 
surveillance technologies, like satellite photography, motion triggered cameras, maps and 
meteorological reports, in order to sense and visualise material and other more-than-human processes 
as both causative agents and mnemonic devices for border violence.  
 
                                                   
65 Hydrophone recordings were a central part of Ifor Duncan’s practice, with whom I visited Evros in 2019 and co-authored the 
respective chapter. 
66 Charles Heller, et al., “Disobedient Sensing and Border Struggles at the Maritime Frontier of Europe”, Spheres: Journal for 
Digital Cultures 4, (2017). 
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Here, by way of parenthesis, I need to acknowledge a danger that lurks in my choice of research 
methods, and vocabulary choices: directing the gaze to the terrain, rather than the human histories that 
cross and inhabit it, can serve to further displace personal stories and subjectivities in an environment 
that is already hostile to human testimony. Similarly, to speak of, “border natures” in the context of 
contemporary migration, risks reproducing the dangerous discourse that dehumanizes people on the 
move, describing them as “alien”, or “sheep” (koyun - as migrants are often referred to by smugglers in 
turkey)67 to be run by “coyotes” (slang for smugglers on the US-Mexico border), moving in “waves”, 
“floods” and “surges”, and intercepted by RABITs (the acronym for Frontex “Rapid Border Intervention 
Teams”). Such a blurring of people with the natural terrains they inhabit (or in this case, cross) is a well-
researched trope that has historically served to rationalise racism and justify colonial regimes. To say 
that this is not my intention is an understatement. On the contrary, I intend to demonstrate how the 
“wilderness” to which migrants are often directed, and physical processes like floods and waves, are 
carefully designed across time and space to be used against mobility.  
While aligning myself with an array of scholars that understand migration as a movement ‘that 
possesses knowledge, follows its own rules, and collectively organises its own praxis’68, I also strongly 
believe that the numerous people who appear in my study don’t need their stories told on their behalf. 
As Astrida Neimanis points out, “no representation would ever be adequate to the entity represented” 
69. For Neimanis, Eduardo Kohn70, and a number of posthumanist scholars, the same is true for non-
human entities too. However, this is a visual practice that I am engaging with, precisely tasked with 
representing the different scales of border violence. Between choosing not to represent or not to 
engage, I choose to represent. At the very least, however, I am conscious at all times of the politics 
produced by my representational attempts. Representation, in my writing and practice is the product of 
a constant negotiation between notions of transparency, opacity71, and obscurity. As I will demonstrate, 
borders demand silence from those who inhabit and enforce them. They rely on the erasure of certain 
“unruly” populations and subjects, an erasure which is often predicated on race, national identity, or 
ethnicity. On the other hand, being visible on the border often equals being subject to systems of 
knowledge, power and, ultimately, to indexing, incarceration and deportation. Reflecting on this double-
edged condition, rather than claiming to ‘shed light’ on the concealed territories I research, I try to 
mediate it, so that it can penetrate some surfaces – particularly those obscured by state practices - 
while leaving others opaque. This kind of condition requires critical visual practitioners to look for means 
                                                   
67 Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis Tsianos, “The Autonomy of Migration: The Animals of Undocumented Mobility”, in 
Deleuzian Encounters: Studies in Contemporary Social Issues ed. Anna Hickey-Moody and Peta Malins. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
68 Dimitris Papadopoulos et al., “After citizenship: autonomy of migration, organisational ontology and mobile commons”, 
Citizenship Studies, 17, no.2, (April 2013): 178-196. 
69 See Astrida Neimanis, “No Representation without Colonisation? (Or, Nature Represents Itself)”, Somatechnics 5, no. 2, 
(Autumn 2015): 135-153. 
70 Eduardo Kohn, How Forests Think, Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University 
of California Press, 2013), 84. 
71 for “the right to opacity” see Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, (Chicago: University of Michigan Press,1997).  
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of procuring images of border violence, and founding political claims that go beyond the stereotypical 
portrait of the “vulnerable” refugee72. This is precisely why I argue that it is by foregrounding and 
“contaminating” natural processes, while at the same time relegating the more visible manifestations of 










fig.3. Boats and life vests used in migrant crossings aggregating on the shores of Agathonissi island. Photo by 
author, May 2018. 
 
 
vi. Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis is organised in three different parts: part I: Ghost Habitats. Prespa/Prespa/Prespës: A 
Border, Wilded, part II: Anáchoma. Weaponising a River: The case of the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa and part 
                                                   
72 In a previous text, I have referred to this condition of visuality as nyktopolitics, the politics of the night (Nyx). See Embassy for 
the Displaced, “Nyktopolitics”, The Photographers’ Gallery, May 2017, unthinking.photography/articles/nyktopolitics.  
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III: Grey Rocks, Black Waves. The Aegean: A Border Archipelago. I organize the different chapters 
thematically, but also in relation to the geographical and material qualities they explore. The thesis 
follows an altitudinal structure, from the alpine meadows and the abandoned, forested villages on the 
ridges of Prespa, down the course of the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa river, to the surface, and seabed, of the 
Aegean Sea. This is a trajectory that is dictated by the different voluminous configurations of the border 
itself. Travelling downhill, I interrogate natural/legal processes that are involved in boundary 
demarcation, like the “watershed”, which deems that borders follow the catchment of mountain 
streams, or the “thalweg”, “accretion”, and “avulsion”, central to the legal heredity of boundary 
demarcation along rivers, all the way to the “territorial waters”, and the “contiguous” and “exclusive 
economic zones” which carve territories out the ocean’s surface and abyss. Importantly, from 
mountain, to river, to archipelago, this structure is also designed to highlight the different geo-physical 
elements that forge border natures, and render them hostile for certain crossers and border subjects.  
The first part of the thesis, Ghost Habitats, ventures to the mountainous, cross-border area of the 
Prespa lakes, and the trilateral nature reserve that spans across Greece, Albania, and the Republic of 
North Macedonia, to research the ecological and historical processes that are involved into the gradual 
construction of what is today referred to as a “green border”73. Divided into four sections, The Ridge: 
Crumbling Impermanence, The Forest in Clouds, (P)lethe: The Village, and “Udhë Ujk”: The Wolf Trail, 
the text follows the border downhill, from the ridgeline to the lake, to unearth traces of the violent 
processes that were central to its construction at the turn of the 20th century and which, I argue, still act 
on it today. Following animals that appear before a series of trail cameras that I have installed in different 
locations inside the park, I engage with more-than-human forms of witnessing to explore how the 
layered histories of the region shape contemporary border practices, like the “circular” migrations from 
Albania to Greece, the recent “Prespa Agreement”, the “Balkan route” and the trilateral park. 
Conversely, I also probe the ways in which the delineation and enforcement of borders along natural 
environments reconfigures regional ecosystems, to understand how these are eventually rendered into 
“wild” frontiers, subject to different legal orders and methods of policing than the remainder of sovereign 
territory.  
 
The second part, Anáchoma, focuses on the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa river border between Greece, Turkey, 
and Bulgaria. The text (co-authored with Ifor Duncan) is structured in four main sections which follow 
the shifting geography of the river from the Rila mountains in Bulgaria to its discharge in the Aegean 
Sea: Tributaries: Six Flooded Graves, The Main Course: A Fluvial Frontier, The Floodplain: An Ecology 
of Exception, and The Delta: Night, Fog and Mud. Following the river downstream, we trace the ways 
in which the Evros floodplain has been rendered into a trench74 against Turkish expansion, political 
“contamination” from the former socialist state of Bulgaria, and more recently, against migrants and 
                                                   
73 The term “green border” refers to “natural” border areas which are unpopulated. The term will be unpacked further in Part I: 
Ghost Habitats. 
74 As I will discuss, anáchoma is the Greek word for embankment. 
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refugees seeking to reach the European north. Set against current migratory movements, the river is 
examined for its twofold function as an apparatus of killing, deterrence, and obfuscation, as well as a 
body which records, stores, and occasionally reveals this violence through seasonal shifts in its 
hydrological cycle. Through this enquiry, the fluvial frontier emerges as a space where seemingly 
contradicting elements like conservation, transboundary river management, military technology, the 
geopolitics of resource logistics, and border crossing, calculatedly coexist to enforce a condition of 
ecological exception where the state acts in violent excess. 
 
The third, and final part of the thesis, titled Grey Rocks, Black Waves, examines the maritime border of 
the Aegean Sea. Through a close analysis of two deadly shipwrecks of vessels carrying migrants from 
Turkey to Greece, the Aegean archipelago is interrogated for its dense history and materiality, and for 
the effect these have on contemporary conceptions of territory, security, and agency. This is pursued 
through two main sections. The first section, Grey Rocks, maps the two shipwrecks against genealogies 
of state-sanctioned violence in this maritime region, to situate and discuss migration, detention and 
death in the Aegean in their full historical depth. The second section, Black Waves, interrogates the 
ways in which this interstitial and historically charged materiality is mobilized as a defensive 
infrastructure within the context of contemporary migration at sea. I enquire into the manoeuvres in 
which the very matter of the archipelago is enlisted to perform the work of border enforcement, and 
reflect on a spatial and visual practice that attempts to decode this matter to reveal traces of state 
violence. As I maintain throughout the thesis, I argue that the Aegean border functions less as a line on 
the sea and more as an ecology, one that is enforced through law and military strength, as it is through 
















 “Any movement needs to investigate their territory, interrogate their ghosts 
and uncover the repressed memories and stories” 








 “Hello India”. An international calling card, March 2019. Photos by author. 
 
Pictured is an international prepaid calling card for five euros. Such cards are common with migrants 
who live in Greece and want to call their families and friends abroad. I would normally not think twice 
about this card, had I not found it burried inside a tunnel dating back to the 1945-1949 Greek Civil War, 
in the mountains of Prespa/Prespa/Prespës75, near the Greek borders with Abania and North 
Macedonia. The tunnel had been dug by communist partisans, possibly to store their ammunition, and 
keep it from being damaged during air raids. Given that this tunnel had not been unearthed before (at 
least not recently - I located it following testimony from locals and patterns on the ground and dug it 
open with a shovel), it is unclear how this card made it there. Could it have been carried there by the 
wind and rain until it seeped through a small hole on the ground? I don’t think so, the card was not 
found by the entrance, but well inside the tunnel. Could a small animal - a fox or a weasel perhaps – 
have carried it there thinking it was an interesting object to take back to its nest? More likely. The 
question that I am most interested in, however, is not how the card got there, but what kind of 
movements, and ghosts, it conjures. What was this card doing in this forest in the first place? Why are 
there tunnels in the mountain? 
 
As I will discuss in this chapter, and as the story of the card shows, the region of Prespa is one where 
borders meet and histories layer. Split between three sovereign territories, Prespa76 has, like so many 
                                                   
75 The region is called “Prespa” both in Greek and Macedonian, and “Prespës” in Albanian. 




other “shatter zones”77 of the Balkans long been a space of conflicts. These, however, are not conficts 
that are past and gone. On the contrary, I will argue, they remain very much alive, and continue to 
shape the spatialities of the region to this day. From the mass Albanian migrations of the 1990s; to the 
opening of the “Balkan Corridor” in 2015, and its subsequent closing and shifting westwards, through 
Prespa, with the EU-Turkey deal in 2016; to the “Prespa Agreement” between Greece and North 
Macedonia in 2018 (all of which I will unpack in this part of the thesis), Prespa holds a central, if less 
celebrated, position among Europe’s borderlands. 
 
Because of these layered histories, and the conflicting narratives, and silences, that these produce, this 
is also a region for which not much has been written outside of the official historical archives. To unearth 
the more nuanced histories of Prespa, and their present mutations, one needs to look closely at the 
landscape. Only then, I will show, do the traces of border struggles begin to reveal themselves.  
 
Scattered at different altitudes within this landscape are a series of motion-triggered “trail”, or “trap” 
cameras, which I have installed. I will use these cameras to move between different locations in the 
basin – a ridge, a forest, an abandoned village, and a trail - to enquire into the forces – ecological, 
cultural, legal, and military - that converge over the landscape of Prespa to render it into a “green”, or 
“wild”, border in the eyes of the authorities. To trouble this dominant narrative, in this text I will read the 
landscape against a limited, but rich, historical and ethnographic bibliography. I will also bring in the 
voices of people who live here, pressed up against the border, as well as the movements of its more-
than-human inhabitants who ignore it, but are, I will argue, conditioned by it. Crucially, I will consult the 
expertise of environmental scientists, with whom I will trek along the border line in search of non-
discursive traces of violence. 
 
 
The tunnel inside which the card was found, March 2019. Photos by author. 
                                                   














A black redstart lands on border pyramid !"#
!




At an altitude of 2334m, a black redstart78 is trying to balance itself against the wind. As it lands on an 
eroding concrete block marked !"#
!
,  with its back turned towards the trail camera, its right wing flaps in 
Northern Macedonia, its left in Greece. The bird is bisected by the 256.13 kilometre-long border line 
that runs along the ridge and cuts across the hostile, alpine terrain of mount Varnountas/Baba79.  
 
On Greek territory, mount Varnountas has twelve peaks above 2000 metres, the 2334 metre 
Despotiko/Kitchevo, where the bird is trying to land, being its highest80. Below it, at an elevation of 
approximately 850 metres, and shared between the three littoral countries are the two Prespa lakes, 
Greater and Lesser Prespa, the highest tectonic water bodies in the Balkans. The lakes are connected 
to each other by a narrow isthmus, and surrounded by more mountains - Tsoutsouli, Devas and Mali i 
Thatë/Galičica to the West and Triklarion to the south - which define their 1300 square kilometre 
                                                   
78 Phoenicurus ochruros, identified by the ornithologist Thanos Kastriniotis. 
79 The mountain is called Varnountas in Greek, and Baba in Macedonian. When cross-border terrain features are mentioned in 
the text, I will use all the placenames in the languages spoken on the respective side of the border. When I refer to a specific 
location, in a specific moment in history, I will use only the name it has in the territory where it falls at the respective moment. 




catchment basin81. Along with the neighbouring lake Ochrid, into which they drain via karst channels, 
the Prespa lakes are considered by geologists to be the oldest tectonic lakes in Europe. As such, they 
host high numbers of endemic fresh-water species, including plants, invertebrates and fish. Due to their 
rich waters, combined with their location on a transitional climatic and geographic zone between the 
limits of Mediterranean and Central Europe, the lakes are a meeting point for avifauna, hosting the 
largest colony of Dalmatian Pelicans in the world and attracting species from diverse latitudes. The 
transitional climate, the geological composition, and the major altitudinal variations in the Prespa basin 
are also responsible for an equally wide diversity of plant communities in the catchment, ranging from 
alpine and subalpine meadows above the treeline, montane conifer forests and deciduous forests below 
1800 metres, mixed broadleaf and deciduous oak forests below 1400 metres and reedbeds and wet 
meadows in the littoral zone82. As I will discuss, this altitudinal diversity and enclosed morphology of 
the area83, and its liminal geographic, geological and climatic location, intertwine with the complex 
history of the region as a borderland to make Prespa a biodiversity “hotspot”84. 
Partitioned along the three sides of the border are four different national parks, one in Greece and 
Albania respectively, and two in Northern Macedonia85. In February 2000, the Prime Ministers of 
Albania, Greece, and the (then) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) agreed to establish 
Prespa as the first transboundary protected area in the Balkans86. The lakes are also protected by the 
1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands as well as the NATURA 2000 European Ecological Network, 
and were declared the 14th Transboundary Biosphere Reserve in the world by UNESCO in 2014.  
As the need for cross-border conservation efforts suggests, the slightest movement in the Prespa basin, 
animal or material, entails the crossing of national boundaries87. The same is often true for humans. 
Indeed, during my own ascents to the summit to set up my cameras, I continually zig-zagged between 
the two countries following trails carved in the alpine vegetation by high-altitude-dwelling animals. Apart 
from a few border markers (also referred to as “pyramids”) scattered every few hundred metres among 
                                                   
81 Konstantinos Panagiotopoulos, et al., “Vegetation and Climate History of the Lake Prespa Region Since the Lateglacial”, 
Quaternary International, (2012): 1-13. 
82 More than 1800 plant species and subspecies have been recorded in the Prespa basin, making it a hotspot for phytodiversity 
in Europe and the Balkan peninsula. See Sakellarakis, F.N. et al, Flora of Prespa area database, NW Greece, Hellenic Botanical 
Society Congress, Athens. 
83 According to the most widely held belief concerning the origin of the name “Prespa” (from the latin “praespe” which means 
“manger”) this morphology is also responsible for the name of the basin. 
84 Norman Myers et al., “Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities”. Nature 403, (2000): 853-858. 
85 The respective “Prespa National Parks” in Greece and Albania and the “Pelister” and “Galicica National Parks” in northern 
Macedonia.  
86 This agreement was further ratified in 2010, and a trilateral coordination committee was established to undertake conservation 
efforts on all three sides of the border simultaneously. For an example of cross-border collaboration in conservation efforts in 
Prespa see Giorgos Katsadorakis, et al., “Waterbirds Wintering at the Prespa Lakes as Revealed by Simultaneous Counts in the 
Three Adjoining Littoral States”, Macedonian Journal of Ecology and Environment 15, no. 1. (2013): 23-32. 
87 The axiom, common among conservationists, that animals do not respect borders has necessitated the creation of a sub-
discipline in conservation called “movement ecology”. See Nathan Ran, “An Emerging Movement Ecology Paradigm”, PNAS 105 
no.49, (December 2008): 19050-19051. Cross-border movements of certain protected animal species are also known to 
complicate the work of border enforcement. In the US-Mexico border, holes were made in the fence to allow for the endangered 




the slopes, I found little material evidence to demarcate the limits of the nation-state on the ridge. In the 
absence of fences, checkpoints, or official border crossing stations to either Albania or Northern 
Macedonia within the basin88, the borders of Prespa are often elusive to the untrained eye.  
I placed the first of my motion-triggered cameras on the ridge to document these ecologies of cross-
border movement. Of the videos captured, none provided a better metaphor for the complex 
interractions between human infrastructure, environmental forces and the agency of non-human life 
that act upon the border, and which I will explore in this part of the thesis, more accurately than a beech 
marten scent-marking its territory on the border pyramid - the marker of territory par excellence. For the 





A beech marten scent-marking border pyramid !"#
!
. Video still, full video available online at vimeo.com/490208957/d76959c919.
                                                   
88 The nearest crossing stations to Albania and Macedonia are on the other side of the mountains, in Krystallopigi-Kapshtice 




1.1.2. Drawing the line 
 
Mountains have historically been looked to by military cartographers tasked with drawing the contours 
of nation states. Beyond their significance as physical barriers, peaks have also been conscripted by 
nationalist imaginaries as sublime symbols for the nation to assert its “natural right to territory”89. 
Reflecting specifically on the delimitation of the northern borders of Greece, in the capacity of Vice 
Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Greek Civil War, Panagiotis Pipinelis90, suggested that 
geophysical and spiritual criteria should be preferred over questions of national identity. “The human 
factor represented by the inhabitants”, Pipinelis argues, “is usually of a transitory and unstable 
character.” Instead, the nation should be built on the basis of “geography, nature, the spirit of the 
inhabitants (…) the living past of countless centuries”91. Growing sceptical of the attainability of cultural 
homogeneity at the country’s newly annexed, northern, territories, Pipinellis instead proposed the 
imaginary of the “natural border” as a mythic space, endowed with natural powers and transcendental, 
spiritual qualities. As I will discuss in this section, however, the maintenance of a “natural” mountain 
border is somewhat of a less straightforward process, only as impermanent as the mountain itself.  
 
When their physical and material qualities are examined, mountains emerge as more than merely 
passive receptacles for state sovereignty and national mythologies. Rather, they are inhospitable, hard 
to access spaces for the state apparatus, their voluminous, and geographically difficult terrain long 
offering “a refuge from soldiers”92, as Fernand Braudel notes93. Indeed, throughout history, mountain 
communities have decidedly eschewed state governance, inviting the (not always peaceful) 
coexistence of diverse ethnicities, languages and other cultural practices94. Such was the case of 
Prespa, and mountainous Macedonia at large, until the early 20th century.  
 
Under the the Ottomans, the mountains of Prespa “fell within the agrapha, the “unrecorded lands” too 
                                                   
89 Kenny Cupers, “Governing Through Nature: Camps and Youth Movements in Interwar Germany and the United States”, 
Cultural Geographies 15, no. 2, (2008): 173-205. 
90 Pipinelis, a former senior conservative Greek politician and diplomat, served as Greece’s ambassador in Budapest and Sofia, 
before he was made Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Civli War. In the 50s he was Greece’s representative in NATO. 
He later served as interim Prime Minister in 1963 and as a Minister of Foreign Affairs for the military dictatorship of 1967-74. 
91 Panagiotis Pipinelis, Europe and the Albanian Question, (New York: Greek Government Office of Information, Culture, 
Civilization, and Demarcation at the Northwest Borders of Greece), p.35, quoted in Laurie Kane Hart, “Culture, Civilization, and 
Demarcation at the Northwest Borders of Greece”, American Ethnologist 26, no.1, (1999): 196-220. 
92 Braudel offers the example of the Kutzo-Vlachs who, “nimble as mountain goats” led a nomadic existence over what he calls 
the “free spaces in the Balkans, from Galicia to Serbia and the Aegean Sea”. See Braudel, Mediterranean, 31 
93 Braudel, Mediterranean, 32-33. For Braudel, the history of mountains is “to have none”. Though valid for certain cases, this 
view that holds all cultures that live in the shadow of the state as lacking history is a dangerous simplification that has allowed 
states to conveniently erase and claim populations at will. 
94 James Scott’s work is seminal in this regard. See James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). The Greek writer Akis Gavriilidis attempts a direct reading of Scott 
against the context of Macedonia in his text “Macedonicity as an Art of Not Being Governed”, November 5, 2016, 




rugged for imperial tax collectors”95. As the Greek anthropologist Lenio Myrivili notes in her seminal 
treaty on the borderlands (and lakes) of Prespa, The Liquid Border, during the final decades of Ottoman 
rule, Macedonia “was the last space in Europe where different and overlapping ethnic, religious and 
linguistic worlds coexisted under the ecumenical auspices of a deteriorating Empire”96. A true example 
of what the American political scientist James C.Scott calls a “shatter zone”97, after the retreat of the 
Ottoman empire at the turn of the 20th century, the region was claimed by six different nation-states 
(Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Turkey, Albania and, to a lesser extent, Romania). In Myrivili’s words again, 
“’Macedonia’ was being claimed and reclaimed as land, history, and people, as cradle of at least three 
civilizations, and as part of the newly formed nation-states surrounding it.”  
It was only in 1913, in the wake of the successive Balkan Wars, when the former Ottoman region of 
Macedonia was divided between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria in Bucharest98 that the first “lines” were 
sketched on its ridges, but these were quickly rendered obsolete by the Great War that followed. Due 
in part to the war, but also to the geographic and cultural complexity of the region, the borders of Prespa 
(both with Serbia and with Albania, wich I will discuss later in this chapter) were left unresolved until 




Conflicting territorial claims after the end of the Balkan wars. Prespa is annotated with a Green box. Source: Wikipedia. 
 
                                                   
95 Rozita Dimova, “The Hollow Signifier “Prespa”: Some Reflections in the Lake, the Agreement, and the State”, In Macedonia 
and Identity Politics After the Prespa Agreement ed Vasiliki P. Neofotistos. (London: Routledge, December 2020). “Agrapha” 
literally translates as “unwritten”, not registered by the state logs. 
96 Myrivili, E. “The Liquid Border: Subjectivity at the Limits of the Nation State in Southeast Europe”, (PhD diss., Columbia 
University, 2004), 71. 
97 Scott speaks of “shatter zones”, geographically and materially diverse areas like “mountains, marshland, swamps and steppes, 
and deserts”, where “pattern[s] of state-making and state-unmaking produced, over time, a periphery that was composed as 
much of refugees as of peoples who had never been state subjects”. See Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 6-9. 






During the Great War, the Allied and Central powers met over the ridge. In anticipation of the confrontation, the French army, 
which administered Prespa between 1913 and 1919, dug a network of trenches on the mountain which are still visible today 
and, ironically, run parallel, if zig zag, with the border. Before the border was officially demarcated, it was etched on the 






The line was finally demarcated on the rigde as late as 1930, when a joint Greco-Yugoslav committee 
installed 177 large pyramids, 503 smaller pyramids, and 695 landmarks99 along the entire length of the 
border. From number 166 onwards, the line scales the slopes of Mt.Varnountas/Baba, before it is 
immersed in the waters of Greater Prespa Lake at pyramid 177, and from there, 11.4 kilometres later, 
it reaches the trilateral border between Greece, North Macedonia, and Albania. My first camera is 




As the decaying pyramid facing the camera suggests, in this hostile terrain, the maintainance of border 
markers and geodesic elements that are necessary to measure and represent the border is a near 
impossible task100. Each year, from November to June, the markers, 1.5m at their tallest, are hidden 
under metres of snow. Ice creeps into the concrete and the expanding water causes the markers to 
erode, break and fall. Originally made from boulders collected from the area and cast with cement, 
these symbols of the impermanence of borders eventually become indiscernible from the mountain, 
and the border itself illegible on the ground101. On harsh winters, the lakes below also freeze, and the 
buoys that have from time to time been installed as floating border markers102 are destroyed under the 
pressure of the ice. The violent seasonal changes and glacial processes that are typical of mountainous 
terrain therefore trouble “the triangulating logic central to the cartographic endeavour”103, in the case of 
Prespa hiding and damaging the landmarks that were built to measure the state.  
 
And yet, it is these same glacial processes that offered themselves for the delimitation of the border in 
the first place. When the snow melts in late sping and early summer, and the border is legible again on 
the back of the mountain, cold streams start running down the slopes and ravines. These streams define 
the “watershed” line (the line that follows the river catchments, which does not always coincide with the 
ridgeline) that the joint committee designated as the border. However counterintuitive, this legal-
cartographic concept is common in the delimitation of mountain borders, for reasons to do with states’ 
                                                   
99 The border line was first agreed upon five years earlier, in 1925, with the “Florence Protocol”. Following the signing of the 
protocol, a joint Greco-Yugoslav border demarcation committee was set up in March 1927. The demarcation work finished in 
1930. 
100 In the past 70 years, the markers were only maintained twice: in 1958, to repair damages caused by the wars, and in 1984, 
when the 177 pyramids were complemented with 2366 smaller ones and 18 floating buoys in Prespa lake, 1.5m tall each, which 
are today gone. See the Hellenic Army Geographical Society, “Κατάλογος Γαιωδετικών Στοιχείων των Μεθοριακών Σημάτων 
της Γραμμής των ελληνο-Γιουγκοσλαβικών Συνόρων [Catalogue of Geodesic Elements and Border Markers along the Greek-
Yugoslav Border]”, date of publication unknown. 
101 To anticipate permanent damage of border markers, the foundations of these pyramids would usually be laid with coal. If the 
pyramid is destroyed, the coal is exposed to humidity and rain, painting the soil around it black, and, with it, drawing the border 
on the ground. See Elias Dimitrakopoulos, “Τα Χερσαία Σύνορα της Ελλάδας [The Land Borders of Greece]”, (PhD diss., 
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 1986), 48. 
102 As the lake border transitions from liquid to solid, new cross-border routes open as well, while the operating capacity of 
patrol boats is effectively neutered. 
103 Francesca Hughes, “Inequalities of Ice: Francesca Hughes on the Seductions of Measure”, in ed. Marco Ferrari, Elisa 










A fragment from a type II border pyramid, July 2020 (left). Photo by author. Different types of border pyramids used to 
demarcate the Greek-Yugoslav border (right). Source: Dimitrakopoulos, “The Land Borders of Greece”, 1986. 
 
Upon its demarcation, the border intersected different linguistic and ethnic groups that inhabited Prespa 
at the turn of the previous century: Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs, Ottomans, and, overwhelmingly, people 
who self-identified as ethnic Macedonians105, or dopioi (locals)106. In so doing, it forced the nation-state 
upon populations who had until then maintained an ambiguous and fluid ethnic designation, abruptly 
separating families who inhabited villages on either side of the ridge107.  
 
Myrivili describes this process of state expansionism over the Macedonian territories as a moment of 
“originary violence”. The very term “New Lands”, as the territory acquired by Greece after the Balkan 
Wars is often referred to by Greek historians108, she argues, is eerily reminiscent of the “New World” of 
                                                   
104 This relationship between water flow and border delimitation will be explored further in the next part of the thesis, 
Anáchoma. 
105 At the turn of the century, the population of Florina prefecture was made up of 77% Macedonians, numbering 45.517 
individuals. See Andromachi Solaki and Ifigeneia Vamvakidou, “Μετονομασίες Οικισμών στην Περιοχή της Φλώρινας του 
20ου Αιώνα: Ιστορικές Αναγνώσεις [Renaming of Settlements in the Florina Area in the 20th Century: Historical Accounts]”, (self 
published, date unknown). 
106 Dopioi (plural of dopios), translates as a person “born to the site”, an autochthone, indigenous. As the Greek anthropologist 
Marica Rombou-Levidi explains, the term was only introduced after the population exchanges of the early 20th century, for the 
locals to be differentiated from the refugees from Minor Asia and the Black Sea (prosfighes). See Marica Rombou-Levidi (2009) 
“Dancing Beyond the “Barre”: Cultural Practices and the Processes of Identification in Eastern Macedonia, Greece”, (PhD diss., 
University of Sussex, 2009).  
107 As the anthropologist Laurie Hart notes, the violent drawing and re-drawing of the Southern Balkan borders “generated a 
vocabulary of fragmentation and mutilation.” Consequently, “[s]ame-nation communities are visualized as severed by borders 
from their proper homelands and thus as withering or decaying. Other-nation communities are described by politicians in the 
terminology of the Freudian uncanny, as introjected limbs or externalized viscera of foreign bodies.” For Hart, these corporeal 
metaphors continue feeding nationalisms and irredentisms in the region. See Hart, “Culture, Civilization, and Demarcation”. 




the Americas, and reveals the authorities’ double bind between the potentialities of newly conquered 
territories and a fear of the unknown that lies there109. Echoing this double bind is Charles Eddy, 
President of the League of Nations’ Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, who, in 1931, described 
the mountainous region of East Macedonia, some 200 kilometres East of Prespa, as a place “as 
unknown as if it were in the centre of Africa”110. Fittingly, the Western part of Prespa, beyond the isthmus 
was at the time locally known as “Africa”, presumably owing to its ground limestone soils and its sparser, 
savanna-like vegetation made up of centuries-old juniper trees, combined with its absolute remoteness 
from the remainder of Greek territory. 
 
Despite the strong colonial resonances present in the multiple redrawings of the border under the 
arbitration of the so-called Great Powers111, the Balkan states’ attempts to claim and ethnically cleanse 
their “New Lands” are undoubtedly incommensurate with the genocidal violence unleashed against the 
“New World” or, indeed, Africa. Yet, what persists is the spatialized dimension of these violent state 
processes. Or, as described by Achille Mbembe, “the creation of the space through violence over which 
violence is then exercised”. 112 
 
Indeed, in order to govern these different constituencies that inhabited its “New Lands”, the Greek state 
implemented a series of severely discriminatory, and spatialized, policies. Most important, and directly 
associated with demographic “engineering”, were two treaties dealing with population exchange: The 
Greco-Bulgarian “voluntary emigration” agreed at Neuilly in 1919 and the compulsory Greco-Turkish 
exchange, agreed at Lausanne in 1923113. The people of the “New Lands”, both dopioi and “refugees”, 
were also subjected to “inclusionary” measures intended to further eliminate ethnic and cultural 
difference. The harshest of these policies involved the establishment of a “Supervised Zone” or “Zone 
under Surveillance”
 
along the border by the Ioannis Metaxas régime in 1936.  
 
Two checkpoints were set up at the mountain pass that leads to the Greek side of the Prespa basin114, 
and one more at the narrow isthmus that separates the two lakes115. The checkpoints were controlled 
by the army, and special travel documents were required to cross them116. Far from being isolated 
structures, these checkpoints were nodes within a larger, 1212-kilometre-long and between five and 
one hundred kilometre wide infrastructure of “barres” that ran the entire northern border of Greece, and 
                                                   
109 Myrivili, “The Liquid Border”, 112. 
110 Charles Eddy quoted in Rombou-Levidi, “Dancing Beyond the “Barre””, 19. 
111 The six Great Powers of that time were Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy 
112 Achille Mbembe, On the postcolony. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 25. 
113 Rombou-Levidi, “Dancing Beyond the “Barre””.  
114 The first checkpoint was at the 1500m “Vigla” pass in Mount Varnountas, and the second one at the 1150m “Pervali/Prevol” 
pass, where Mount Varnountas meets Mount Triklario. 
115 A location locally known as “Koula”. 




contained four hundred and twenty towns and villages in Macedonia, Thrace, a large part of Epirus, 
and northern Corfu117. The “zone” was designed to isolate the unwanted, culturally “other” subjects 
living within it (the “insiders”) - Albanian minorities (Chams) in Epirus and Corfu, in the West, 
Macedonian and Bulgarian minorities in the North and Turkish and Pomak muslim minorities in Thrace 
in the North-East - and to recast the ethnically diverse areas adjacent to the border into a buffer against 
the Balkan socialist states in the North and Turkey in the East. The zone remained in the decades that 
followed the Second World War, when the northern borders of Greece represented the frontier between 
the Western bloc, and Communist Easern Europe. In Prespa the barres were removed in 1982118. For 
half a century, the slopes of Mount Varnountas therefore also delimited an internal border containing 
minorities living within the basin, regulating the movement out of, and into, this frontier area. The “iron 
curtain” here folded over mountains, forests, and lakes, extending both outwards and inwards and 
assuming a thickness that hosted a dual regime of exclusion and subordinatory inclusion. 
 
Through these successive, violent zonations, the borders of Macedonia were rendered into a frontier 
on the edges of the Balkans and the margins of modern day Europe. As I will demonstrate in what 
follows, this spatiality was enforced further by the Civil War that ensued, and, to a degree, still dictates 
the ways in which this border/frontier funtions today. 
 
1.1.3. Higher Ground 
 
The Greek Civil War of 1945-49 came as the tipping point to decades of state coercion. During the war 
the ridge was a stronghold for the communist partisans of the Democratic Army of Greece (ΔΣΕ), who 
established a “Temporary Democratic Government” within the Prespa basin from spring 1948 until 
August 1949. The mountains around Prespa were the theatre of major battles, and were the last to fall 
to the national army, along with the neighbouring mountain of Grammos. In the words of a former fighter, 
Dimitris Penis, during the Civil War “Prespa was a free territory which was the Caste and Symbol of the 
fight of the Democratic Army of Greece.”119 
 
                                                   
117 Rombou-Levidi, “Dancing Beyond the “Barre””.  
118 Ιn the region of Thrace, as I will discuss in the next part of the thesis, they remained until as late as 1995. 
119 Dimitris Penis, Πρέσπα η Εληνική [Prespa, the Greek], (Sofia: Elma, 2007). 20. Naturally, there are varied, more nuanced 
opinions about life in Prespa during the Civil War. What is generally accepted, however, is that ethnic discrimination had stopped 





A map showing the defensive line set up by the partisans on the ridge. The map was produced in preparation of the final 
offensive of the national army codenamed “Operation Pyrsos”. Source:  Hellenic Army General Staff, “Operation Pyrsos”. 
 
Τhe ridge, made of karstified dolomites, limestone and granite120, and covered with thich forests in lower 
altitudes, offered the partizans not only the fundamental advantage of controlling the higher ground, but 
also an uneven karst landscape in which they could seek refuge, and which they could modify to impede 
the advance of the national army. Gastón Gordillo, in his text Terrain as Insurgent Weapon, describes 
how in mountain warfare this geographical asymetry “neutralizes the technological and arithmetic 
superiority of tactical armies, undermining their mobility and field of vision”, and amplifying the otherwise 
limited firepower of the insurgents121. A report drafted by geographers of the national army in 
preparation of Operation Pyrsos, the final offensive that ousted the partisans from Prespa and the 
nearby Mount Grammos in August 1949, describes the problems the terrain posed to army attempts to 
recapture the area: 
The terrain of the region is deeply cut by steep ravines and rocky ridges. With the exception of the SW of 
the area, at the border passage to Albania, where the ground is relatively open, the rest of the region is 
densely wooded. The entire area is impenetrable by any kind of wheel.122 
During their four-year long occupation of the ridges, the partisans constructed a network of trenches, 
lookout points and defensive positions, which were referred to as “castles” in their own right. The same 
military geographers’ report describes these “castles”: 
                                                   
120 Panagiotopoulos et al, “Vegetation and Climate History of the Lake Prespa”. 
121 Gordillo, scrutinizing the role of geography in the conflict between the US army and the Taliban in the Korengal Valley in 
Afghanistan, describes this altitudinal unsettling of imperial power as “insurgent verticality”. Gastón Gordillo, “Terrain as 
Insurgent Weapon: An Affective Geometry of Warfare in the Mountains of Afghanistan”, Political Geography 64, (2018): 53-62. 
122 Hellenic Army General Staff, Οι Μάχες του Βίτσι και του Γράμμου 1949, Με το Συνθηματικόν «Επιχείρησις Πυρσός», 
[The Battles of Vitsi and Grammos 1949, Codenamed “Operation Pyrsos”], (Athens: Eleutheri Skepsis, 1993), 63 & 65. 





The partisans’ defensive infrastructure consists of several pressure points installed on crucial high places 
and passes, and include trenches that can fit a man standing up, and shelters covered by 10 or more 
layers of tree trunks and thick layers of branches, as well as minefields. Many of these positions are 
fenced off with barbed wire.123 
 
For the partisans the ridges and forests of Mt.Varnountas offered a sheltering topography that allowed 
them to defend their positions despite their inferior numbers and equipment. For the national army, on 
the other hand, it was “a hostile, dense and restricting materiality, an added obstacle”124 that needed to 
be overcome, or, preferably, avoided. To re-occupy the ridge, the national army, supported by the British 
and American air forces who were determined to prevent a socialist government in Greece, used 
“Spitfire” and “Dakota” aircrafts to attack the trenches from above with machine gun fire, parachute 
troops and incendiary bombs, “torching” the mountain, as the name of the final offensive, Pyrsos, 
suggests125. For the first time since their initial deployment at the end of WWII, and before they gained 
prominence as a counter-insurgency tool in Vietnam and othe counter-colonial struggles all over the 
world, Napalm bombs were used on these mountains throughout 1948-49 to devastating effect. As 
Gordillo notes of Afghanistan, “when insurgents “melt into the mountains,” imperial militaries often have 
no other option but to target, randomly and blindly, the terrain.”126 To attack the insurgents “melting into 
the mountain” with Napalm, which burn at a temperature ranging from 800° C to 1200° C, is to make 
the mountain itself melt. Using military technology the army changed the very chemical composition of 
the Prespa terrain, merging body with rock, human and non-human, Bios and Geos127. In a tragic twist 
of irony, “Greek fire”128 had returned to its birthplace to eradicate what the state viewed as non-Greek 
within its own borders129. 
 
                                                   
123 Ibid, 67-68 
124 Gordillo, “Terrain as Insurgent Weapon”. 
125 “Pyrsos” is Greek for “torch”. 
126 Gordillo, “Terrain as Insurgent Weapon”. 
127 Povinelli uses the term bios and geos to describe what she theorizes as biological life and geological non-life respectively, 
Elizabeth Povinelli, Geontologies.  
128 “Greek fire” was the name of what is considered to have been the first ever incendiary weapon, used in naval warfare by 
the Byzantine fleet. 
129 The successive waves of state oppression the local population had suffered meant that they were readily supportive of the 
cause of the Democratic Army. Within the DSE there operated a separate political and military organization, the National 





Partisan positions on a peak surrounding Prespa named “Polenata” being battered by the artillery of the national army (left), 
and a damaged defensive position on “Polenata” (right), 10/08/1949, as photographed by Ioannis Papamarkakis, a soldier for 
the national army. Source: ww2wrecks.com 
 
Remnants of bombs and craters still remain on these slopes as wartime scars, as do the defensive 
positions built into the mountain by the partisans. To the trained eye wandering above the treeline, 
these scars are visible as changes in the landscape of the alpine meadows; out-of-place decomposing 
trunks, large piles of rocks, and craters stand out of the shrubs and grass that dominate the landscape 
at these altitudes. The few trees that persevere in the sub alpine and alpine zones rarely exceed 50cm 
in height, compressed for months by the weight of snow and beaten by the wind year-round. Their roots, 
strained by the lack of space, hold the thin layer of soil in place and their branches carpet the floor, yet 
failing to conceal the topography beneath. If the war modified the terrain, the harsh mountain 
environment preserved these traces of wartime violence, years after the conflict ended. These 
modifications are now part of the mountain habitat, and the trenches have become corridors hosting a 
rich flora which shelters small mammals from predatory birds flying above130.  
Perhaps not incidentally, it is the same frictions131 which turned the mountainous terrain of Prespa into 
a weapon during the war that make them alluring as borders. It is also due to these frictions that 
illegalized border crossers prefer them to the more densely guarded plains below. As I will demonstrate 
in the final section, Udhë Ujk, from the mass Albanian migrations of the 90s, up to this day, migrants 
attempting to evade state surveillance, continue to be subjected to the same kinds of deadly perils that 
limited the capacity of the national army during the Greek Civil War. 
 
                                                   
130 In Europe, Laos, and elsewere, wartime “scars” have been studied by conservationists for their biodiversity. See Csaba Vad 
et al., “Wartime Scars or Reservoirs of Biodiversity? The Value of Bomb Crater Ponds in Aquatic Conservation”, Biological 
Conservation 209, (May 2017): 253-262. 
131 “Friction of terrain” is a concept developed by James Scott to account for the obstacles that terrain may put on human 









1.1.4. Ghost Habitats 
 
Those who settled in houses that were not in the center of the village, their women were scared. During 
the night they would hear birds screeching Kou Kou E - Kou Kou E and were terrified132. They thought 
they were the voices of deceased people killed during the Civil War. They were scared because of the 
tons of blood that had been shed. They came to my own house for a while, because it was situated in 
the center of the village, but afterwards they could not take it any longer here; they left. They went to 
Athens, Germany, Canada… 
Vasso, a settler in a village of Prespa. 
 
After the defeat of the partisans, entire villages were emptied, partially destroyed, and abandoned. Their 
ethnically “Other” inhabitants retreated with the Democratic Army to the neighbouring Balkan countries 
and from there they fled to Eastern Europe, Canada, the US, Australia, and the Central Asian socialist 
republics. As a result, diasporic communities of Macedonians from Prespa today exist in places as 
distant from Prespa –and from each other- as Toronto, Melbourne, Budapest, and Tashkent, in modern 
day Uzbekistan. Settlers were brought in from other corners of Greece to fill the void, and to provide a 
demographic buffer to the border. As the story told by Vasso reveals, this transitional period of the 50s 
was ripe with its own hauntings, for displaced and settler communities alike. 
 
For Maria Rombou-Levidi, the anthropologist who collected Vasso’s testimony, Vasso's narrative 
“indirectly refers to the intensified presence of ghosts in the deserted village. Vasso attributes this 
phenomenon to the sheer frequency and randomness of violent death within a very limited space and 
time.” 133 Indeed, in the Civil War alone, the villages of Prespa lost 307 of their inhabitants to battle with 
the partisans134, and many more from other parts of Greece, both partisans and regular soldiers, died 
in the area. “Ghosts”, Rombou-Levidi continues, 
 
are in fact often seen as the inevitable excess of the defilement which emerges from the flooding of social 
space with death. Evidently, this approach assumes that there is a “natural” balance between the quantity 
of death and spatial and temporal dimensions. The intensification of death within discrete units of space 
and time beyond the natural balance transgresses the classificatory order. This transgression is 
evidenced by the return of the past in the present in the reappearance of the dead and their voices as 
ghosts.135   
 
                                                   
132 KKE, pronounced Kou-Kou-E, are the initials of the Greek Communist Party (Kommounistiko Komma Ellados). 
133 Marica Rombou-Levidi, «Εδώ Καπούτ»: Η Βία του συνόρου. Μετανάστευση, Εθνικοφροσύνη και Φύλο στην 
Ελληνοαλβανκή Μεθόριο [“Here Kaputt”: Border Violence, Migration, National Sentiment and Gender at the Greco-Albanian 
Frontier], (Athens: Alexandria, 2017). 
134 The data was compiled by the author from a list of casualties in the Florina prefecture provided in Nikos Kentros, Ο 
Εμφύλιος στη Φλώρινα [The Civil War in Florina], (Athens: Vivliorama, 2011). 
135 Rombou-Levidi, “Here Kaputt”. Rombou-Levidi draws on the anthropologist Allen Feldman, and his analysis of political terror 
in Northern Ireland. See Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence. The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern 




Within this ghostly space, the violent histories of the near past are today carried forward and expressed 
in nuanced forms, like whispered conversations in village squares, off-sounding hellenized surnames, 
cultural performances like dance-events and singing practices136, as well as the terrain and natural 
environment of Prespa itself, which is the focus of my research. Eavesdropping on these half-whispered 
histories, the contemporary borders of Prespa read like a continuation of the enduring founding violence 
of the Greek state.  
 
The border is itelf also ghost. Destroyed buoys and pyramids aside, the demarcation of the nation state 
here is a largely immaterial endeavour, one that materializes less through open force, and more in 
secret, through “an expectation and a threat that lurks in the region”137. In that sense, the policing of the 
borders is conducted in a manner that is unlike the other two border regions which I will discuss later in 
the thesis. Border patrols, unable to cover the entire mountainous border terrain of Prespa, are, as I 
was confided by local policemen, primarily conducted on high points which offer relatively clear views 
of the lakes and passages below138. According to locals, the police has also placed cameras along 
certain cross-border paths in the mountain to monitors crossings, not far from where I have installed 
my own139. Within the borders, policing is continued by ghostly undercover forces and civilian informers. 
In these ways, the border is internalized by the local populations. As Myrivili argues, 
 
The people in Prespa are disciplined by those invisible presences in their daily movements around the 
lakes. (…) Fishing in the lake, hunting or shepherding on the mountains, they have to know literally where 
they stand vis-à-vis the nation-state. Through this territorial type of knowledge and practice, a different 
sense of the limits of the nation occurs and different types of subject positions develop.  
 
To read the traces of these hauntings in the space of the nature reserve, I turn to a term introduced by 
Rob Nixon in his seminal book Slow Violence: ghost habitats. As Nixon describes it, “ghost habitats is 
a term environmentalists refer to in order to describe those ecological shadows of a once powerful 
presence in the landscape, traces from which one can reconstruct what might otherwise appear to have 
vanished entirely.”140 In theorizing the border natures of Prespa as a “ghost habitat”, two questions 
present themselves: what is the “once powerful presence in the landscape” and what could the “traces 
from which one can reconstruct what might otherwise appear to have vanished entirely” be?  
                                                   
136 Maria Rombou-Levidi, Επιτηρούμενες Zωές: Μουσική, Xορός και 
Διαμόρφωση της Υποκειμενικότητας στη Μακεδονία [Lives Under Surveillance: Music, Dance, and the Formulation of 
Subjectivity in Macedonia], (Athens: Alexandria, 2016). 
137 Myrivili, “The Liquid Border”, 39. 
138 During my stay in Prespa, I discovered what looked like unexploded mortars from the war in the forest, and alerted the 
authorities to collect them. Ridin in a police car to where I had found the mortars, and having gained their trust as a law-abiding 
citizen, I discretely asked the police men questions about their border patrol tactics. I unfortunately did not carry my camera when 
I discovered the mortars, and was not allowed to take photos when I returned in the presence of police. The next day, a convoy 
of vehicles - army, police and an ambulance – returned to the spot and removed the mortars.  
139 I visited a few of the locations where locals suggested that cameras had been placed, but I didn’t find any, nor did I find any 
documents online confirming their purchase. It is not unlikely that police are spreading these rumours to make locals believe their 
gaze reaches farther in the forest than it actually does. As I will discuss in Part II, trap cameras are certainly employed for border 
surveillance in the Evros/Meriç border, both by Greece and Turkey.  





In my analysis, the “powerful presence” is the border, igniting the violent nation building processes and 
conflicts of the first decades of the 20th century. In these processes, the conservationists who founded 
the park in the 1970s found a powerful, if unpleasant, ally. Half a century of war and state oppression 
rendered the area all but devoid of people. In 1940, 8080 people lived in the 16 Prespa villages, the 
overwhelming majority of whom were Slav Macedonians. During the Civil War, the fighters brought the 
population to around 13350 people. At the end of the 40s, many villages had lost most of their pre-war 
inhabitants while others, like Sfika/Besfina of Kranies/Drenovo to which I will return later in this chapter, 
were emptied completely141. More people left in the 60s and 70s due to economic hardship and 
persistent discrimination from the state. Today, a century after the demarcation of the border, and 
seventy years after the end of the Civil War, Greek Prespa is inhabited by some 1100 people, a measley 
15% of the pre-war population. Spead across an area of 37 square kilometres and separated from 
either of the two nearest towns of Florina and Kastoria by more than 50 km of mountainous roads, the 
region is largely isolated from the rest of the Greek territory. Like Juanita Sundberg notes of parts of 
the US-Mexico border along the Rio Grande, in Prespa “the layering of ‘historico-geographical 
processes of dispossession and protected area legislation have produced vast areas where nonhumans 
are the dominant characters”142.  
 
 
Communist (left) and Royalist (right) graffiti remaining on houses in the region. Photos by author, 2019-2020. 
 
While highlighting the existing parallels with the well-documented use of enclosures and protected 
areas to inflict displacement and disposession on selected populations is important, a distinction must 
be made: contrary to parks in settler colonial contexts like the USA, South Africa, or Israel/Palestine, 
the Prespa natural park was not actively set up to suppress and evict populations. Founded in 1974, it 
was established at a time when hostile state practices were de-escalating (the zone was abolished in 
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the early 80s), and, to a large degree, played a reconciliatory, if obfuscating, role, casting “nature” as 
the protagonist in the Prespa landscape instead of the border. Years later, the trilateral border park 
continued this reconciliatory role, ushering in a narrative of cross-border collaboration and the “healing 
of wounds”, an aspiration which is nevertheless incommensurate with the lived experience on the 
ground. My argument is that the park, and the natural environment of Prespa at large, benefitted from 
past violences and, as I will show in the following sections of this chapter, inadvertently furthers the 
work of erasure. As Sundberg argues of the operations of dispossession along the Rio Grande border, 
“such processes have not produced the particular living beings and specific attributes constituting 
these landscapes, [but] their overall arrangement has been (re)configured.”143 Or, in other words, the 
nature reserve, patrolled by police vehicles and possibly dotted with surveillance cameras, ghosts and 
mirrors the violent spatiality of the “Surveilled Zone”. 
 
Sundberg’s analysis also provides an insight into how the question of traces can be interrogated. In the 
deafening absence of an official account, and the linguistic and material erasure of first-hand human 
testimony through exile and coersion144, the main witness of the territorial struggles and projections of 
power and dominion over the ethnically liminal territory of Prespa is the environment itself: the surface 
of the mountain, the composition of the forest, or the local vernacular architecture. I therefore choose 
to turn to non-human forms of witnessing in order to examine human forms of territorial power as they 
register spatially in the materiality of the Prespa National Park145. To do so requires engaging with 
complex ontological questions to do with the kinds of “nature” that are enclosed within the limits of the 
park, which in turn affect simplistic readings of the “natural border” that cuts it in three. 
                                                   
143 Ibid. 
144 To be sure, this was an erasure that was only effective within Greek territory. The memories and cultural practices of those 
exiled were carried and maintained abroad by diasporic Macedonian communities. 
145 As the French poet Paul Eluard wrote upon his visit to Prespa at the height of the Civil War: L’homme (…) Inscrit son ombre 
au ciel et son feu sur la terre. [Man (…) inscribes his shadow on the sky, and his fire on the earth]. His poem, titled “Dans la 
montaigne vierge [In the virgin mountain]” narrates a landscape of immense natural beauty, one which is nevertheless permeated 
by scars and inscriptions. In so doing, the poet manages to capture the tension between the landscape and the long stories of 










1.2.1. Mist, Soil and Tephra 
 
 
In the summer of 1948 the army launched a surprise attack against the partisans on the mountain of 
Bela Voda in an attempt to enter Prespa. The news spread like lightning among the villagers who grabbed 
what belongings they could carry and took to the hills of Varnountas, near the border with Yugoslavia to 
seek refuge. Within two hours, the gorge by the Greek-Yugoslav border was droning like a beehive with 
the voices of the elderly villagers. The sound of machine guns coming from the peaks of Bela Voda was 




When the moist air masses from the lakes below scale the rising terrain of mount Varnountas/Baba - a 
process known in meteorology as orographic lift - the vapour cools, releasing the lake waters back onto 
the mountain. These vertical microclimates - higher altitudes receive up to 1400mm of rain and snow 
every year, double that of the lake shores - are responsible for a dense zonation of habitat types across 
the basin. Descending from the ridge to the slopes of Varnountas/Baba, the alpine and subalpine 
meadows that dominate the areas above the treeline give way to dense forests of Macedonian pine, 
silver fir, European beech, and oak mixed with several other broadleaved species that carpet the two 
sides of the border147.  
In the morning of June 18th, 2018, the forest was engulfed by a cloud of an altogether different chemical 
composition. When busloads of far-right and nationalist demonstrators trying to reach Prespa were 
stopped by police on the mountain, riots broke out and tear gas was used extensively. The 
demonstrators had gathered in response to a Greece-wide call to stop the signing of the “Prespa 
Agreement”, a bilateral treaty between Greece and, what was until then formally called the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The agreement, intiated by the momentum of liberal 
governments on both sides of the border, sought (and managed) to resolve the decades-long diplomatic 
stalemate surrounding the name of Greece’s northern neighbour. The demonstrators never reached 
Prespa and the agreement was signed across the two banks of the lake. Greece subsequently lifted its 
                                                   
146 Penis, Prespa the Greek, 57. 
147 The treeline, itself ebbing and flowing in history with the changes in climate, is set at an altitude of approximately 1700 




veto in the United Nations, allowing FYROM to be renamed “North Macedonia”148. The riots of June 




The “Battle of Pisoderi”, June 18, 2020. Photo: Vice News. 
 
Empty tear gas canisters now litter the forest floor next to unexploaded pieces of ammunition, leftovers 
of the second World War and the Civil War that, in previous decades, were known to kill and maim 
shepherds, lumberjacks, locals who used to collect copper shellings from the forest to sell as scrap, 
migrants who have been crossing the mountains, and, finally, large animals150. Nowadays mines and 
unexploaded remnants of war, are only an afterthought, but, are still regularly found by hikers, such as 
myself. As Nixon writes on the latent violence of Iraqi minefields, “the[y] have assumed the sedimentary 
character of the nation's layered conflicts.”151 
 
The 2018 “Battle of Pisoderi” was both the product and a violent reminder of the layering of conflict 
upon the geography of Prespa. The signing of the Agreement itself proved a seminal moment in 
contemporary Greek politics, precipitating a change in government in line with the global turn towards 
far-right and, subsequently, affecting the way the country’s borders are managed152. Seventy years 
                                                   
148 Also included in the treaty was a provision to open the long-disused border crossing point between Macdonia and Greece by 
the Greater Prespa lake. When I last visited that part of the border in autumn 2019, the army had cut a wide dirt road on the 
Greek side. On the Macedonian side, a group of workers was still weeding the area by the future checkpoint, somewhat more 
reluctantly than their greek counterparts. And rightfully so. The works were abandoned by the new right-wing government who 
had been vocal against the agreement. At the time of writing, the border is set to open in 2022. Environmentalists in the area are 
torn about this prospect as the road that is planned to run across the border will make it harder for animals descending from from 
the mountain to access to the lake. This is a space of constant conflicts. In this case, between pristine habitats and politics of 
recognition and loose borders. 
149 Pisoderi, or “Vigla” (which translates as “lookout”) is the name of the mountain pass where the protestors’ buses were stopped. 
The location also hosted one of the three checkpoints of the “Surveillance Zone”. During the Civil War it was occupied by the 
partisans and was fortified with heavy artillery. 
150 According to a 2007 study conducted by the Western Macedonia Prefecture, there are as many as 540 suspected minefields 
in Greek Western Macedonia alone. See https://mines.pdm.gr (accessed November 2018) 
151 Nixon, Slow Violence, 225. 
152 To claim that the agreement alone changed the course of politics in Greece would be reductive and inaccurate, as it would be 
to claim that the left-leaning government of SYRIZA of 2015-2019 followed a policy of open borders. For reasons of brevity, I will 




after the end of the Civil War and the ethnic “disciplining” of this border region, the clashes between the 
police and protestors, opposing what they saw as a betrayal of Macedonian “land and soil”, that the 
nationalist imaginary sees as exclusively Greek, ghosted the deadly battles of the civil war that had 
taken place in the same mountain. In doing so, they reminded a forgetful Greek society that the wounds 
carved on the terrain of Prespa during the first half of the 20th century were still very much open153.  
 
Several of the protesters donned t-shirts with the slogan “Greece or Tephra”, a quote which belongs to 
the late 19th century writer and poet Periklis Yannopoulos and was popularised in the 2010s by the 
neo-nazi party of Golden Dawn. Its contemporary meaning within circles of the extreme-right is twofold, 
projecting violence both inwards, towards the Greek society which they see as weak and morally 
compromised (“Greece will either be great, or it should turn to ashes”), and outwards, towards Greece’s 
neighbours which they view as hostile nations founded on occupied, “naturally” Greek, land (“you will 
either succumb to Greece or you will be turned to cinders”). Soil, and its volcanic counterpart, tephra, 
were mobilized within the context of the Prespa Agreement as bounding materials of Greek nationalism. 
Perhaps to undo this “Greek soil”, and the borders that bound it “naturally”, requires looking at its 
material composition. 
 
In November 2009, a team of palynologists154 from the Institute of Geology and Mineralogy of the 
University of Cologne retrieved a composite sediment core from the bed of lake Great Prespa. Using 
tephra deposits from known volcanic eruptions to calibrate the core to geological time, it was found that 
the last 17000 years, spanning from the late Pleniglacial/Oldest Dryas to the present day, Late 
Holocene/Anthropocene periods were compressed in the upper 320cm of the core. Studying traces of 
pollen captured in the sediment, the scientists were able to determine movements in the Prespa treeline 
and changes in its composition. In their words, the various  
 
colonizations of the prespa landscape by different plant species and their altitudinal migrations registered 
changes in climate such as cooling events, shifts in fire frequency and seasonality as well as a substantial 
restructuring of the Prespa landscape resulting from anthropogenic activities, such as animal husbandry, 
clearances and agriculture.155 
 
Through palynological analysis, the lake sediment becomes a telluric archive, holding and narrating the 
natural history of Prespa through paleobotanical evidence. At this resolution, the bounding principles of 
Greek nationalism fail to register. At a thickness of 0.076 milimetres per year, the history of modern 
Greek Macedonia since its annexation from the Ottomans in 1913 ammounted to the top 7.296 
                                                   
153 At the time of writing, two years after the “Battle”, a commemorative plaque stands in the location where the buses were 
stopped. 
154 Palynology is the study of pollen grains found in geological or archaeological deposits. Pollen extracted from such deposits 
may be used for radiocarbon dating and for studying oscillations in past climates and environments by identifying plants then 
growing. In so doing, palynological analysis reads planetary events but also human processes and patterns in land use such as 
agriculture, animal husbandry, and, in some cases, pandemics or prolonged conflict, as they register as layers in the silt, tephra 
etc. The Prespa lakes, surrounded by tall mountains forming a large catchment basin, offer an ideal location for conducting 
palynological research, their sediment concentrating pollen from afar.  




centimetres, or thirty-six pixels in the image generated by the equipment used to scan the core, 
operating at a resolution of 2 milimetres. 6.004 of these seven centimetres correspond to the 90-year 
period since the border was first cartographed and demarcated. The remaining 313 centimetres in that 
core stand to undermine Greece’s “natural” right over these lakes, the forests and mountains that 
surround them, and Macedonia at large. 
 
But can forest evidence be calibrated to a different temporal resolution to record events like the Napalm 
bombardments of 1949 or the ‘Battle of Pisoderi and the tear gas cloud it was suffocated under? Beyond 
taking a bullet in the trunk, can trees register and archive conflict? Can these forests, their leaves, soils 






Not far from the location of the “Battle of Pisoderi”, at an altitude of 1650m, I placed a second camera 
onto the trunk of an old beech tree. Designed to allow for the noninvasive observation of ecosystems, 
“trail cams”, or “trap cameras” as they are called within the relevant community, are commonly used by 
conservationists156 and hunters (and, it seems, border patrol) alike for the “gathering of data on the 
presence and abundance of life, wild or otherwise”157. The camera comes with a weatherproof metallic 
casing coated with camouflage finish. A belt is used to tie the camera around a tree, and a steel, 
adjustable bracket helps mount it onto the tree trunk. It is motion triggered, with a sensor capable of 
detecting movement up to 25 metres at a trigger time of 0.15’’. Its “no-glow” infrared flash is 
undetectable to most animals and humans alike. The sensor is equally sensitive to large mammals that 
inhabit the region, like roe deer, wolf, bears, chamois, wild boar, and possibly the Balkan lynx which is 
rumoured to live in these mountains but is yet to be captured on camera on the Greek side of the 
border158, but also to the movements of the forest itself: trees shedding their leaves in fall or releasing 
                                                   
156 Indeed, my cameras are not the only cameras in the region. The environmental NGO ‘Society for the Protection of Prespa’ 
installs them to track animal populations in the park. This is not a technology that comes without conflict. In Iran, conservationists 
using such cameras to track the rare Asian Cheetah were arrested in 2018 and are facing execution as spies. See Kayleigh E. 
Long, “Jailed Researchers Trying to Protect Threatened Cheetahs in Iran Await Verdict”, National Geographic, March 15, 2019, 
www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2019/03/iran-wildlife-conservationists-jailed/ (accessed March 2019). 
157 Audrey Verma et al., “Imagining Wildlife: New Technologies and Animal Censuses, Maps and Museums”, Geoforum 75, 
(2016): 75–86, 79. 
158 As the Prespa-based writer Julian Hoffman notes, the example of the Balkan Lynx offers a window into the entanglements of 
wildlife conservation efforts and conflict in the Balkans, with which the Lynx population has fluctuated in past decades. The lynx 
rebounded after the end of WWII from a nadir of 15-20 individuals, so that by 1974 they were estimated at 280 individuals. Due 
to prolonged conflict in Yugoslavia, their population dropped to 80-105 individuals by the year 2000. By 2012, their numbers had 
declined yet further, reduced to a mere 40-60, the shrinkage most likely trigerred by the pervasiveness of guns and poaching 
after the collapse of the Albanian state in the 90s and the subsequent looting of its military depots. Today, the lynx has been 
confirmed to live and reproduce in North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, and is rumoured to live in Montenegro and Greece. In 
2011 and 2020, lynxes were photographed in Macedonian Prespa by trap cameras set up by the managing bodies of Pelister 





pollen in spring, rain, hail and snow. 
Trap cameras are called that for good reason. Designed in the shadow of the military159 with the purpose 
of tracing routes and determining points of capture, they can expand the capacity of law enforcement 
and “turn a forest into a surveillance regime”.160  The trap cam is a trap in and of itself. Its very 
mechanism is akin to the operating principle of traps, as described by the British Anthropoligist Alfred 
Gell in his famous defence of traps as artworks, Vogel’s Net.  Like Gell’s traps, each camera is 
“equipped with a rudimentary sensory transducer, sensitive to the animal’s touch” (or, in this case, 
movement), an “afferent nervous system [which] brings information to the automaton’s central 
processor which activates the efferent system”, producing “action-at-a-distance”161: the capturing of 
images. 
Following Gell’s theorizing of traps, the trap camera and the landmine, both advanced mechanisms that 
enable remote, technologically-mediated encounters with bodies in the forest, are models of their 
human creators. But “each is also a model of its victim”162. Built to respond to life’s most vital function, 
movement, both mechanisms are concealed in the forest landscape, hidden under leaves or behind 
camouflaged coating and a flash calibrated against the eye’s retina. They both employ a sensor that is 
imperceptible to its victim - a tripwire for the anti-personnel landmine and a motion-detection sensor for 
the trail camera - a mechanism to receive and process information, and another one to activate it. At 
close inspection, trap cameras in the forests of Prespa are ghosting the minefiled, even if to a vastly 
less violent effect. 
 
 
A trap camera installed on a beech tree in Mt. Varnountas, September 2019. Photo by author. 
                                                   
159 For a history of the military roots of this technology see Etienne Benson, Wired Wilderness: Technologies of Tracking and the 
Making of Modern Wildlife, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2010). For a critical account of the overlaps between 
conservation and military optics see James Bridle, Radar Ornithology (Sage I-III), available at: 
http://jamesbridle.com/works/radar-ornithology, (accessed July 2019). 
160 Steph Yin, “Inside the Animal Internet: How digital surveillance is transforming our relationship with wildlife”, Silica Magazine, 
May 20, 2020, www.silicamag.com/features/inside-the-animal-internet (accessed June 2020). 





This, however, is not an entirely benign exercise either. As critical conservation scholars point out, the 
monitoring and recording of non-human animal worlds can be interpreted as an extension of human 
domination over wildlife. However well intentioned, or indeed necessary for the preservation of certain 
species, such conservation efforts and technologies incorporate the natural realm into regimes of power 
and knowledge, often resulting in its quantification, mapping and curation163. These, scholars point out, 
are the same tools – censuses, maps and museums - outlined by the British political scientist Benedict 
Anderson as the social instruments that enabled the ‘imagining’ of communities and laid the foundations 
for nationalism in the first place164. 
Operating, as I am, in this liminal space between nature and nation, it is therefore important to define 
who or what - whether this be a former partisan, a settler, a botanist, a leaf, a marten, tephra or a 
camera recording - is able to speak in my text and through what processes. Below I will attempt to 
address this question. 
 
 1.2.3. Orography: Mutedness and Natural Testimony 
 
what happens to the physics of things, whether a sovereign subject or a rhizomatic object, when the frontier is viewed 
from the indefinable, crumbling, and corroding edges of things, where things become quasi things, only ever thingish? 
At the outermost edge the thing is nominal—any thing is always composed of a set of trailings and exfoliations of all 
sorts—the scent an animal leaves behind, the light off a lake, the sand raised up and sent across vast areas by the 
winds, smoke off a wild fire. Trailings are also the differently drawn effects of animal tracks, underground cables, and 
bitumen roads.
 
Elizabeth Povinelli, “Three Imaginaries of the Frontier with Illustrations” 165 
 
On my way back to Athens from Evros/Meriç in March 2020, I made a diversion to Prespa to offload 
the material from my cameras. Considering their technical specifications, it came as both a surprise 
and a disappointment when I hiked to one of the cameras in the forest, only to find a trail of bear prints 
in the snow, but no recording of the bear itself. In the absence of an image, the orphan prints in the 
snow are the only remaining testimony of the animal’s passing in front of my camera. In this sense, they 
are what conservationists working on the same mountains as me have called bio-indices166: signs 
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166 M. Petridou et al., Assessing the Distribution and Relative Abundance of Large Mammals Using Camera Traps in the Aoos 




betraying the presence of a certain, elusive, species in an ecosystem. They serve as a reminder that, 
in the forest, “encounters between matters and events”167 are continuously registered on the material 
composition of the forest floor. As Ralph Waldo Emerson elegantly (if a bit exaggerratedly) describes,  
In nature, this self registration is incessant. All things are engaged in writing their history. The planet, the 
pebble, goes attended by its shadow. The rolling rock leaves its scratches on the mountain; the river, its 
channel on the soil...Not a foot steps into the snow, or along the ground, but prints, in a character more 
or less lasting, a map of its march168.  
As the battle of Pisoderi foregrounded, the latent violence of post-Lausanne nation building processes, 
enabled and perpetuated by the systematic silencing of alterity in official historical accounts, is still 
acting upon the terrain of Prespa and affecting politics on both sides of the border. Considered against 
this erasure, animal movements here have the capability to unsettle histories of conflict and migration, 
which are encoded and layered as organic and inorganic matter in the forest floor. This unsettling may 
be understood as the animals’ frequenting former human-made trails, trenches, or tunnels, which have 
since been abandoned; their crossing of borders, challenging the possibility of geographic division in 
the basin; their very presence in numbers which would not be possible had the area not been emptied 
during the long Balkan 20th century; or the more straightforward, and deadly, activating of a landmine 
with their body weight. The prints in my camera therefore become a powerful meditation on forms of 
witnessing and evidencing in conditions where human testimony is scarce, or actively muted, and non-
human life is abundant. The forest floor then becomes what Susan Schuppli calls a “material witness”, 
a term she uses to describe “non-human entities and machinic ecologies that archive their complex 
interactions with the world producing ontological transformations and informatic dispositions that can 
be forensically decoded and reassembled back into a history.”169 
 
These natural processes, writing vectors of movement onto the mountain landscape, leave not only 
traces, but script onto the surface of the natural terrain. I somehow find myself returning to the scientific 
term orography, which has come to represent the impact of the topographic relief of elevated terrain on 
global climate. Recasting the term to its original etymology, which derives from the Greek words from 
mountain (όρος/oros) and script (γραφή/graphi), provides us with a term to discuss this vocabulary of 
traces; the scripture of the mountain. It offers a theoretical prism through which lines of flight across the 
mountain, in the form of broken twigs, disturbed or overgrown vegetation, tracks in the soil or snow, 
stream paths, trenches, trails and tear gas clouds can be considered for their testimonial value.  
 
                                                   
167 Scuppli, Material Witness, 40. 
168 Ralph-Waldo Emerson, quoted in Eduardo Cadava, Emerson and the Climates of History, (Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press,1997), 4.  





Bear prints caught on a trail camera. Mt. Varnountas. Video still, full video available at vimeo.com/490159759/14fbe81c50. 
 
As Shela Sheikh suggests in her text The Future of the Witness, looking to nature as a witness of 
anthropic processes entails an epistemological shift. It requires us to reconceptualise “the act of 
‘testimony’ itself, the process whereby one ‘bears witness’, as a relational concept”, and to expand the 
figure of the witness “beyond the category of the human” to include ecological systems170. For Sheikh, 
such a shift troubles established legal and testimonial protocols, as well as “categories of personhood, 
legal standing and voice” often reserved for humans alone. The question of voice, and the speech acts 
ascribed to it – witnessing, testimony, narration - is particularly interesting to consider against the 
seemingly “mute” forests of Prespa. The implications of such an enquiry are twofold, touching upon 
both with the presumed muteness of non-human nature in the modern imaginary (a passive backdrop 
against which politics is played out and history is written), but also with the historical erasure and 
physical destruction of a portion of the human population of Prespa and their languages, memories, 
and traditions.  
 
As Sheikh points out, however, to claim that nature “witnesses” or “testifies” is inherently 
anthropocentric. This is a view that is taken further by the anthropologist of more-than-human worlds 
Eduardo Kohn, in his book How Forests Think, where he proposes that our understanding of nature 
and the vocabulary we use to describe it must be expanded to include forms of relation that are not 
bound by language. “Extending linguistic relationality to non-humans”, Kohn argues, “narcicistically 
projects the human onto that which lies beyond it [...] In the process, the properties that might permit a 
more capacious view of relationality are obscured”171. Instead of language, Kohn offers representation 
as a non-discursive form of relation forest worlds. Drawing from indigenous cosmologies of the Runa 
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of Ecuador’s upper Amazon, Kohn proposes to understand the inhabitants of the forest not simply as 
“non-human beings”, a description which he sees as reductive, but as selves in their own right, who 
retain agency over their surrounding environment and are capable of representing both their 
interractions with it, as well as their own selves. 
 
The question then again becomes one of ontological reckoning with the very concept of nature. What 
is the kind of nature that is enclosed and “self-represented”172 in the Prespa national park? Is it not one 
that is conflictual and relational itself? With human and non-human lives appearing intermittedly and 
intersecting in my analysis of the Prespa border, and in line with my theorization of border natures, I 
attempt a relational reading of the park and its history, approaching both human and non-human with 
great caution, to avoid a methodology and a vocabulary that animalises the former and 
anthopomorphisizes the latter. 
Learning to read orographic scripture “against the grain” of the deep history of Prespa173 is a complex 
endeavour that requires the cross pollination of different disciplines, ecological, historical, linguistic and 
spatial. Returning to Elisabeth Povinelli’s quote above through the prism of orography, the bordered 
routes of governance become legible as exfoliating forest matter174. Attached to this very forest matter 
- trees, boulders and village ruins - along cross-border routes of governance, my trap/trail cameras are 
here repurposed as orographic devices that record the residual histories of Prespa. The animals 
appearing before them and the prints that remain after their passing testify to decades of abandonment, 
displacement, and enclosure. They become “one of many parts” of what Sheikh has called a “witness 
collectivity”175. They narrate Prespa as a “ghost habitat”
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173 James Scott, Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017) 
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1.3.1. Allophony: Domestic Space as Border 
 
 
“The bulk of these peasants speak a Slav dialect...not Serbian...nor Bulgarian. It contains, as is natural, 
a large number of Turkish, Greek and Albanian words, and has some grammatical peculiarities” 
Edith Durham, The Burden of the Balkans, 1905176.  
 
“They cut our tongue” 
 




When the mixed broadleaf forests extending over the gentle slopes of Sfika/Triklario mountain caught 
fire in July 1988, the exploding ammunition - land mines, mortars, and aerial bombs - that remained 
scattered across the forest since the Civil War prevented firemen from accessing the area from the 
ground.177 As a result, the fire smouldered for days, the slopes exploding in its wake. The latent energy 
that was stored in the ammunition that had been waiting, unexploded, for forty years and released by 
the exothermic reaction caused by the forest fire once more activated the archival nature of the the 
forest floor. The blasts served as indices of past violences, untreated and ever-ready to thrust their way 
into physical and social space.  
This eruptive ability of the civil war-era bombs is strongly reminiscent of the way the people of Prespa 
themselves were understood by the state throughout the 20th century. A 1928 quote from the Greek 
envoy to Paris, Nikolaos Politis, helps bring the argument home. Albanian-speaking minorities in 
Greece, Politis claimed, were “foreign bodies, continually filled with explosive materials”178. Like the 
bombs scattered in the forest, the people of the “Surveilled Zone”, as Rombou-Levidi notes (echoing 
Foucault) were perceived as dangerous “at the level of their potentialities”, not their actions179. In this 
section, I will explore these (un)past violences as they collapse over the ruins of Sfika/Besfina village, 
a former Macedonian speaking community by the Greek border with Albania. 
/ 
 
During the negotiations of territorial limits between Greece and the newly-independent state of 
                                                   
176 Edith Durham, The Burden of the Balkans, (London, 1905), 90.  
177 Angelos Sinanis, Κορέστεια, τα χωριά της Λήθης, [Koresteia: The Villages of Lethe], (Elati Trikallon: Self Published, 2015), 
208. 
178 Politis in Hart, “Culture, Civilisation and Demarcation”. The similarities with the contemporary xenophobic discourse which 
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179 Michel Foucault in Power: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, ed. J.D.Faubion, (New York: The New Press, 




Albania180, it was decided by the Great Powers that the border be determined on the basis of 
“ethnological and geographical criteria”181. These ethnological criteria, in turn, were to be identified, as 
the anthropologist Laurie Hart notes, not according to the language spoken in public, but that which 
was "spoken in family life"182. As a result, a series of censuses were conducted in the fifteen-period 
over which the border took shape183, with public servants going door to door to enquire about the 
language spoken in each house. In so doing, they diverted the border drawing exercise from the terrain 
of Prespa onto the space of the village, and that of the household where culture was more freely 
performed184.  
Beyond the more sinister exclusionary policies that the demarcation of the border entailed, the post-
delimitation process of national incorporation was carried out through a subtler process of assimilation, 
which also revolved around language, and which, I will show, often required the recruitement of the 
natural environment in efforts to erase allophony. Over the three-year period of 1926-1928 that followed 
the demarcation of the border, 2479 non-Greek sounding placenames in the Greek territory were 
formally replaced by a committee compised of geographers, archaeologists, historians and linguists185. 
So were the names of rivers and mountaintops. In the Florina prefecture alone, 94 villages were 




ΦΕΚ 346/1926 whereby “Besfina” was renamed “Sfika”. Source: Hellenic Parliament Library. 
                                                   
180 The border was first discussed at the London “Conference of the Ambassadors” in August, 1913. As with the border with 
Serbia, talks were postponed until after the Great War, when a tripartite committee made up of one British, one French and one 
Italian colonel, observed by a Greek and an Albanian counterpart was charged with its precise delimitation. The border was 
finalized in 1925 with a treaty signed between Great Britain, France and Italy in Florence (known as “the Florence Protocol”), and 
ratified by Greece (and Yugoslavia) in 1926. 
181 Dimitrakopoulos, “The Land Borders of Greece”, 112. 
182 Hart, “Culture, Civilisation and Demarcation”. 
183 Three censuses were conducted in Sfika/Besfina during that period, each registering a steadily declining population. In 1913 
there were 431 residents, in 1920, 348, and in 1928, 322. All census data for Sfika/Besfina are taken from www.florina-
history.blogspot.com/2010/04/besvina.html (accessed October 2018). 
184 When, in 1929, the Greek minister of Exterior Andreas Michalakopoulos anecdotally complained to his French counterpart, 
Aristide Briant, about the committee’s decision to cede fourteen of Prespa’s villages to Albania, it is rumoured that he received 
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Albania, or the villages to Albania, and the residents to you.” Whether true or not, the above anecdotal story attests to the scale 
and violence of demographic restructuring that took place in this border region during the first half of the 20th century. Vassilis 
Kondis, Greece and Albania, 1908-1914, (Thessaloniki: Self Published, 1976), 116-118. 
185 This process was initiated by a 1909 royal decree regarding the forming of a “Committee for the study of placenames in Greece 
and their historical justification”. A second decree, issued in 1926, extended this process over the “New Lands”.  




The new name, “Sfika”, Greek for “wasp”, was in line with that of the rest of the villages in Greek Prespa, 
which were almost entirely reterritorialized as plants or forest animals: “Bukovik” was renamed “Oxia” 
(beech tree), “Ornovic” was renamed Karies (walnut tree), “Drenovo” was renamed “Kranies” 
(dogwood), “Trnovo” was renamed Agathoto (thorny), “Trobicista” was renamed “Daseri” (wooded). 
“Popli” was renamed “Lefkona” (poplar grove), “Medovo” was renamed Miliona (apple grove), “Orovo” 
was renamed “Pyxos” (box tree)187. For the first time in Prespa, even if only in the field of semantics, 
nature, and trees in particular were used as instruments of cultural erasure. It would not be the last.  
Along with the villages, the state also changed the names of the people inhabiting them188. Sekulov, 
the former resident of Prespa (and partisan) whom I quote above, was renamed Sekoulopoulos189. 
Coming a few years after the Neuilly and Lausanne population exchanges, the renaming of settlements 
and people furthered a process of replacement, both corporeal and semiotic, along the border. As I will 
describe in what follows, these ethnocidal and memoricidal190 policies were facilitated by the very 
domestic space the state sought to penetrate and discipline. 
 
 
Roe deer grazing on moss that grows on an abandoned grave in Sfika. The names on gravestones were often changed to 
commemorate Greek subjects instead of Slavic ones. Video still, full video available at vimeo.com/490232396/72b8862840. 
 
                                                   
187 In some cases, usually when placenames stemmed from landscape and vegetation features, the translation retained the 
original. More often, however, the original meaning was ignored and an altogether new placename, usually from ancient Greek 
culture, was introduced. Often, placenames that bore negative connotations were changed to signify something “pure”. In Prespa, 
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188 See Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict. Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World, (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 160. 
189 As Myrivili notes, “people had two names and two languages: one that was spoken indoors, (…) and another that was used 
in public. The presence of the Nation had infiltrated and articulated the very rooms of the house”, Myrivili, “The Liquid Border”, 
85. See also Tasos Kostopoulos, Η Απαγορευμένη Γλώσσα: Κρατική Καταστολή των Σλαβικών Διαλέκτων στην Ελληνική 
Μακεδονία [The Forbidden Idiom: Strate Coersion of the Slavic Dialects in Greek Macedonia], (Athens: Mavri Lista, 2000). 
190 The French anthropologist Pierre Clastres defines the term “ethnocide” as the “cultural disappearance of the other”. The term 
“memoricide” has also been used to describe the erasure of the very recollection of the “other” within the context of the production 
of terra nullius in Israel/Palestine. See Pierre Clastres, Archaeology of Violence, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2010) and Marcello 
Svirsky, “The Production of Terra Nullius and the Zionist-Palestinian Conflict”, in ed. Simone Bignall and Paul Paton, Deleuze 




1.3.3. Collapsing onto the Landscape 
 
Due to the geology of the area, favouring terra rossa soils over stone, most buildings were built on 
plinths (locally known as plithiá) made of mud and straw, a vernacular style of adobe architecture that 
is characteristic of the region191. To prevent decay from the ground, the foundations, and the first couple 
of metres up to the ground floor windows were built with two rows of stone walls, of 60-70cm 
thickness192. The rest of the external walls were built with raw plinths made of clay soil, small pieces of 
rock and wheat straw at a thickness of 55-60cm. The mortar that was used to bind the plinths together 
was also made of earth and straw, as was the 2-6cm thick plaster layer that was used to protect the 
walls from the elements. The material composition of the plinths was designed so that the bricks 
gradually “melted” into each other, and formed a uniform, statically sound unit. The thinner internal 
partitions were usually also made of plints, or reeds from the lake woven together, and supported by 
wood. The floors were supported by beach, oak, fir or juniper tree trunks, 10-15cm thick, the edges of 
which were built into the mud walls. Onto the trunks, the mason laid branches or reeds and, on top of 
them, compacted earth. The roof was made of tree trunks and branches again and, depending on 
whether the building was used for dwelling, storage, or as a barn, it was covered with ceramic tiles or 
reeds and was built at a slight gradient to extend beyond the external walls, protecting them from the 
rain. Made from earthen materials, these houses required constant maintenance from their inhabitants, 
involving the regular plastering of walls, replacing damaged plinths and wood components193.  
 
The desertion of the village after the Civil War made this maintenance impossible. Before the Second 
World War, in 1940, its residents were 294, all of them ethnic Macedonians. In the 1951 census, two 
years after the end of the Civil War, the register was zero. The villagers, over 100 of whom had joined 
the ranks of the Democratic Army194, had followed the partisans across the border, and the village had 
been emptied. 
 
After a plinth building is abandoned, the plaster that covers the walls is the first to go. Exposed to the 
rain, the walls erode. They assume irregular textures and gradually become thinner, from the top 
                                                   
191 The houses provided shelter for an extended family, multinuclear family (zadruga) its members living under the same roof and 
taking up the same profession – in the case of Sfika the trade of timber or animal husbandry. The houses were relatively small, 
initially long, one storey buildings split in half to house the family on the one side, and their animals on the other. From the 19th 
century onwards, the houses were built in two floors, with the family inhabiting the top floor and the animals the ground floor. In 
some cases, rich families would build their houses from stone. Sfika had one such house, which used to stand until the 90s. 
Today, one of its walls is among the few remaining in the ruins of the village.  
192 In cases where the subsoil was weak, a layer of beach or cedar tree trunks was laid under the first layer of stone.  
193 Beyond my own fieldwork, much of the architectural analysis provided here is based on Michalis Prodromou’s Masters thesis, 
which he was kind enough to share with me. Michalis Prodromou, M. “Σεισμική και Θερμική Συμπεριφορά Κτιρίων απο 
Ωμόπλινθους στην Περιοχή των Πρεσπών [Seismic and Thermal Behaviour of Adobe Buildings in the Prespes Area]”, (Masters 
diss., Metsoveion Polytechnic of Athens, 2016). 
194 Atanas Tane Naumovski, Lerin in Mourning, (Wareemba AUS: Pollitecon, 2014). Several of the villagers died in battle. The 
precise number of casualties is, however, unknown. A former partisan, Nikos Kentros names eight casualties from Sfika. 




downwards. When they reach a thickness that is insufficient to support the weight of the roof, the latter 
caves in. So familiar is this process to locals, that they share an axiom that states: “once the roof is 
gone, the building is gone”. Water enters from above, slowly eating away the walls and internal 
partitions. The wooden parts, floors, balconies and weight-bearing beams, rot and, when the external 
walls become too thin to support the floors, these fold inside the building. The rain then slowly melts 




Plinth houses at the village of Ano Kranionas at various stages of decay. Photos by author, April 2019. 
 
Often, from stones dropping from the plum, apple, quince or cherry trees planted in the yard other trees 
grow inside the walls, accelerating the decay. In a few years, the building is reduced to a lump of earth; 
a small hill with trees growing on top of it. As a local told Michalis Prodromou, an engineer studying 
these buildings, “plinth houses melt like ice, and return to earth”. (P)lethe, the title of this section refers 
to this slow, natural process of concealment of otherness through architectural decay. A compound of 
the word plinth and lethe - the personification of forgetfulness in ancient Greek mythology - the term 
encompasses the tension beteen the two worlds, the dopia Macedonian culture, and the ancient Greek 
heritage, imposed by the state to claim Macedonia as Greek. 
 
Indeed, today the village is indistinguishable from natural topographic features. Walking among the 




homes and was inhabited by more than 500 people. Slowly but surely, Sfika has become another ghost 
habitat. The Greek-Albanian border, after cutting into households through language, collapsed back 
onto the landscape, taking the entire village with it. Covering the former houses and alleys is now a 
mosaic of wilded orchards, mixing with low lying ruderal vegetation, mountain rivulets, and the young 
mixed broadleaved forest which gradually descends upon the village claiming the abandoned terraces 
and former pastures. This migrating treeline, rolling downwards from the slopes of mount Triklario into 
the village, creates a rich ecotone, which, as the cameras I have placed in the vegetated ruins show, is 
frequented by species, like roe deer and bears, that thrive on the forest edge, feeding on the fruit from 









Roe deer in the village ruins. Video stills.
                                                   
195 In conservation ecology these are called “edge species”. Leslie Ries and Thomas Sisk, “What is an Edge Species? The 




Like the animals that visit it, the village reveals itself differently with the seasons. Between May and 
October, when the trees that grow around and inside the village still hold their leaves, patterns of 
habitation are almost entirely erased by the forest. The ruins are so well hidden that hikers who look for 
them often come back empty handed. Far from being attributed to natural processes, this is an erasure 
that is equal parts human196. It is only in the winter months, when trees shed their leaves, that one might 
see a wall here or there. The agencies of trees, their “abitities and tendencies (…) to grow, reproduce, 
spread and break up”197 buildings are mobilised by the state apparatus to perform a slow violence that 






A drone photograph of Sfika in December 2019, laid on top of a 1945 aerial photograph. The forest has rolled downhill, now 
engulfing the church. Archive photo: Greek National Cadastre, Drone photography: author and Marianna Bisti.  
                                                   
196 In other abandoned villages in the area this forest erasure was more actively pursued by the state. The village of 
Babtsor/Vapsori, also a stronghold of the partisans, was burned and planted with black pine. This was done in the 1950s, masked 
under an initiative by the forestry department to plant belts of black pine above mountainous villages to protect them from 
landslides as well as from flood events. This practice of erasure through reforestation is widespread and well documented 
globally. See for example the secret reforestation plan to hide evidence of mass graves in the Nazi death camp located near 
Chełmno nad Nerem inside, Rzuchowski Forest in Poland. See the “Race and Forest” project, available at: 
biennalewarszawa.pl/en/rasa-i-las-2/ (accessed February 2020). For the replanting initiative by the Greek Forestry Service see 
Kalliopi Stara, “The impact of perceived land-use values on biodiversity conservation in the Vikos-Aoos National Park, Papigo, 
Greece”. (Masters diss., University of Wales, Bangor, 2000). 
197 Owain Jones, Paul Cloke, “Non-Human Agencies: Trees in Place and Time” in eds. Carl Knappett and Lambros Malafouris, 





1.3.4. Wild Archaeologies 
 
In one of my visits to Sfika, in March 2019, I noticed two large holes in the ground. They were dug 
meticulously, revealing the knee-high stone walls of a building and running parallel to them, as if to 
unearth something that was adjacent. It was obvious that they had not been dug by an animal. Talking 
to Makis198, a local from the nearest inhabited village who turned out to have been keeping guard during 
the dig, I learned that the holes were dug by looters – including a former army colonel and a priest - 
who had received a tip from the daughters of a former partisan now living in Bulgaria, claiming seven 
boxes of gold coins were buried there during the civil war. This news did not come as a surprise. 
Enchanted by tales of partisans hiding golden coins and weapons in the mountains, looters, equipped 
with metal detectors, often dig in these forested ruins in search of “concealed objects of value”199. Based 
on rumours that partisans received support from Stalin and Tito in the form of gold, these beliefs are 
predicated on misinformed historical readings that carry to the present the state’s perception of the 
“other”, the partisan or the ethnic Macedonian, as an uncontrollably potent subject. Recognizing the 
destructive capacity of these rumours, the Greek state has shown profound tolerance towards these 
illicit excavations, particularly as these have intensified during the years of the financial crisis200. 
Unfetted by the state, looters destroy the little that is left of the houses and remove culturally significant 
objects from them201, indirectly furthering the reach of the state and joining a long history of state-
sanctioned destruction of heritage202. Like the trees that cover the ruins, looters, are “harvested” for 
their destructive agency, and perform a kind of violence that is slow and structural, the violence of 
erasure. 
                                                   
198 Not his real name 
199 Sutton, “The Hidden Bounty”, 86. 
200 As David Sutton explains, during the financial crisis, the emerging discourse on hydrocarbons potentially hidden in the Greek 
undersoil echoed that on antiquities. This was a discourse that was “tied to the mystic powers of the landscape to produce wealth, 
with ‘depths’ serving as a metaphor uniting the geographical, the historical, and the spiritual”. ibid, 100. 
201 The American archaeologist Blythe Bowman Proulx defines looting as the “removal of culturally significant material from 
archaeological sites for commercial gain” see Blythe Bowman Proulx, “Archaeological Site Looting in “Glocal” Perspective: 
Nature, Scope, and Frequency”. American Journal of Archaeology 117, no.1, (2013): 111-125.   
202 As the architectural historian Robert Bevan has shown, in places like Bosnia and the West Bank, acts of looting have been 
deployed by invading and occupying armies as a means to demonstrate brutally and concretely the dominance of the conqueror. 





Photogrammetric reconstruction of a hole dug by looters in the ruins fo Sfika. By author. According to Makis, a local, this hole 
was dug by a group of treasure hunters, including an army colonel and a priest, based on a tip they received from a former 




Makis, not actively looting himself but undoubtedly expecting a minor cut of the treasure, smirkingly 
described the looters as “a curious type of archaeologists”. Makis based his description on the fact that 
looters dug up the mountain in search of old valuables at the slightest of rumours, sometimes using not 
only shovels, but also tools as advanced as ground penetrating radars and metal detectors. To describe 
looters as “curious” archaelogists is an interesting displacement that invites questions not always 
permitted by the more fixed discipline of history. Implemented in the ruins of Sfika, Makis’s “curious 
archaeology” is similar to what the German media theorist Knut Ebeling describes as a “wild 
archaeology”, a discipline operating at a different temporality to that of history, and looking not for the 
old, but for that which is still effective today. As Ebelling argues, “wild archaeologies are working with 
effective, unpast pasts, which is why many of their texts include ghosts and zombies and undead pasts, 
suggesting something that is unfinished, unpast and still effective”203. This is an approach that goes 
against rigid conceptions of archaeology, a discipline which, as demonstrated by the presence of 
archaeologists in the committees responsible for the renaming of settlements, has historically been 
intimately tied to the construction of the imaginary of the Greek nation-state as a descendent of classical 
Greece204.  
 
The looters’ unearthing of the material imprint of Sfika, and of the civil war that emptied it (looters very 
rarely find gold but they often find weapons), has the opposite effect to that of ancient sculptures. Like 
                                                   
203 Knut Ebeling, “The Art of Searching On “Wild Archaeologies” from Kant to Kittler”, The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 51, 
(2016): 7–18, 11. 
204 See Yannis Hamilakis, The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece, (Oxford: 




the sediment core retrieved from the lake, the soil of Sfika holds a telluric archive that, once unsettled, 
troubles jus soli understandings of nationhood and with it, the very concept of the nation state as a 
bounded, linguistically and culturally uniform space, one which safeguards its continuity from classical 
Greece through rigid, impermanent and historically unaltered natural boundaries.  
 
Engaging with the ghost habitat of Sfika through the prism of “wild archaeology” requires understanding 
the village as a complex archaeological record, and the material remnants of inhabitation held under 
the soil and in its very material composition as spatial codifications of the politics of the present. It also 
invites questions of how to best represent the entangled histories of violence that are encrypted in the 
material strata of the Sfika landscape205. Adding to the trap cameras that document the village being 
reclaimed by wildlife, I decided to map the ruins using aerial photography and three-dimensional 
scanning. Invisible from a ground-level perspective, the village reveals itself to the bird’s eye view. From 
above, the outlines of buildings and alleys are still clear, the orchards that conceal them now seemingly 
planted in rows. Using a drone to photograph the village from above, and compositing these photos 
through a process called photogrammetry, I create an accurate, three dimensional model of the village 
ruins. This shift in perspective from the ground to the sky is also largely shadowed by military 
technologies. As with the trap cameras and the minefield, the use of remote sensing and 3D scanning 
through drone photography ghosts the frequent surveillance flights the state army conducted over this 
unfriendly terrain during the civil war as well as the bombardments that ended it. The 3D scans of 
melting plinth walls, their subject no more stable than a photograph of a body in movement, capture 
this double violence of original displacement and destruction, and the quiet, gradual violence of 
replacement and erasure. They document what once was a village, before, soon enough, its spatial 
traces are forever lost. 
                                                   











1.3.5. Ruderal Evidence 
 
“What kind of times are these, when  
to talk about trees is almost a crime  
because it implies silence about so many horrors?” 
 
Bertolt Brecht, to Those Born Later 
 
 
“Plants are sentient, sensing bodies. Shifts in their year-to-year patterns of vigor and decay record long-
term transformations in the environment — changes in the climate, but also political transformations, 









The young, female roe deer seems alarmed. It runs, pauses, looks around wearily, runs again. Since it 
first walked through that door, it has been behaving as if it has walked into a trap, and for good reason. 
Surrounding it are the four walls of what was once St. Athanasius church of Besfina/Sfika. Located on 
a hill overlooking the village, at an altitude of 1215 metres, the church is completely surrounded by the 
forest. It was one of the only two buildings in the village made entirely of stone, and, consequently, it is 
the only one still half-standing. The church was intact until the late 1980s - early 1990s, when the roof 
caved in. Since then, the forest has slowly been making its way inside. Today, the church walls, 12.3 
                                                   




metres wide, 21.5 metres long, and 7 metres tall, reveal the size of the community that once 
congregated inside them and now define the limits of an enclosed garden. The church walls protect the 
plants growing inside them from the winds descending from the mountain behind. The oak, beech, 
cherry and hop-hornbeam trees that now grow 10, 15, 20 metres tall, their canopy reaching above the 
walls, allow little light to penetrate and create a microclimate within the church, milder and more humid 
than the ruderal207 mosaic of abandoned fields and wilded orchards that dominate the rest of the village 
ruins. A carpet or ferns, orchids, iris and wild strawberries covers the church floor, and moss and 
mushrooms grow on the wood planks, stones, and ceramic tiles that fell inside the church after the roof 
collapsed. Lichens, clematis and ivy scale the walls and tree trunks. One cannot move within the church 
without tripping on their roots, which form a dense, entangled network that is reminiscent of the 
minefield. Like the many animals that enter the church to graze, the alarmed deer is feeding within a 
30-year-old forest.  
 
 




Photo: The church seen from a bird’s eye view, November 2019. Photo by author and Marianna Bisti. 
 
                                                   
207 The word “ruderal” comes from the Latin rudus, meaning “rubble”. While in botany the term is used to describe the first plant 
species that colonize disturbed lands, here I am using it somewhat more freely to encompass all the plant species growing on 
the rubbles of Sfika. 
208 Nikolaos Moutsopoulos, Εκκλησίες του Νομού Φλώρινας. Βυζαντινά και Μεταβυζαντινά μνημεία της Μακεδονίας. 





The Sfika church is only one of the many blooming ruins of post 40s Europe. Abandoned in the 40s 
after the end of the Second World and Civil Wars, and collapsed in the early 90s, coinciding with the 
fall of communist regimes across the border, the church joins a nexus of abandoned and decaying 
spaces that span seven decades and extend from the German “rubble mountains”, or 
Trümmerbergen209, to the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone in, and the demilitarized zones at the edge of the 
iron curtain. Trees growing on this rubble are charged with the histories of abandonment that created 
the conditions for the forest to penetrate the church. Consequently, the role of the environmental 
disciplines in archiving these histories or, as Susan Schuppli phrases it, in “gain[ing] access to the 
informational quotient” carried by the “spatialized matter” of trees210 is paramount. As the German 
novelist Heinrich Böll, who proposed that plants emerging from the rubble of WWII bombing in Cologne 
are used as temporal indices of time elapsed since an area was bombed, unearthing complex histories 
of violence here is often directly a “question of botany”211. 
 
To access this “informational quotient” I collaborated with botanist Fanourios Nikolas Sakellarakis, a 
Tour du Valat scholar who has been researching flora in the Prespa region for years, to conduct a 
floristic study of the church forest. Conducting several field visits between May and August 2020, we 
registered 29 plant taxa212 growing inside this 12.3 m by 21.5 m grid. For each taxon a sample was 
collected, pressed, identified and catalogued in an herbarium, joining a growing archive that evidences 
the slow violence of the border. The space of the church, where the samples were extracted, was crucial 
for the demarcation and enforcement of this border. The building itself, architectural evidence of the 
Christian religion of the inhabitants of Sfika, was important in ceding the village to Greece. After the 
demarcation, the “divine power” to change the locals’ names was also vested to the space; both inside 
its walls, through baptism, and outside, through burial. 
 
For the people entering (or leaving) the country through the mountain, the forest that surrounds the 
church extends the border, often in unexpectedly deadly ways. In July 2019, near the church of Sfika, 
the body of an unidentified Albanian man was found, dismembered by the forest animals.  The young 
shepherd who found the body, Christos, later took me to the location. A few electronic devices and 
household objects were still lying nearby. These led the police to swiftly conclude that the man was a 
burglar who had crossed over from Albania and was returning home with his catch. The case was never 
resolved and the police closed the file without an identification, leaving the objects in the forest for me 
to collect. The anthropologist Michael Taussig describes this constant interplay of the nation state (and, 
                                                   
209 Trümmerberg, which translates as “rubble mountain” or Schuttberg (debris hill) is a term used to describe the hills that were 
created in German cities from amassed rubble caused by allied bombings. See Fernanda De Maio, “The Green Hills of Rubble 
in Black and White”, Transactions on the Built Environment 131, (2013): 531-541 
210 Schuppli, Material Witness, 208. 
211 Heinrich Böll, Der Engel Schweig (The Silent Angel), trans. By Breon Mitchell (1995 (original 1949-50)) 
212 Species and subspecies. Full floristic catalog can be found in the appendix. More species of lichen, moss and fungi were 




by extension, its borders) between “ordered system and unstable agent of terror”, as “the nervous 
system’”213. Dig into the soil to uproot a plant (which we had to do several times in our botanical survey), 








In his essay In the Forest Ruins, Paolo Tavares argues that in Amazonia “the natural environment 
itself—the content and distribution of plant species, the shape of the canopy, variations in topography 
and soil composition etc.—constitute archaeological records in their own right.” The forest, he continues 
quoting the ecologist William Balée, “configures a great archaeological archive that “harbors 
inscriptions, stories and memories in the living vegetation itself.”214
 
Reflecting on indigenous 
understandings of the forest as a sacred entity with its own societal codes and structures, Tavares 
observes how, on the opposite side of the spectrum, “[i]n western thought the forest represents the 
threshold of the law, the space of the civic.”215  Reading Tavares against the ruins of Sfika, I argue that 
the moving treeline is calculated to consume the civic space that was once inhabited by non-ethnic 
Greeks living within what became Greek territory. The violent border histories of Sfika are therefore 
encoded as “wild archaeologies” into the vegetative matter of the trees growing inside the church, their 
growth “branching” into politics and history and “acting as temporal indices that allow us to travel back 
in time” to the day the roof collapsed, or even further, when the border was carved on the slopes behind 
                                                   
213 Taussig quoted in Myrivili, “The Liquid Border”, 53.  
214 Paulo Tavares, “In the Forest Ruins”, e-flux, available at: https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/superhumanity/68688/in-the-





the village216.  
 
Built from, and returning to, the forest soil, the vegetated ruins of Sfika trouble not only notions of identity 
and nationhood in Prespa, but also the very boundaries between culture and nature in the park itself. 
As the forest gradually engulfs the village, the “wild”, a concept central to the construction and 
governance of otherness by the western colonial imaginary is here conjured to assist in the spatial 
construction of the Greek and European frontier. In erasing patterns of habitation by the border, the 
constructed “wild” creates a forested buffer between Greece, Albania and Northern Macedonia and 
“naturalises” the border making it seem as if it was always there. As the subtitle of the part of the thesis 
suggests, following decades of coercion and abandonment, Prespa is now a border, wilded. As I will 






Herbarium Besfinense, Ophrys sphegodes subsp. mammosa (Desf.) E. Nelson. (left), and Epipacts sp. (right). By author and 
Fanourios-Nikolaos Sakellarakis. 
 
                                                   
216 Here I am drawing from Susan Schuppli’s enquiry into trees “branching into law”. In a chapter that goes under the same name, 
Schuppli details how the “arboreal signature” of a Lombardy poplar, a mulberry, and a walnut tree captured in a video and 







Herbarium Besfinense, Iris germanica L (top). Iris germanica growing in space of the former the cemetery, outside the church 
walls, June 2020 (bottom). Photos by author. While the iris is native in the forest of Sfika, it’s the density at which it occurs 
outside the church signals that it has clearly been planted there as a decorative plant, and has since multiplied. With the graves 











1.4.1. A Red Lake 
 
“If, exceptionally, the demarcation line is followed by a trail, or a narrow, the citizens of the two littoral 
countries will have the right to use this trail or narrow.” 
 
Article 6 of the 1925 Florence Protocol, “Trails and narrows following the border”217 
 
Following the mountain streams down the ravines of Sfika, one finds the old trail that runs through 
another abandoned village, Kranies/Drenovo, along the southern shores of Lesser Prespa lake. When 
it was in use, the trail was called “Udhë Ujk”, Albanian for “wolf trail”218. Today, due to its location on the 
foothills of the north-facing, steep slopes of mount Sfika, the trail runs through thick Oak and juniper 
forests and is for the most part near impenetrable. Doing justice to its old name, it is overwhelmingly 
used by wildlife, with the exception of the occasional hiker or herders from the nearby Greek villages 
who bring their flocks to the lush pastures of Kranies during the spring and summer months. Wrapped 









Until the end of the 19th century, the trail was part of the mule route that passed through Florina, Pisoderi 
pass, Prevol, Oxia in modern day Greece, into Biglista, Korce and Devoll, in modern day Albania, 
connecting not only the multi-ethnic communities living around the lakes but also forming part of a 
                                                   
217 available online at www.sfeva.gr/E41C4090.el.aspx (accessed July 2020). 




network of roads that connected the Ottoman territories of the southwestern Balkans to Istanbul219. 
When the cart road that connected Pisoderi to Krystallopigi and Biglista was built in 1872, the same 
road that today leads to the official border crossing station, the trail was largely abandoned, and was 
mainly used to reach the village of Kranies/Drenovo.   
 
During the Civil War, the trail was used frequently once again as it connected the partisans to Albania, 
allowing them to move safely between the fronts of Prespa (Vitsi) and Grammos, to transport supplies 
and arms into Greece and to take their wounded to the hospitals they had set up in the Albanian side 
of the border. On the last day of the ‘Pyrsos’ offensive, August 16th 1949, the national army rolled 
downhill from Sfika to block the partisans’ and locals’ escape to Albania throught the trail.220 From there, 
they also embarked on small boats to reach the peninsula across the lake and cut off the last possible 
route to Albania, through west Prespa.221 The events of these days, narrated by the former partisan, 
Dimitris Penis, are harrowing: 
 
From the early hours of the 10th, different types of airplanes started flying above Prespa in waves, so fast, 
and so low, that their wake forced the reeds to bend before them. Wherever one would look, they would 
see black smoke. In the six days that the bombardments lasted, over 100 air raids were conducted, 
thousands of 227-245kg bombs were thrown, 44 of which were Napalm. They shook the lake waters. The 
mountains between Mikrolimni and Oxia villages were burning. The small bay with the magnificent lake 
view and the meadows and reedbeds where the eggretts wintered was being battered by mortars and 
bombs. The water birds, scared, were trying to seek refuge in the reeds, while the travelling birds, breaking 
with their migratory patterns had to cut their stay short and left for unknown destinations. (…) Hundreds 
of thousands of dead fish were floating in the waters of the lake, which was painted red by the blood of 
both partisans and animals.222 
In Penis’s narration, the eruptive violence of the civil war is inscribed on the body of the lake. The bomb 
strikes fill the lake with blood, mixing human and animal and turning the waters of the lake into a 




The trail seen in aerial photographs of 1945. Photo: Greek National Cadastre. 
                                                   
219 See novazora.gr/arhivi/12779. 
220 Hellenic Army General Staff, Operation Pyrsos, 79. 
221 Ibid, 98. 





Part of the clear segment of the trail, April 2019 Photo by author. 
 
 
In the years that followed the Civil War, the village of Kranies/Drenovo was abandoned in the same 
manner as Sfika/Besfina, and so was the trail. While the trail itself was conceded to the forest, the rich 
lands around the lake that were left behind were confiscated and redistributed by the state223. This 
ushered in a new wave of engineering and disciplining, this time directed towards the lake waters 
themselves, and the land around them. The lakeside landscape of the entire basin was reconfigured: 
riparian forests were cleared, an irrigation network was constructed (which is being renovated at the 
time of writing), and lots were carved out of the fertile shores. During the 1980s, the agricultural 
production of Prespa was converted to bean monoculture through state subsidies and regulation. This 
shift coincided with Greece's entry to the European Economic Community (the predecessor to the EU) 
and is still effective today. Similar shifts in land use took place in the North Macedonian shores, where 
apples are cultivated as a single crop, and in Albania, where mass deforestation in the years of the 
Hoxha regime caused extensive soil erosion. 
 
Joining the “wounded” ridges and expanding forests, this new riparian landscape was yet another 
spatial expression and consequence of state force at the border. It was also consistent with 
longstanding colonialist programmes to subject and regulate the terrain, and even climate224, in their 
                                                   
223 As the anthropologist Ricky Van Boeschoten has shown, this redistribution favoured the settlers over the dopyi who had 
stayed behind, therefore reinforcing the “stratification of the Prespa society along ethnic lines and criteria of national loyalty”. 
Riki Van Boeschoten, “When Difference Matters: Sociopolitical Dimensions of Ethnicity in the District of Florina” in ed. Jane 
Cowan, Macedonia: The Politics of Identity and Difference. (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
224 As Eyal Weizman notes, “the climate has always been a project for colonial powers, which have continually acted to engineer 





efforts to eradicate indigenous ways of life225. As Ros Gray and Shela Sheikh fittingly discuss in their 
text The Wretched Earth, “colonialism has always entailed the cultivation of lands as well as that of 
bodies and minds.”226  
 
Today, the violence that turned the lake red in august 1949 is still carried by the body of the lake in 
more nuanced and slower forms. Pesticides and fertilizers from large-scale bean monoculture fill the 
lake waters with excess nutrients, causing their eutrophication227, and intensive irrigation joins karst 
drainage and diminishing levels of snowfall in the winter as one of the main reasons that contribute to 
the steady shrinkage of the two lakes. At the time of writing, in summer 2020, Greater Prespa lake 
stands some 10m lower that in the 1990s228.  
 
In their eutrophic retreat, the lake waters change the very chemical composition of the liquid border - 
now a mixture of melting snow, sediment, aquatic life and fertilizers - and unevenly partition new arable 
territory to the three riparian countries, therefore directly altering the borders between them. As the 
water around it ebbs and flows in tandem with land use, earthquakes, and snowfall in the mountains, 
the 22.3 kilometre long border line separating the three countries over the waters of the two Prespa 
lakes229 is scripted on new “New Lands” emerging from the bottom of the lake and, in so doing, becomes 
an measuring device for both local and planetary earth-altering processes, and a reminder of the effect 
these have on attempts to demarcate state sovereignty.
                                                   
225 For James Scott, there is a “permanent association” of the state with sedentary, fixed-field, plantation-style agriculture in the 
place of more diverse forms of cultivation. Scott, The Art of not Being Governed, 5-9.  
226 Ros Gray and Shela Sheikh, “The Wretched Earth”, Third Text 32, no.2-3, (2018): 163-175. 
227 Zlatko Levkov et al., “Ecology of Benthic Diatoms from Lake Macro Prespa (Macedonia)”, Algological Studies 124, (July 
2007): 71-83, 71. 
228 Thinking through the entanglements of hydrogeological and political shifts in Prespa within the context of the 2018 “Prespa 
Agreement”, the Macedonian anthropologist Rozita Dimova suggests that the fact that the lakes are shared by three countries 
“created conditions for producing alterity and phantasmic stories whereby the Other was always the culprit” for the receding 
waters. See Dimova, “The Hollow Signifier “Prespa””. 
229 The Greek/Macedonia border over the Greater Prespa lake is 11.4 kilometres long, the Macedonian/Albanian border over the 
Greater Prespa lake is 4 kilometres long, the Greek/Albanian border over the Greater Prespa lake is 5.9 kilometres long, and the 





1.4.2. RABITs on the wolf trail: the “Green Border” 
 
“Before Frontex started the Joint Operations, we used to apprehend more migrants in the urban areas; 
now thanks to their troops patrolling the green border, the migrants are located mainly on the border 
section with Greece,”  
Albanian Border Police director Eduart Merkaj, to Reuters230 
 
“The southernmost part of the European Green Belt hosts a hot spot of biodiversity and endemism. 
Predominantly located in the mountain ranges of the Balkan Peninsula, it forms an extremely 
heterogeneous mosaic of natural landscapes, including pristine alpine ecosystems, forests and steppe 
habitats, as well as lakes and coastal zones. The remote border areas and extensive forests are home to 
shy animals such as the Balkan lynx.” 
The European Green Belt Association231 
 
 
In the 1980s, the trail was partially cleared up to a few kilometres from the border on the Greek side 
after French ornithologists discovered a cross-border habitat in the narrow tip of the lake: a shallow 
mosaic of half-submerged willow trees, reedbeds, wet meadows and patches of open water dotted with 
water lillies and inhabited by an incredible wealth of avifauna232. On the Albanian side, throughout the 
Hoxha years the trail was cut on the border with electricified barbed wire and was guarded by armed 
soldiers. This fortification was equally to do with cross-border disputes between Greece and Albania233, 
and with preventing Albanian citizens from fleeing the insular regime.  
Throughout the 1990s, after the Socialist regime in Albania collapsed in 1991, followed by the collapse 
of the economy in 1997, the trail, like so many other remote and treacherous mountain passages, was 
crossed daily by groups of Albanians who tried to reach Greece in search for seasonal work in Prespa, 
or continued South, looking for a new life in the Greek cities. Criminals, also mostly (but not exclusively) 
Albanian, set ambushes along these passages robbing the migrants returning to their villages on the 
                                                   
230 See Benet Koleka, “On Albania Border Patrol, EU’s Frontex Helps Tackle Migrant Flow”, Kathimerini, July 24, 2019, 
www.ekathimerini.com/242957/article/ekathimerini/news/on-albania-border-patrol-eus-frontex-helps-tackle-migrant-flow 
(accessed July 2020). 
231 The “European Green Belt Association” initiative, with the moto “borders divide, nature unites!”, envisions the establishment 
of a cross-border wildlife corridor along the demilitarized borders of the formed iron curtain. The “Green Belt” runs from the 
Russian-Finnish border in the north, through the Baltic states, Germany, Central Europe and the Balkans (which it describes as 
“the mountainous Belt”), spanning the entire length of the northern borders of Greece. See www.europeangreenbelt.org 
(accessed July 2020). 
232 Giorgos Catsadorakis, “The Importance of Prespa National Park for Breeding and Wintering Wirds, Hydrobiologia 351, no.1 
(August 1997): 157–174. 
233 This infrastructural introversion, consistent with the logic of the bufferization of Prespa, was also true for the Greek side of 
the border. When, during the 60’s, the inhabitants of Greek Prespa asked the state to build roads in the region, they were told 
that this was not possible as it would “facilitate the advances of the invading enemies.” See Myrivili, “Liquid Border” 105. Until 
1985, the border pass of Krystallopigi, on the other side of Sfika mountain was the only operational border pass between 




other side of Prespa of their seasonal earnings234.  Greek border police patrolled for both. In her 
fieldwork notes, Myrivili describes the experience of driving around the mountains of Prespa at the time, 
to encounter “the Albanian as a flash, like a deer suddenly bounding across the road, disappearing just 
as quickly into the rocks, bushes and trees, never to be seen again.” Myrivili here mirrors the language 
of the police, recounting how “[a]mong (…) military men, myths run rampant about the Albanians’ 
toughness, their speed, and their ability to bear hardship and pain. This, of course, demeans them as 
it ennobles them: the Albanian both as superhuman and as primitive or animalistic.”235 
Crucially, this “hunt” along the “wolf trail” was carried out within the context of the Entry-exit, Sojourn, 
Employment, Deportation of Aliens, Recognition of Procedure of Foreign Refugees and Other 
Provisions directive, which, issued in 1991, was the first immigration-related piece of legislation in 
Greece. Under this directive, a special border patrol force was established within the police, and was 
vested with the authority to decide who would get permission for entry and who would be returned, 
therefore circumventing well-established international asylum protocols. 
The Greek border with Albania, and the “wolf trail” in particular, is therefore one of the loci where the 
contemporary border apparatus of Fortress Europe began taking shape in the aftermath of the 1985 
Schengen Agreement. A close look at its recent history is critical in charting the origins of practices that 
are today widespread in the Greek borders, and external borders of the EU at large, like civilian 
paramilitary “hunts” of asylum seekers in the Evros river Delta, and illicit pushbacks in the Aegean Sea 
by the Greek Coast Guard, both of which I will explore in the following chapters. 
Still, today, people who are not granted the necessary documents to cross through the Krystallopigi 
border passage, on the other side of the mountain, take to the trail, making it an important node in the 
informal natural-infrastructural network of cross-border pathways that enables what today is called the 
“circular migration” from Albania to Greece236. Consequently, over the past 30 years, the trail, 
intersecting a border that is selectively porous, but no less violent, has provided a route through which 
labor mobilities are filtered and governed, perpetuating a regime of “differential inclusion”237.  
Even though in the last decade the necropolitical gaze of “Fortress Europe” has shifted eastwards, 
towards the Greek borders with Turkey, the Prespa border is by no means dormant. In parallel with the 
seasonal migrations of the “circular route” European authorities are now concerned by an emerging 
sub-route through Albania to Central Europe for “non regional migrants”, as Frontex call them. Since 
                                                   
234 Going for hikes as a child in Prespa, I still remember the locals cautioning me against taking that trail because it was 
frequented by the “Albanian Mafia”. 
235 Myrivili, “The Liquid Border”, 50. 
236 See Frontex, “Western Balkan Route”, https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-balkan-route/ 
(accessed October 2020. 
237 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour, (Durham and London: Duke 




the EU-Turkey deal of 2016, and the closing of what came to be known as the “Balkan Corridor”238, the 
borders of Prespa have been contested and crossed anew, this time in the opposite direction, by people 
fleeing conflict elsewhere in the world. Ghosting the movements of the Civil War armies and of the 
Greek border guards in the 90s are “guest officers” from Frontex who monitor and intercept these 
crossings within the context of Operation “Poseidon Land”. Though the trail itself is not actively patrolled 
today – police informally told me the dirt road that leads to the trail is too rough for their jeeps - it is here 
that they have allegedly hidden cameras in the rocks and trees.  
Since May 2019, however, this border presents another particularity, once more casting it as a testbed 
for bordering practices to be implemented widely. It hosts Frontex’s first-ever operation carried out on 
the territory of a neighboring, non-European Union country. Frontex Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
(RABITs), made up of 50 officers from 12 EU countries239, patrol the Albanian side of the border jointly 
with Albanian officers, intercepting an average of ten people a day on Albanian soil240, in what is an 
outright performance of border externalization.  
In the words of the director of the Albanian border police, Eduart Merkaj, Frontex’s presence on the 
“green border” of Prespa thickens it, transforming it from a line, back into a zone, within which migrants 
are intercepted before they reach the Albanian cities. This spatial arrangement mirrors similar zones 
that have historically been set up on the Greek side of Prespa, from the flexibly interpreted “deportation 
zone” within which Albanians were captured and summarily deported in the 90s, to the “Surveilled Zone” 
of the post-war decades, and the “shatter zone” that preceeded and precipitated both.  
 
The term “green border”, alluded to by Merkaj is an emerging trope used to describe the forested, 
mountainous and infrastructure-free former borders of the iron curtain. In border patrol, the term is used 
to convey the double-entendre of the softer, materially diverse “natural” border infrastructures, where 
the environment does the work of fencing. Made up of uneven forces and flows, the “green border” 
expresses the difficulties that the vegetated, hostile terrain poses on border surveillance efforts. At the 
same time the term is also indirectly mobilized to deflect blame for any deadly “frictions” this terrain 
imposes on the bodies of migrants, as was the case with the man who was discovered eaten by the 
animals near the church of Sfika, and with many more who continue to lose their lives during these 
treacherous mountainous crossings.  
 
Examined against the context of the Prespa trilateral border, the “green border” hints to the ecological, 
                                                   
238 The term “Balkan Corridor” refers to the route asylum seekers would take during the “summer of migration” to go from Greece 
to Germany within the space of a few days, crossing several Balkan borders freely. The signing of the EU-Turkey deal closed 
that route. For weeks after the deal was signed, the Balkan borders shut in a domino-like effect, and thousands of migrants found 
themselves stranded at the Greek – Macedonian border of Idomeni/Gevgelija, not far from Prespa. Since, crossings have shifted 
westwards, through Albania, often through Prespa.  
239 These numbers are for the final quarter of 2019. See www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launches-
first-operation-in-western-balkans-znTNWM (accessed June 2020) 
240 According to data published by the Greek newspaper Kathimerini, 2,047 migrants were apprehended in 2015, then numbers 




cultural, legislative, and military processes through which the border was demarcated, engineered, 
emptied, and “wilded”. It becomes a crucial theoretical tool that allows us to de-construct the deep 
histories of originary, perpetual border violence and their contemporary hauntings. Spanning large 
swathes of the external frontiers of the EU, the green border speaks to the intentional rendering of 
borderlands into “wild spaces”, ones that are “naturally” governerned by violence. Spaces that at first 
glance appear to be wild or natural and thus outside the space of civil law, but in reality, as I will discuss 
further in the remaining chapters, are very much the result of a “flooding” of the space of the border with 
violence through law and operational assets. 
Implying an absence of human life, the “green border” echoes the threats, whispers and silences that 
lurk in the thick foliage of the Prespa forests and that maintain the order of the nation state, shoring up 
its boundaries and hiding its unpleasant and undead pasts. In so doing, it presents researchers with 
important questions regarding the the authority of historical archives to narrate this “ghost habitat”, and 
it calls for a closer reading of the environment as the medium upon which the untold is inscribed and 
codified.  
My enquiry into the borders of Prespa has tried to respond to this challenge. Reflecting on a trilateral 
boundary that has been historically porous for people, animals, and water alike, I have shown that 
bordering is a process that has a duration, and which involves the hybridization of nature, whether direct 
or collateral. The environment, here, “belongs within the histories of violence”241, and, when paid 
attention to, it speaks to a territorial divide that may be claimed as natural, but which fails to naturalize, 
the line incessantly refracted like the evening light on the lake’s surface. This was not only an enquiry 
into the past. Beyond piecing together what once was, and what is now muted, I tried to unpack and 
represent the contemporary spatialities of border power and the complex interractions between human 
collectives, environmental forces and non-human forms of life that these set into motion. 
 
In the remaining two chapters, Anáchoma and Grey Rocks, Black Waves, I will explore how the natural 
environment is itself not only sculpted to conceal and further past atrocities, but also is strategically 
rendered hostile and weaponised to perform an indirect, yet attricious, kind of violence against the 
bodies of border crossers.
                                                   










This second part of the dissertation is co-authored with my collaborator Ifor Duncan, PhD (CRA), and Post-doctoral fellow at Ca’ 
Foscari University, Venice. A first version of the text was written into Ifor’s PhD following a joint visit to the region of Evros in early 
2018. Ifor took the lead, adjusting the text to his overall thesis, and I contributed with edits. Different chapters from the text have 
since been edited, published and presented jointly and separately. The present text, primarily authored by myself and edited by 
Ifor, draws heavily from these past iterations, while also introducing new research and analysis, with an emphasis on dissecting 




In the minefields of Evros, 
In the bottom of the Aegean, 
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2.1.1. Six Flooded Graves 
 
 
“I was expecting three bodies, I received seven legs. Instead of six, there were seven legs in the box. I 
said to the people from the mortuary ‘guys, what is this’? They put one extra leg in the box… They didn’t 
know who it belonged to, so they put it in anyway. We ended up burying all seven legs. We need to 
respect a dead body. People would say ‘it’s a spare leg, throw it away’. No, it doesn’t work like this… In 
Gemisti, there is a minefield. Someone entered, he got killed. No-one would dare to go and collect the 
body. Several years later - because you could only see the bones and the skull by then - a person from 
a funeral parlour entered carefully, collected the bones, put them in a cardboard box and brought them 
here. I respected that.” 




It was early evening when we243 arrived at the “Cemetery for Illegal Aliens”244, a fenced area overlooking 
the village of Sidiro. The February sun was setting rapidly behind the gentle hills, where the Rhodope 
mountain fades into the plains of river Maritsa/Evros/Meriç245, and Bulgaria into Greece. The afternoon 
silence was only interrupted by the occasional dog barking from the village below. Except for the 
fencing, there was little in this pastoral landscape to betray this field as a site of border violence. We 
were unsure of the location as there were no immediate signs246 or gravestones. 
 
Had we not eventually stumbled upon the sight of six deep, body-sized holes in the ground, flooded by 
winter rainwater, we would have turned back and left, thinking we had trespassed into some villager’s 
field. Looking carefully around the six holes, and with the help of the long, late afternoon shadows, we 
began to discern several lumps of earth within the bramble berry bushes and weeds. The size of the 
lumps indicates that there are human bodies buried underneath them and their arrangement, in rows, 
betraying that these bodies are many. In one corner of the cemetery, tucked behind earth and 
vegetation are four247 small plaques demarcating the graves of two men who had been identified post-
mortem, a Syrian from Aleppo and a Palestinian from the Yarmouk camp in Damascus.  
                                                   
242 Translated from a recorded conversation in Greek by the author. 
243 “We” refers to myself and my collaborator Ifor Duncan, PhD (CRA) (Post-doctoral fellow at Ca’ Foscari University, Venice), 
with whom Part II of this dissertation is co-authored. Where key terms from our separate research appear, such as ‘border 
natures’, pertinent to my research, I will specify so. 
244 “Illegal aliens” is a loose translation of the term lathrometanastes, a derogatory term used by xenophobic discourse to describe 
illegalized migrants. The use of the term was banned by law in 2018 but is still used widely, including from state officials. 
245 In this text, the name used changes to reflect the cultural and geopolitical division of the region and the river. When the entire 
river catchment is discussed all three names will be provided. When just the river border between Greece and Turkey is referred 
to, this changes to Evros/Meriç. When one name is provided, the river is addressed from the context of the relevant side of the 
border. 
246 The sign, pierced by bullets, has since been removed. 







Flooded graves at the “cemetery for illegal aliens” at Sidiro, February 2019. Photo by authors. 
 
 
Sidiro, Demirören in Turkish, is a predominantly Turkish Sunni Muslim village on the eastern slopes of 
the Rhodope, a large mountain range that spans the borders of Greece and Bulgaria. It is located 11 
kilometres south-east of the Greek-Bulgarian border and some 15 kilometres west of the Greek-Turkish 
river border of Evros/Meriç. In this remote corner, Greece is only 20km wide, pressed in and 
crisscrossed by the Evros river and its tributaries descending the Rhodope slopes, the Daul Dere and 
the Erythropotamos/Kizil Dere/Luda Reka248. This is an area of ethnic and linguistic diversity. It is also 
one that is regularly crossed and, consequently, heavily policed. 
 
The Evros/Meriç/Maritsa is the second longest river in the Balkans. It has its source in the Rila 
mountains in western Bulgaria and runs for 310 of its 528-kilometre-long course through Bulgaria, as 
the Maritsa. Its final 210 kilometres form a border, delimited by the 1923 Lausanne Peace treaty249, 
initially between Bulgaria and Greece, where the river is called Evros, and then for the last 192 
kilometres between Greece and Turkey, where it is called Meriç, before reaching its delta and emptying 
into the Thracian Sea in the northern Aegean. This Final stretch of the Evros/Meriç is frequently referred 
to as the “land” border or a “natural border” between Greece and Turkey250. Thrace251, the cross border 
area through which the river runs, provides the only land crossing between Asia and Europe south of 
                                                   
248 As the river is called in Greek, Turkish, and Bulgarian, respectively. 
249 from here on: Lausanne. 
250 Evros is also part of the “European Green Belt” project that engulfs Prespa and the borderlands along the former Iron 
Curtain. 




the Black Sea. Consequently, the Thracian plain, and the river that cuts across it, have been of strategic 
geopolitical importance for centuries. The history and memory of conflict in the region is engrained into 
the border landscape, and is still palpable through the ruins of Byzantine watchtowers and fortresses 
overlooking the river. In conservation ecology the area is also known as the “Thracian Bridge”, due to 
its importance as a corridor for migrating birds. It is the same geographical qualities of connection that 
attract border crossers to the river: since the late 80s the Evros/Meriç has become an established route 
for refugees travelling through Turkey from the Kurdish territories, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, as well as from East Africa.  Following the failed 2016 coup d’état in Turkey, Turkish asylum 
seekers are also increasingly crossing the river into Greece in response to President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s post-coup purges and repressive policies.  
 
The completion of a 12-kilometre-long fence in 2012 along the only part of the border that is not 
delimited by the river made these crossings significantly more difficult. This meant that migrants had to 
cross the river rather than the safer land route, and also saw a major increase in crossings elsewhere 
such as the deadly Aegean route252. The pattern changed again after the EU-Turkey agreement of 2016 
which led to a decrease in the numbers of crossings along the Aegean sea route and saw the land route 
increase once more253. This increase was especially evident in 2018 where the number of crossings 
spiked along the river, exceeding those in the islands for the first time since the “refugee crisis” of 
2015254. Many more who cross the river, however, are never registered. They are summarily arrested 
and detained and violently returned across the river to Turkey in secrecy, in an illegal practice widely 
referred to as “pushbacks”. Several human rights reports identify that pushback practices are 
systematic and embedded within the Evros/Meriç border regime, stretching back to before the 
millennium255.  
In late February 2020, the Evros/Meriç river became a flash point once more, when the Turkish 
government opened its borders with Greece in an attempt to exert political pressure on the EU over the 
conflict in Syria, directing thousands of migrants and refugees to the Evros/Meriç border with the false 
promise of an open route to Europe. The Greek government responded by deploying large police and 
military forces to the region, and suspended its asylum system. Tensions lasted for several days, during 
which at least two asylum seekers lost their lives to Greek bullets256. Among the many politicians who 
visited either side of the border during the “March 2020 events” was the European commission 
                                                   
252 Many, including activist group Stop Evros Wall consider the increases of drowning in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas as 
the direct result of the fence. Stop Evros Wall, stopevroswall.blogspot.com/ (accessed May 2019). 
253 Land route refers to crossing the Evros. 
254 Giannis Papadpoulos, “Ξημέρωμα στην πόρτα της Ευρώπης [Sunrise at the Door of Europe]” Kathimerini, 29 April, 2018, 
www.kathimerini.gr/961340/interactive/epikairothta/ereynes/evros-3hmerwma-sthn-porta-ths-eyrwphs (accessed May 2019). 
255 “Stuck in a Revolving Door: Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European 
Union”, Human Rights Watch, 26 November, 2008, www.hrw.org/report/2008/11/26/stuck-revolving-door/iraqis-and-other-
asylum-seekers-and-migrants-greece/turkey (accessed May 2019). 
256 Muhammad al-Arab and Muhammad Gulzar. The Greek authorities to this day deny these deaths and denounce any such 




president, Ursula von der Leyen. Accompanied by the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and 
three more EU leaders, von der Leyen gave a statement from Evros, in which she praised Greece for 
being Europe’s aspida, using the Greek word for “shield”, ασπίδα (aspída)257. Der Leyen’s choice of 
vocabulary uncannily echoed local military discourse, in which the region is often called 




EU Commissioner Ursula von der Leyen flying over Evros on 3 March 2020. Source: news.gr. 
 
The March 2020 events, with their eruptive force, shed a sudden light into what until that point was the 
slow and largely imperceptible weaponisation of the river. They were punctuating moments that brought 
to the fore the slower environmental processes mobilized against asylum seekers at the border and 
which, as we will discuss, contributed to its further and rapid militarisation. The river now forms an 
almost impenetrable fluvial barrier against those who attempt to cross into the EU to apply for asylum. 
The defunct “Surveilled Zone” that also included Prespa is here ghosted by an active military buffer 
zone which shadows the river, extending as far as the main roads and railway line at the edge of its 
floodplain. Access to this buffer zone is tightly controlled and photography is prohibited, creating a 
scarce image regime and clear limitations for research. This contributes to an ambiguous frontier zone 
with gaps in knowledge and observation within which extraterritorial violence takes place with impunity. 
Coinciding with the extents of the Evros floodplain, the buffer zone is maintained through a combination 
                                                   
257 Jennifer Rankin, “Migration: EU Praises Greece as ‘shield’ after Turkey opens border”, Guardian, 3 March, 2020, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/migration-eu-praises-greece-as-shield-after-turkey-opens-border (accessed March 
2020). Tellingly, “Operation Shield (Aspída)” is also the name of the border patrol operation launched by the Greek government 




of ecological, military and, at places, conservation processes that produce a fluvial border technology. 
This blurring of the floodplain and buffer zone is a particular focus of this chapter, as are the continuums 
of violence and zoning that produce the lethal spatiality of the Evros/Meriç border. 
 
As such, the Evros/Meriç is a deadly border. Professor Pavlos Pavlidis, coroner of the Greek Evros 
prefecture and the authority on post-mortem conditions in the region, keeps a detailed archive of the 
bodies found on the Greek banks of Evros. When I visited him at the University hospital of 
Alexandroupolis in November 2018, his excel spreadsheet listed 359 casualties since the year 2000258. 
During our conversations, Pavlidis stressed the point that the numbers in his computer screen only 
accounted for the bodies found on the Greek side of the border and that, due to lack of communication 
with the Turkish authorities, there is no consensus on the total number of people who have lost their 
lives attempting this crossing. Pavilidis said that he can only assume that there are at least as many 
corpses on the Turkish side, and many more who have not been found. He therefore informally 
calculates the total number of casualties for these past twenty years to be well above 1000 people. 
 
More than three hundred of these bodies are buried here, underneath our feet, in this bald patch of 
ground surrounded by young oak trees, across a ravine from Sidiro. Since the mid-90s, Mufti Mehmet, 
the former religious leader of the Muslim community of Evros259 and a resident of Sidiro has been 
administering burial rights for unidentified bodies recovered from the river in this cemetery. The first 
dead were buried in Sidiro in 1989. They were the mutilated bodies of three Turkish Kurds from the 
Anatolian province of Tunceli who had stepped into one of the many minefields that, until at least as 
late as 2008260, riddled the Greek banks of Evros. Their dismembered remains, and a seventh, 
unidentified, leg, were buried in the Muslim cemetery of Sidiro, next to deceased locals. The entire 
village gathered, the Mufti remembers, to pay their respects through prayer. In the years that followed, 
the Mufti buried more people in the Sidiro cemetery and in the cemeteries of the other Muslim villages 
of Evros261. However, as the number of bodies emerging from the river grew262, and the local cemeteries 
began running out of space, the residents complained that soon they “won’t have space for their own 
people”. It was decided that the dead migrants needed to be buried in a separate place and, following 
a lot of deliberation, the community deemed the current location appropriate, a field where the Mufti’s 
father used to grow barley, which is relatively flat and far enough from the village. 
                                                   
258 The vast majority of whom are men (326). A report published in late 2020 by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency lists 133 
casualties for the period January 2018 - October 2020. Subtracting the 23 casualties listed on Pavlidis’s sheet for 2018, and 
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“Migration: Fundamental Rights. Issues at Land Borders”, December 9, 2020, fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-
2020-land-borders-report_en.pdf, (accessed December 2020), 18. 
259 from 1988 to 2018. A mufti is an Islamic jurist qualified to issue a nonbinding opinion (fatwa) on a point of Islamic law (sharia). 
Sharia is still in effect in the muslim (Sunni, Alawite, and Bektashi) minority communities of Western (Greek) Thrace, in the 
Rhodope, Xanthi, and Evros regions. 
260 Pavlidis’s spreadsheet did not list any deaths from minefields since 2008. 
261 In Alexandroupolis, Agriani/Ahrenpınar, Didymoteicho/Dımoteka, Megalo Dereio/Büyük Dervent, Sidirochori/Alren Pınar. 





Since then, and until 2016, unidentified bodies of people who had died trying to cross the river border 
would arrive at what came to be called the “cemetery for illegal aliens” after a process by which they 
were discovered in the river before being reported to the Police, who would in turn deliver the body to 
the Forensic Medical centre at Alexandroupoli General University Hospital. There, pictures and records 
of DNA and finger prints were taken for the purposes of subsequent identification. Bodies were kept in 
refrigerated chambers in the hospital morgue for a number of months263, and, in the case of non-
identification or non-repatriation, these were prepared for immediate burial in Sidiro. 
 
The Mufti told us how, following Muslim burial rites, he meticulously cleaned the bodies and wrapped 
them in white cloth. Once in the grave, he covered them with wooden planks – “so that the wild animals 
can’t dig them open” - and buried them with no more soil than that which had been taken out of the 
ground to dig the hole in the first place. According to the Qur’an, he said, the graves need to resemble 
“a camel’s hump”. The six flooded graves, the Mufti says, were the last to be dug in Sidiro. They were 




2.1.2. The “Camel’s Hump” 
  
The existence of the cemetery has been the cause of scrutiny since it first opened. Anthropologist Kim 
Rygiel equates the original siting of the cemetery in Sidiro, 15 km from the river, as the extension or 
“diffusion” of the border264. Rygiel argues that solidarity shown to living relatives by local community 
mobilisation, such as at Sidiro, as well as transnational activism around the funerary treatment of the 
dead offers the potential for a transgressive politics that disrupts the physical and biopolitical borders 
of citizenship. Rygiel’s optimism cannot be faulted. State reliance on local, transnational and sometimes 
informal processes, however, reveals another politics of disregard at play, one that reproduces the very 
conditions where bodies wash up in the river in the first place. 
 
                                                   
263 In 2018 the bodies exceeded the capacity of the hospital to store them, and the International Committee for the Red Cross 
had to donate a refrigerated container. See Leo Dobbs, “Greek forensics professor finds missing links for grieving families”, 
UNHCR, 21 June, 2018, www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/6/5b28cdcf4/greek-forensics-professor-finds-missing-links-grieving-
families (accessed July 2020). As we will discuss, the ambivalence regarding the precise number of dead bodies in the river 
contributes to an intended atmosphere of fear in Evros/Meriç. Fady, a Syrian refugee interviewed within the context of Forensic 
Architecture’s investigation, testified to having read reports that “commandos have 1,500 unidentified dead bodies in their 
refrigerators”. Global Legal Action Network, “Communication to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, in the case of FAJ 
against Greece”, November 17, 2020, available online at: c5e65ece-003b-4d73-aa76-
854664da4e33.filesusr.com/ugd/14ee1a_4e9dea36dd1043d48e6a50dbe5b78f04.pdf (accessed November 2020). 
264 Kim Rygiel, “In Life Through Death: Transgressive Citizenship at the Border” in Engin Isen and Peter Nyers, eds. Routledge 




Border scholars who have been studying similar places of internment along the world’s borders analyse 
them as spatial “reflections of care”265, or lack thereof, for those who die at the border. As Alexandra 
Délano Alonso and Benjamin Nienass note in their study of the politics of mourning and haunting at the 
US-Mexico border, 
 
the invisibility and inaccessibility of the spaces where migrants are buried, reveal a profound inequality in 
the presence of death for migrants (...) This inequality reveals as much about the disregard for migrants 
as recognized members of a political community (…) as it does about the denial of state responsibility for 
these violations of rights, in life and in death.266 
 
Echoing this analysis, and countering Rygiel’s view, the activist group “Welcome to Europe” claim the 
Sidiro cemetery to be a site of mass burial, one that reflects the brutality of the border that “puts up with 
the death of those looking for protection.”267. This claim is also in direct opposition to the Mufti’s account, 
who exercised supervision of the burial process and insists that he has buried each in a separate grave, 
keeping a record of the location of each corpse.   
 
However conflicting, Rygiel’s and “Welcome to Europe”’s positions on the cemetery both hold part of 
the truth. Nevertheless, each fails to locate this space within the continuums of state violence in the 
region. To do so would reveal this hillside, filled with dead bodies, as paradigmatic of a long standing 
politics of internal marginalisation in Thrace. These villages on the south eastern slopes of Rhodope 
are what remain of the Muslim community of Western Thrace after the population exchange of the 
1920s. Where the river had been primarily a point of connection, since the post-Lausanne demarcation 
of the border, the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa has emerged as a space of control. With delimitation came the 
transfer of populations. This began with the transfer of Christian and Pontic Greeks, from what became 
Turkish territory along the coasts of the Aegean and Black Seas and the Anatolian mainland. In return, 
Turkish Muslim populations from Greek territory were moved to Turkey, although a significant minority 
population remains in western Thrace, including the Evros region.268 As with Prespa, the transfer along 




                                                   
265 Alexandra Délano Alonso and Benjamin Nienass, “Deaths, Visibility, and Responsibility”, Social Research: An International 
Quarterly 83, no. 2, (summer 2016): 421-451.  
266 Ibid. 
267 “Mass Graves of Refugees in Evros Uncovered”, Welcome to Europe Network, 2010, 
web.archive.org/web/20101015082734/http://w2eu.net/2010/08/09/mass-grave-of-refugees-in-evros-uncovered/ (accessed 
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268 With the exception of Didymoteicho/Dimetoka, the Muslim communities that remain are all in the foothills of Rhodope, close 





A 1926 map showing the new settlements established in western Thrace after the exchange of populations with the Lausanne 
treaty. New settlements are shown in white dots. Source: Archives for Contemporary Social History (ASKI) 
 
In the century since, Turkish, Pomak (Slav-speaking, mostly Bektashi, muslims), Roma and other ethnic 
minorities in western Thrace have been the focus of multiple marginalising practices. The system of 
barres that run through Prespa ended here, in the Easternmost reach of the Greek Northern border. In 
these Muslim villages of Thrace, the “Surveilled Zone” functioned for fifteen or twenty years more than 
the rest of the territory and had added significance: beyond isolating these minoritarian communities 
from the rest of Greece, the barres were also meant to separate the Pomaks living in the hills of 
Rhodope from the Turkish speaking villages of the plains. This separation intended to prevent what is 
predominantly a Slavic-speaking minority to enter the Turkish sphere of influence269. The last of the 
“barres of shame”, as they came to be called, was finally abolished as late as November 1995, with its 
symbolic lifting by the then Minister of Defence Gherassimos Arsenis, outside the Pomak village of 
Echinos in the Prefecture of Ksanthi in Thrace270, some 100km west of Sidiro. During our visits to the 
region we saw the check points still standing, abandoned, as an ambient reminder.  
It is in the context of this marginalization that unidentified border crossers (who are assumed to be 
Muslim) are handed to local communities for the performance of funerary rites. These villages, 
themselves ostracised by the Greek state, are expected to facilitate the burial of migrants because of 
the assumption of shared religious identity. Concealed from the rest of the Greek territory for decades, 
by way of legislative and infrastructural discrimination (many of these villages are still only accessible 
by dirt road, and there is little to none cell-phone reception) they safeguard the secrets of the deadly 
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border. The Sidiro cemetery therefore reflects this continued marginalisation and concealment of 
Muslim, and other non-Greek populations in its territory - both Greek citizens and migrants, both alive 
and dead. Further to this, it indicates the State’s overall abdication of responsibility for the violence of 
the border, even beyond death.  
Much like the melting houses of Sfika, the “humps of camels” poking out of the earth in the field outside 
Sidiro, of equal volume to that of the person they cover, are a spatial index of the scale and frequency 
of loss of life at the border271. Taking the analogy further, the flooded graves, dug in anticipation of 
bodies found in the river, speak to death as a constant presence, as something to be anticipated at the 
border. Together, they serve as powerful spatial metaphors of the gradual lethality of the Evros/Meriç 
border apparatus and of the river waters themselves as vectors of border death. They tell (half) the tale 





As the slogan quoted in the opening pages of this section attests, in the past twenty years, border 
crossers in Evros have been losing their lives to different and interchangeable weapons or 
infrastructures of border defence, from minefields in the early 2000s, the fence in the early 2010s, and 
bullets in early 2020. Throughout these two decades, however, the river, like the Aegean Sea, has 
emerged as the only constant weapon. Beyond being a background against which the violent eruptions 
of border operations take place, it is the very liquid medium through which lethal border violence is 
enacted. Along with the dispersed military infrastructures, the processes of the river are also 
weaponized and incorporated into an architecture of border defence. Of the 359 people on Pavlidis’s 
spreadsheet, 249 had died of either drowning and hypothermia, the first and second causes of death 
in Evros respectively. Seven more people died of “pathological causes” such as heart failure, eighteen 
more of “indeterminate causes”, and fifteen more were found in a skeletal state, where the cause of 
death could not be determined. Official records attribute these deaths to “natural causes”, deflecting 
responsibility for border deaths to the natural environment; the river, the rough terrain, the temperatures, 
and the wildlife. According to these records, people simply die there.  
 
Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics or necropower is useful to understand the pervasiveness of 
death in the world’s borderscapes, as in Evros or, indeed, the Aegean. Mbembe coins the concept, 
 
to account for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in 
the interest of maximally destroying persons and creating death-worlds, that is, new and unique 
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forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to living conditions that confer 
upon them the status of the living dead.272 
 
We argue that the way in which populations are governed and persons are destroyed in the Evros/Meriç 
border has a direct relationship with how the riverine border environment, and water in particular, is 
known and managed. Water management here produces new social exploitative formations and forms 
of water governance that reflect and facilitate wider social formations of violence at the river border. 
Thus, to perceive the border as constructed through water, allows for a nuanced understanding of the 
possible death-worlds that are produced in the hydrologic register. Theorizing Mbembe’s necropolitics 
against the ways death-worlds are created in relation to the waters of Evros, we propose necro-
hydrology273 as a theoretical prism which exists where the knowledge and corresponding management 
of water emerges as adversarial to life. 
 
The identification of a relational space such as a river basin as a border speaks to what Mbembe refers 
to as “borderization,” asking what the intention of “transfom[ing] certain spaces into impassable places 
for certain classes of populations? What is it about, if not the conscious multiplication of spaces of loss 
and mourning, where the lives of a multitude of people judged to be undesirable come to be 
shattered?”274 As we will show, the case of the Evros necro-hydrology spans beyond the impassable 
banks of the river, to which border crossers are directed, to the entire river basin, incorporating the 
entire spectrum of the river’s humidity such as the mud in the fields that weighs down the asylum 
seeker275, or the fog that hangs above the valley and contributes to the risks of hypothermia. These are 
less direct forms of river management but become obtuse elements of how a river becomes a weapon 
in more dispersed but just as deadly ways. All of the above contribute to the reality that those who 
manage rivers as borders identify, and maintain them as impassable spaces in the “shattering” of the 
lives of those deemed undesirable. The river as a “natural boundary”, acts as an alibi276 that lets border 
crossers die.  
 
Navigating from the Sidiro cemetery and the bodies held in its soil, in this chapter we will discuss the 
ways in which the river has been weaponised as a border infrastructure, and how the ambiguities 
produced within what we call the fluvial frontier enforce a condition of ecological exception where the 
state acts in violent excess. Opposing the material and discursive reproductions of both rivers and 
                                                   
272 Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, trans. by Steven Corcoran (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2019), 92. 
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borders as “natural”, this chapter identifies the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa as the result of multiple 
organisational technologies of territorial sovereignty, through which the river is constructed as both a 
deterrent and a weapon. As we will show, the fluvial frontier braids together multiple elements including 
conservation, transboundary river management, military technology, the geopolitics of resource 
logistics,277 and the divergently visible and opaque politics of border crossing.  
 
Attempting to disentangle and read this braid, we will ask: What is the role of water in the politics of 
death at the border? How is this border made, enforced, but also contested at the intersection between 
social, material and “natural” processes? Finally, what methodological approaches can be adopted to 
perceive the subtle modes of bordering in such environmental weaponisation? These questions will be 
approached through four main sections which follow the shifting geography of the river from the Rila 
mountains in Bulgaria to its discharge in the Aegean Sea: Tributaries: Six Flooded Graves, The Main 
Course: A Fluvial Frontier, The Floodplain: An Ecology of Exception, and The Delta: Night, Fog and 
Mud. 
 
Through a fieldwork practice focusing on the intersection of the river ecosystem and border violence 
conducted at Evros / Meriç through 2018-2020, this research takes the form of field notes, audio and 
video recordings, photography, and cartography. A multi-disciplinary approach is likewise adopted here 
through the bringing together of border theory with history, natural sciences and legal boundary 
literatures. Through this approach this part of the dissertation explores the strained border relationship 
between Greece, Bulgaria, the EU and Turkey as it manifests across ecological scales at the 
Evros/Meriç/Maritsa. In the foreground are tensions over irregular border crossings between Greece 
and Turkey278, a friction that spans across ongoing territorial disputes between the two. As we will show, 
these tensions have had environmental impacts, including the failures of transboundary river 
management and adequate flood prevention. The confluent politics of the fluvial frontier are, we will 
discuss, central to border defence strategies and affect the lives of both border crossers and the 
inhabitants of this cross-border region. Throughout the chapter we will refer to a series of investigations 
into human rights violations at the Evros/Meriç border which I coordinated within the context of his 
participation as a researcher within Forensic Architecture279. The relationship of this thesis with the 
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Forensic Architecture investigations is close and reciprocal: The investigations, which also ran through 
2018-2020, draw heavily from the concepts and methodologies developed within this thesis. Often, 
material gathered within the context of our research fed into the Forensic Architecture project, and vice 
versa. Similarly, interviews and field trips often overlapped. These human rights investigations, 
however, are the result of collaborative work and their scope exceeds the breadth of this academic 
research, just as this academic research exceeds the conceptual framework of the investigations. 
Therefore, they are not submitted as part of the practice per se but will rather appear in the pages of 





2.2. The Main Course: Violent Waters 




 “The rushing river they call violent 
But the riverbed pressing it in 
Nobody calls violent” 
 




2.2.1. Accretion and Avulsion: Between Trespass Lines and 
Trespass Waters  
 
 
The foundations for the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa border demarcation were laid by Article 2 (2) of Lausanne, 
which stated that from the village of Bosna-Keuy280 all the way to the Aegean the border would follow 
the median line of the river course. However, as the river braids, and at times splits, the two countries 
disputed which of the two main branches of the river should constitute the main course to be followed 
by the border. Greece argued for the eastern branch, while Turkey argued for the western. An 
international committee, headed by Dutch colonel J.Backer, was assembled with the task of determining 
the precise course of the border. Three years later, an agreement was finally reached, and ratified by 
the 1926 Athens Protocol: the border was to follow the eastern branch, granting Greece more space 
over the river waters. This was the first time the course of the border was drawn in detail: from the 
trilateral point to the Aegean Sea, the border follows the median line between the banks throughout the 
course of the river, or its eastern, main branch, when the river splits. Despite the impossibility of 
reducing a geography as volatile as the Evros river to legal text, the 1926 committee defined the border 
with a degree of clarity. The line was marked with red ink on ten maps, and the first 26 pyramids were 
installed. Islands were given names or letters from the Latin alphabet281. The triangle of Karaağaç, a 
piece of land west of the river that was ceded to Turkey as a buffer to the city of Edirne and now hosts 
the border fence, was the only exception. The committee, however, deemed that the border should not 
follow the changes of the route of the river, but instead it decided that it be “definitely fixed by the 
position of the course or channel at the time when the present Treaty comes into force.”282 Delimited in 
such an inflexible way, like many river borders, it could not respond to shifts in the course of the river 
and the median line.  
 
The Evros/Meriç/Maritsa is fast, with a mean annual flow rate of 103 cubic meters per second (a rate 
which can increase twofold between December and April). Its course flows over sandy and malleable 
soil, and annually discharges approximately 3.2 million tons of sediment and 9.5 billion cubic meters of 
freshwater from the Rila mountains into the Aegean sea283, resulting in frequent erosions and accretions 
that alter the river banks. There is now almost one hundred years of geomorphological variation 
between the drawn border and the current course of the river. Islands that used to be there are no 
longer, banks have moved, and canalizations have directed the river in divergent ways. Two rivers and 
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two borders exist at the Evros/Meriç: the cartographic border of the old median line (featuring now 
almost unmoving oxbow lakes) and the water of the new trespass line – but not the border. The 
capricious shifts of the river across a boundary geo-spatially tethered to the riverbed present an 
unintentional political agency. The shifts produce ambiguous spaces within and around which territorial 
processes become deadliest. 
With 72,000 km of river and stream forming over a third of all international land boundaries it is clear 
that rivers, like mountains, offer characteristics that are attractive to those tasked with the territorial 
project of imposing “trespass lines”. However, as is highlighted by the gradual shifting of the river away 
from the 1926 boundary line, rivers as “natural borders” are mired in material, spatial and legal 
ambiguities. Due to these ambiguities, many legal scholars and geographers have considered rivers as 
inadequate political boundaries. Victor Prescott and Gillian Triggs highlight the paradox of the transitory 
flow of water between two states “while sovereignty imports the notion of permanence.”284 Oye 
Cukwurah, legal scholar of boundary delimitation, likewise identifies that a river “maps its own course 
and boundaries are merely delimited along its thalweg285, median or bank”.286 John Donaldson, a 
prominent legal scholar who has written extensively on the international law of river borders, words it 
more explicitly,  
 
the presence of water makes a boundary river unstable, forceful and risky; incompatible with the legal 
fiction of a fixed boundary line that would prefer the stability of land over the dynamism of water.287  
 
Donaldson places specific focus on accretion and avulsion as the key geo-legal terms to identify the 
spatio-temporal movements of river courses. For Donaldson the legal mechanisms behind avulsion and 
accretion reinforce the “land bias”, a bias made all the more problematic when addressing the 
vacillations of dynamic bodies such as rivers288. In his survey of the heredity of accretion and avulsion 
in International river law, Donaldson cites a number of Supreme Court rulings identifying accretion as 
the slow, and crucially, imperceptible movement of a river whereby the border shifts laterally with the 
central channel of the river. Avulsion, on the other hand, is a violent and perceptible deviation of a river’s 
course to produce, for example, a major change in deltaic plumes, the emergence of a large looping 
meander after floods, or, conversely, a “river cutting through the 'neck' of such a meander”289. 
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Elsewhere, Dilip Da Cunha has shown that the drawn line of the riverbank at the moment of mapping 
almost always takes precedence over the flow of water. Once the line has been drawn the water itself 
is no longer relevant. “After all”, Da Cunha argues,  
 
rivers do not cease to exist when they are without water. It is accepted that they ‘run dry’, some seasonally 
and others exceptionally. What remains is a space between lines which continue to be seen and enforced 
as a ‘river’ or a ‘river bed’, suggesting that it is the line more than water that is essential to rivers.290  
Indeed, Da Cunha claims that the lines themselves invented the concept of “rivers”: “without lines rivers 
are inconceivable, which is to say that to hear or speak the word ‘river’ is to think flow and see lines.”291 
The choice to see a river also involves the choice of the moment of representation, the abstract notion 
of a river in a “natural” state, being contained neatly between its banks292. This choice, as with 
borderlines, requires seeing with the line already entrenched within the mind, and therefore credulously 
accepted as naturalised, de-political, and non-agentive.  
The river’s agentive resistance to the line brings its own dangers as it contributes to a dynamic condition 
within which states can exert their muscles and enact violence with impunity within an uncertain terrain. 
In the case of the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa, the river’s shifts produce their own territorial ambiguities. Close 
to the Greek village of Feres a large meander neck has been cut through a straightening of the river 
course: there now exists an expanse of Turkish earth on the “wrong” side of the river. In another 
example upstream, in an area locally called “Melissokomeio”, land has been ceded by the river to 
Greece and Greek farmers still tend to the land on the Turkish side via yearly periods of sanctioned 
river crossing.  
 
Consequently, efforts to enforce the 1926 line have long been hampered by the agency of the river 
itself. Often, due to the morphology of the river, the markers are not placed on the border to begin with, 
but on the nearest piece of “land”. No example better illustrates this than that of pyramid number 1 
which is meant to demarcate the trilateral border between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria in the river: 
since the trilateral point lies in the median point of the river, the pyramid was placed 60 metres north of 
the border, on the southern tip of the island that goes by the name “A”293. When markers were placed 
inside the river, these were short lived. As early as 1960, markers that had been installed by a joint 
Greek-Turkish committee the year before were quickly carried away by the water. Eight years later, in 
1968 the two countries installed vertical railway beams along a two-kilometre stretch of the river to mark 
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the old location of a shifting sandbank near Amori village called the “Amori island”, only to see them 
carried away too months later. During 1969-1971 a number of technical protocols were signed by both 
sides to demarcate the border on the ground, but these were never put into effect294. Overall, none of 
the plans for a fixed border demarcation were fully implemented and, after the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus in the 1974, bilateral communication ceased for decades. More recently, in 2015, parts of the 
border fence were carried away by flood waters released from the Ivaylovgrad dam295 and, in October 
2017, Turkish authorities dug trenches underneath the fence to prevent flooding296. As a result of these 
river movements, the precise location of the river border remains ambiguous on the ground over several 
kilometres of its length. 
 
 
Shifts in the “Amori island” between the border demarcation in 1926 and 1986. Source: Dimitrakopoulos, “The Land Borders of 
Greece“. 
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describing how the works will be undertaken, titled “Protocol on the maintenance of the demarcation” and “Protocol on the 
prevention of border episodes”.  
295 ‘Έπεσε ο φράχτης του Έβρου: Ο Σαμαράς τον έχτισε, η φύση τον παρέσυρε [The fence of Evros fell: Samaras built it, 
nature carried it away], News 24/7, February 3, 2015, www.news247.gr/koinonia/epese-o-frachtis-toy-evroy-o-samaras-ton-
echtize-i-fysi-ton-paresyre.6325470.html (accessed March 2020). 
296 “Ντοκουμέντο: Έσκαψαν τρύπα κάτω απο τον φράχτη στον Έβρο [They dug a hole under the fence in Evros]” (23rd of 
October 2017), Newsbomb, www.newsbomb.gr/ellada/story/831290/ntokoymento-eskapsan-trypa-kato-apo-ton-fraxti-ston-evro) 





Part of the border fence near Kastanies was carried away by flood waters in 2015. Photo: News 24/7. 
 
These movements of the river, and the subsequent attempts to stabilize it and demarcate sovereignty 
over it, also contribute to the territorial disputes between the riparian states. In 1963, after significant 
alterations of the river banks, provisions were made to exchange plots of land near Feres and Enez but 
the exchange was never implemented297. During Stefanos’s last visit to the Evros in early March 2020, 
he witnessed trucks carrying fencing towards these contested—yet unfortified—parts of the river. At the 
time of writing, the area is being deforested to accommodate a new, 27 kilometre-long fence298. As 
recently as May 2020 reports emerged that Turkish soldiers had occupied one of these plots as a 
response to Greek military surveyors conducting measurements ahead of the construction of the new 
fence299. The new fence, which is expected to be completed by April 2021 at a cost of 62.9 million300, 
will stand five metres tall and its foundations will go six metres deep into the ground to prevent it being 
carried away by floods. In these ways, the river’s movements compound and yet contribute to the further 
intensification of what is already a militarized terrain. 
 
                                                   
297 In January 1963 Greece and Turkey signed a protocol to “terminate and clarify the disputes over the undertaking of 
hydraulic works aiming to stabilize the course of Evros”. 
298 “Επεκτείνεται ο φράχης του Έβρου στα Ελληνοτουρκικά σύνορα [The Evros Fence along the Greek-Turkish Border is 
extended]”, Το Vima, March 5, 2020, https://www.tovima.gr/2020/03/05/politics/epekteinetai-o-fraxtis-tou-evrou-sta-
ellinotourkika-synora/ (accessed March 2020). 
299 “Land Grab: Turkish soldiers Invade Greece and Occupy a small patch of land on contested border”, The Sun, May 22, 
2020, www.thesun.co.uk/news/11681878/turkish-troops-invade-greece/ (accessed May 2020). As per standard practice in the 
Evros militarized floodplain, the reports were not verified and remain unconfirmed.  
300 “New Evros fence to be completed by April next year, PM says during on-site inspection”, Kathimerini, October 17, 2020, 
www.ekathimerini.com/258187/article/ekathimerini/news/new-evros-fence-to-be-completed-by-april-next-year-pm-says-during-





A map showing the areas where the new fence will be installed. Pictured in the top top-left is the pocket of land where 















2.2.2. Riparian Infrastructures 
 
A week after the EU Commissioner, Ursula von der Leyen’s statement, on the 10th of March 2020, 
while thousands of asylum seekers were still waiting on the banks of Evros to cross into Greece, news301 
circulated that at the request of the Greek government, Bulgaria had released water downstream from 
the Ivaylovgrad Dam on the Ardas302, a tributary of the Evros. As we will discuss below, this alleged, 
and to this day unconfirmed303,  release of water from the dam proves the more insidious use of the 
Evros as an ecological border infrastructure. Defensive architectures here extend beyond built and geo-
engineered interventions, to include the river’s entire catchment basin, from the tributaries to the delta.  
 
Before crossing into Greece near the official crossing of Kyprinos/Ivaylovgrad, the Arda waters run 
along the border between Bulgaria and Greece for two kilometres. A few kilometres further downstream, 
they again serve as a border, this time for one kilometre, between Greece and Turkey, after which they 
meet the Evros/Meriç between the Greek villages of Marasia and Kastanies, at the north western point 
of the Karaağaç Triangle. 
 
Due to its nature as the Evros’s only actual land border, the Karaağaç Triangle has always been at the 
frontline of Greek military contingency, as well as one of the preferred crossing locations for asylum 
seekers. As a consequence, it has long played an important role in the shaping of the Evros/Meriç river 
border. Today, the area is a stretch of deforested arable land hosting the eleven-kilometre-long 
deterrent fence. Proposed in 2011 and completed in 2012, the fence has since directed border crossers 
to more dangerous routes, points in the river where the flow rate is perilously strong and unpredictable. 
Fittingly, the fence is mentioned as a “technical obstacle” in FRONTEX reports, an infrastructural hurdle 
that does not stop crossings, but only makes them more difficult.304 This is what the slogan in the 
opening page of this chapter refers to: the fence itself does not kill like minefields or bullets do, but 
forces asylum seekers to cross the river under conditions in which death is possible, probable even. 
Recently, Greece’s defence minister, Nikos Panagiotopoulos, referred to the Evros fence as itself a, 
                                                   
301 “България изпуска язовир Ивайловград, за да спре мигрантите през Марица [Bulgaria release the Ivaylovgrad dam to 
stop migrants through Maritza]”, Off News, March 10, 2020, offnews.bg/politika/balgaria-izpuska-iazovir-ivajlovgrad-za-da-spre-
migrantite-prez-marit-723617.html (accessed March 2020). 
302 Arda in Bulgarian and Turkish, Ardas in Greek. 
303 Neither the Greek or the Bulgarian government confirmed, or denied, the reports. According to informal conversations we had 
with locals, in the days following the 10th of March, the water levels rose but the river never eventually flooded. Satellite imagery 
analysis also failed to record a significant shift in water levels.  However, the incident shows that riparian nations are able to 
control the river’s width and volume. See “Articles falsely claim Bulgaria flooded a dam to stop migrants crossing”, Afp Fact 
Check, March 16, 2020, https://factcheck.afp.com/articles-falsely-claim-bulgaria-flooded-dam-stop-migrants-crossing (accessed 
March 2020).  
304 “Technical obstacle” is used as a catch all term for impediments applied against foreign military movement as well as 





“natural barrier” which had had “relatively [good] results in containing flows”305. What at first reads like 
a slip of the tongue (surely in the eyes of the authorities who built it, the fence is the only part of the 
Evros barrier which is decidedly non-natural) could indeed be understood as a clue to the ecosystemic 
role of the fence within the fluvial frontier. Directing crossers to the water, the fence blurs the boundary 
between nature and infrastructure, revealing the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa river border itself as the result of 
multiple organizational technologies of territorial sovereignty. Primary amongst these is the mobilization 
of major infrastructure: the fence, the dam, minefields and the contingent release of waters downstream 
are a direct threat to the lives of asylum seekers attempting to enter the EU. We will call these “riparian 
infrastructures”, situated adjacent to the river but also harnessing the river itself in predictable yet deadly 
ways. 
Science and technology studies scholars Caspar Bruun Jensen and Asturo Morita suggest that 
infrastructures are relational forms that activate experimental ontologies in the production of new 
worlds. In this complex relational ontology, infrastructures are not only things themselves but the 
relations between them306. The river border of the Evros/Meriç is the confluence of just such a 
multiplicity of relations. The use of a fence to weaponise nature is of course not particular to the 
Evros/Meriç border. Jason De León has made a similar argument about the fences erected in urban 
areas along the US-Mexico border in Arizona directing crossers to the deadly Sonora desert. He asks: 
“How can we begin to understand the structure of a wall of deterrence that is equal parts human, animal, 
plant, object, geography, temperature, and unknown?”307. Thinking through this proposition, in this 
section we attempt to undo the definite ontological divide between the natural and the human produced 
in order to understand the relation of multiple forms of causal agency present within the bordering 
process in this region. 
 
 
FRONTEX Serious Incident Report n.407, detailing a demonstration of anarchists against the “technical obstacle” in July 2016. 
Source: Frontex. Obtained via FOI request, edited by authors. 
 
                                                   
305 Helena Smith, “Greece Plans to Build Sea Barrier off Lesbos to Deter Migrants”, Guardian, January 30, 2020, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/30/greece-plans-to-build-sea-barrier-off-lesbos-to-deter-migrants (accessed January 
2020). 
306 Caspar Bruun Jensen & Asturo Morita, ‘Infrastructures as Ontological Experiments’ Engaging Science, Technology, and 
Society (2015) pp.81-87. 




2.2.3. “Hybrid Warfare” 
 
 
In March 2020, this hybrid function of the river border as a natural, and relational, infrastructure became 
more visible than ever. The Karaağaç Triangle was the first location along the border where refugees 
were directed by the Turkish government on the 27th of February 2020, and where they found 
themselves trapped against the fence, between Greek forces who would not let them cross and Turkish 
forces who prevented them from returning to the Turkish mainland. It was here, on the 4th of March 
2020, that Muhammad Gulzar, a young man from Pakistan, was shot dead, and six more, including 
Mohamad Hantou, from Syria, and Zeeshan Omar, from Pakistan, were injured from live rounds fired 
from the Greek Special Forces308.  
 
In the war of words exchanged by the two sides during the March 2020 events, the Greek government 
used the term “hybrid warfare” to describe what they perceived as a Turkish attempt to “intrude” on 
Greek territory through indirect means, here with refugee bodies instead of bullets309. However, in 
response to what they perceived as Turkey’s weaponisation of refugees, Greece and the EU also 
employed a form of hybrid warfare explicitly incorporating the river ecology itself. Giorgos Christides, a 
journalist for the German newspaper Der Spiegel took the following notes from live-streamed footage 
from the morning Muhammad Gulzar was killed by the fence: 
 
09:02: a very large group of migrants moved along the fence.  A group of heavily armed soldiers 
followed them along.  
9:05: heavy use of tear gas coming from the Turkish side. Flocks of birds flying out in panic. More and 
more migrants move southwards towards Petalo.  
9:09: the battle also erupted at the Greek outpost. Extensive tear gas thrown from the side of Turkey. 
Both police and military were on the spot.  
09:19: loudspeakers from Greek side play warning: do not attempt to cross  
09:20: more and more police and army vehicles and reinforcements coming to the Greek tower post.  
9:21: 23 soldiers moving along the fence  
9:32: Soldiers dispersed at regular intervals along the fence  
9:41: Calm at checkpoint 
10:00 Migrants return to gather at check point. Black smoke to the south, fire breaks out. 
11:01: Greeks use water canon.310 
 
Where so many people were trapped in spaces along the frontier, they were exposed to a hybrid form 
of border violence involving: teargas, and the deployment of large fans to direct it against the wind to 
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the Turkish side;311 loud speakers and SMS messages warning people against crossing; the use of 
water cannons to spray blue liquid across the fence so those who make it onto the Greek side can be 
easily identified;312 farmers spraying pesticides onto refugees across the fence;313 and, possibly, the 
release of water from dams. In addition to these assembled elements, on the night of the 26th of March, 
the impromptu camp that had been set up in Pazarkule, on the Turkish side of the border, caught fire. 
In videos that were circulated, witnesses claim that the fires were lit by Turkish authorities (jandarma) 
in their attempts to remove asylum seekers from the border (a measure supposed to counter the spread 
of COVID-19)314. In their exaggerated claims driven by nationalist rhetoric, the Greek government 
offered a clue into how methods of border defence in Evros/Meriç are unambiguously mobilizing 
environmental elements and, as we will discuss, are increasingly organised around deadly and hybrid 
structures: from biometric and digital surveillance, to fences, and the necro-hydrologies of river flow, 
flood defence berms, the thickness of mud, and freezing fog.  
 
As I (Stefanos) discussed in the introduction, authors in critical border studies also refer to the 
mobilization of geophysical and environmental features in hybrid terms, a position which is consistent 
with what I refer to throughout the thesis as border natures. As we will discuss in the following section, 
“Arcifinious Waters”, the Evros/Meriç border nature is made possible by the river’s adaptability to both 
force and flexibility, and contributes to the production of an ambiguous space in which multiple modes 
of violence are perpetrated with impunity. As such, “nature” can no longer be an alibi but is directly 
incorporated in the production of death at the border. 
 
2.2.4. Arcifinious Waters: Weaponizing the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa 
 
The hydropolitical literature concerned with access to water resources has shown how water systems 
are used as a tool or weapon in a violent cross-border conflict, particularly within the context of climate 
change and the resulting water scarcity315. Internationally, including in the Kurdish territories in south-
                                                   
311 “Tear gas hits the fan during clashes on the Greece-Turkey border”, AP News, March 12, 2020, 
apnews.com/42098e08f6ca4e952bdea547dd6ef5d1 (accessed March 2020). 
312 “Μπλε μπογιά στους αλλοδαπούς για να εντοπίζονται εάν περάσουν τον φράκτη [Blue paint used against migrants to 
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313 ‘Έβρος: Αγρότης ψεκάζει μετανάστες και οι αστυνομικοί παρακολουθούν [Evros: Policemen watch as farmer sprays 
migrants]”, DocumentoNews, March 8, 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0AsiZIDXuA (accessed March 2020). 
314 Along with water, fire has emerged as another element used to deter and further displace refugees. The “Smouldering 
Grounds” project by Dimitra Andritsou offers a lucid example of fire as both actant and symptom of border violence in the refugee 
camp of Moria, in Lesvos. See smouldering-grounds.com (accessed September 2019). 
315 Most prominent among this literature is Gleick’s understanding of “water as a weapon of conflict”. Heather Cooley & Peter H. 




eastern Turkey, dams are increasingly constructed as, and overtly referred to, as weapons316. The 
argument for the weaponisation of Evros/Meriç as a border nature, however, takes us beyond concerns 
of access to water and questions of scarcity commonly considered in more orthodox literatures, and 
instead it considers how this discourse shifts when it encounters specific riverine locations as 
weaponised technologies of conflict.317 With the EU commissioner’s description of Greece as a ‘shield’ 
in mind, we ask how is the Evros river a weapon and under what arrangement does the floodplain 




While we do not directly pursue the argument through orthodox understandings of weaponry, such as 
ballistics, it is, nevertheless, possible to read rivers in such a way. The mechanics of flow, for example, 
include calculations of velocity, gravity, volume, and friction318. John Collins addresses these weapon-
like qualities of rivers in his compendium of military geography:  
 
Current velocities, usually stated in feet or meters per second, depend primarily on the steepness of the 
stream bed. The deepest, fastest flow normally follows the main channel well above the bottom, 
because stream banks and beds function as friction brakes.319  
Following Collins, the most directly lethal part of a river is often the border “line” itself. Whether it follows 
the main channel (thalweg), or the median line between the river banks, as is the case with Evros/Meriç, 
the border is more often than not located on the deepest and fastest flowing part of the river. Pavlidis 
goes into further detail as to how the morphology of the Evros contributes to its weaponisation:  
 
at one-meter distance from the riverbank [the river’s] depth is 50 cm; the next step that one might take is 
at a depth of three meters because the vortex of the river creates so called holes. A second factor 
increasing the danger is that migrants usually cross at night, in fear and anxiety. They don’t see where 
they are going which makes them panic easily. Many of them don’t know how to swim. If they fall into the 
water, they will lose the feeling of space and they might drown. Finally, the migrants are often not allowed 
to carry their bags with them due to lack of space in the inflatable boats, which results in one person 
wearing three shirts, three pairs of trousers one on top of the other. If they fall in the water the weight of 
the wet clothes will pull them down.320 
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In this one paragraph, Pavlidis assembles elements of the river’s complex spatiality to outline the many 
threats posed by its fluvial characteristics, processes and volumes. In an interview we conducted in 
Athens with Kuzey321, a Turkish national who swam across the Evros/Meriç river 5 times and was 
pushed back on each occasion within the space of nine days in May 2019, he confirmed the dangers 
these elements posed in his attempts to cross the border: 
  
The first time, I was with my clothes on, I never tried swimming with my clothes on before. It was very 
difficult. The clothes take you down and the river don’t push you up like the sea. I was not sure if I can 
make it. I tried to swim freestyle, but in the middle of the river I thought “I can’t manage this, I am tired…”. 
I thought “ok should I take off my clothes here? Can I make it?” So I tried on my back. It was easier, but 
the flow push you like fifty metres, one hundred metres [downstream]. 
 
During another crossing, this time on an inflatable raft he had found on the banks: 
 
It starts immediately the flow. Maybe it gets stronger in the middle, but I always felt it immediately (…) I 
couldn’t cross the river with that boat. The flow was very strong, it made me turn around myself. When I 
hit the oars, sometimes I went towards the Turkish side of the river. When I reached the middle of the 
river, the flow hit me two-hundred metres to the… South I guess. And there was a Greek border bridge 
on there, and I was afraid of being seen by them. So I jumped in the middle of the river. 
 
As is evidenced in Kuzey’s words, people who attempt to cross the river are exposed to the 
disorientation of the turbulent forces of the river. It is in these moments of spatial confusion that 
drowning often occurs, either through the capsizing of boats or exhaustion during an attempt to swim 
across. It is exactly afloat the river’s vortex where the imagined line has been drawn between the two 
banks of state territory that the fluvial frontier becomes most lethal. 
If rivers are always an assemblage, of volumes of water, its contents, and the communities and 
geomorphologies of which it is co-constitutive, then the weaponisation of rivers always occurs as part 
of an assemblage of speeds, contents, and actors. in specific locations and socio-political contexts. 
Scholars of warfare studies Antoine Bousquet, Jairus Grove and Nisha Shah in their text Becoming 
Weapon argue “against the understanding of weapons as static material objects” but rather as 
“technical beings in perpetual formation, transmuting in tandem with their ambient milieus”322. “An 
arrangement of things becomes a weapon”, they argue,  
through relational changes in intensity and context such that its motive force, density, potential energy or 
mechanical capability comes to make events of death and dismemberment. And beyond the immediate 
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occasion of a weapon’s terrible work lies a wider network of relations that condition its emergence and 
support its operation.323 
For Bousquet, Grove and Shah, it is through relational processes that “objects, ideologies, practices, 
bodies and affects get drawn into specific assemblages of violent intentionality”324. A river (or a 
mountain, a sea, a desert) is therefore never inherently a weapon but is made one in the specific 
assemblage within which it, as an assemblage in its own way, is nested325. It is when the river 
assemblage is nested within the border and its antagonistic geopolitical and material qualities, that its 
characteristics of speed and volume are weaponised. In other words, the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa (and its 
tributaries) does not become a weapon on the basis of its speed, width, or depth alone. It is the specific 
condition of the river as a border which turn its waters into “vector[s] of bodily harm or lethality”326.
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no. 1, (2017): 1-8, 2. 
324 ibid, 3. 
325 Manuel DeLanda, Assemblage Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 83. 












This relational approach to theorizing weaponry is consistent with our understanding of borders as 
spaces that themselves are relational, and where the state’s power to know, stop, exclude (and, 
sometimes, include), hurt and kill, is not only projected vertically, but also dispersed laterally. This, as I 
have argued throughout this thesis, is especially true for so-called natural borders, as material spaces 
that are in a constant process of re-definition. In Evros, these fluctuations of non-static “physiographic 
political boundaries”327 are chosen by design not only as modes of deterrence but as weapons through 
their very ambiguity. 
Within the calculations of river flow and sediment transportation discussed in this section, is concealed 
a deadly politics of bordering that incorporates the full spectrum of the Evros’s hydrology and 
manipulates the ambiguities produced by rivers. The de-naturalised condition of the river can itself be 
extrapolated from the way international law conceives of rivers as “arcifinious” borders. Foundational 
amongst this literature is eighteenth-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, author of the 1715 treatise “Of 
the Rights of War and Peace”. Grotius identifies the notion of the weaponised border within the 
“Arcifinious” state, as a state with “natural” boundaries "fit to keep the Enemy out”328, writing:  
 
such lands as are occupied or possessed, either as being vacant, or else by the power of the sword… in 
arcifinious lands, the river, by gradually altering its course, does also alter the borders of the territory; and 
whatsoever the river casts up to the opposite side, shall be under his jurisdiction, to whom the 
augmentation is made.329 
Derived from the legal heredity of international border law, the term “arcifinious” is the territorial concept 
whereby a state is bounded by geophysical limits with defensive capabilities, or “natural” boundaries “fit 
to keep the Enemy out” such as seas, rivers, deserts, and mountains. According to Grotius and his 
followers, rivers are “part of 'arcifinious' or 'natural' military frontier zones that are ‘indetermined,’ and 
flexible based on the application of force.”330  
The understanding of rivers as flexible to force resonates with Eyal Weizman’s analysis of linear 
borders, a legacy of the military cartographic imagination, becoming elastic331. As Weizman 
emphasizes In Hollow Land, the elastic border is constantly being remade, it shifts and reforms and is 
as, or even more, deadly than static borders332.  While Weizman develops his theory of elasticity with 
respect to the various architectural elements – separation walls, roads, blockades, turnstiles and more 
                                                   
327 Martin Glassner, Political Geography (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 77.  
328 Donaldson, “Paradox of the moving boundary”,159. 
329 Hugo Grotius, Of the Rights of War and Peace (London: Brown, Ward, Meares, 1715). 
330 Donaldson, “Paradox of the moving boundary”, 159. 
331 Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2007), 6. 




- deployed to maintain the Israeli occupation of Palestine, his elastic approach to bordering is relevant 
for theorizing the materially elastic border of Evros/Meriç.  
Reflecting on the territorial elasticity of rivers, Stephanie Kane, geographer of the political ecology of 
water, has made the claim that the construction or failure to build water-control engineering is crucial in 
establishing or losing territorial power. Kane, however, adds that “even as flood waters confound 
attempts at constructing territory, their forces, and the forces deployed to control them, can themselves 
be enlisted as territorial technologies.”333 In this way she postulates that both river infrastructures, and 
the lack there of, are paradoxically incorporated into riverine territorial regimes. More importantly, she 
states that floodwaters are themselves territorial technologies.  
 
The rumoured opening of the dam shows how, in the mind of military engineers, right-wing nationalist 
politicians, or far right militia, the river/border assemblage offers the possibility to control flow but also 
has the capacity to bring death to humans exercising their right to claim asylum. The intentional, if 
unconfirmed, flooding of the valley, and its entanglement with border defence strategies, emphasized 
the river not as “natural” but, to the contrary, always flexible to force. Flooding to prevent crossings and 
receding to its measured and (b)ordered banks, the Evros/Meriç is multiple, both smooth and striated, 
as it is both an obstacle and a route for the border crosser. 
 
As Ursula von der Leyen’s statement pre-empted, the material movement of water out of place is here 
not perceived as a threat that must be contained. Instead, it is deployed in the very efforts to both 
delineate and ‘shield’ the space of the nation-state. As we will discuss further in the following section, 
the absence of any real transboundary river management of the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa is not only 
indicative but imbricated in the intentional ambiguities of the river border region. While flooding is 
undesirable in its damage to property, it is, by contrast, this very unpredictability that is necessary in 
the design of the border. The very flexibility of the river—its interstitial condition between water and 
sediment—is useful in the production of an “indeterminate” space that is materially porous, shifting, and 
thus difficult for trespassers to cross. The fluctuations in flow rate, the consequent unevenness of the 
riverbed, its depths and changing banks, are necessary to the production and maintenance of the 
ambiguities of the fluvial violence of the border. In Evros/Meriç, floodwaters and shootings are not 
distinct but are in continuity with the long-term, albeit previously lower intensity, weaponisation of the 
river.  
Indeed, the aforementioned, shifting and contested, “pockets” of land near Feres have long been points 
where fatalities become concentrated. Pavlos Pavlidis and Maria-Valeria Karakasi have identified a 
particular parcel of land as the location where 72 bodies were recovered between 2000 and 2014334. 
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Recently, it was in these stranded parcels where refugees were directed by geographers aligned with 
Turkish authorities during the March 2020 events335, and where a young man from Aleppo, Muhammad 
al Arab, was shot dead by Greek soldiers336 standing inside the dry river bed of the 1926 border, which 
now acts as little more than a vegetated trench337. At the time of writing, the area is being deforested to 
accommodate the new fence. Kuzey, our interlocutor, describes how, after his last pushback he 
accidentally crossed the border – but not the river - into Greece and found himself trapped in one of 
these pockets: 
I didn’t know that I was on the Greek side of the border. I was just walking in the forest, thinking I was on 
the Turkish side of the border. I see a bridge. That shocked me because I never think that there would be 
a bridge in the river. I carefully crossed the bridge. I found a hut. I saw some farmer things, bags with 
fertilizer. The writing on them was not Turkish. They were in Greek language. That time I noticed I may 
be in the Greek side of the border, but I know I was in the Turkish side of the river, but I was not sure. 
 
Kuzey had crossed the border but not the trespass line. He spent two days stranded in that parcel of 
land, hiding inside an irrigation plant without food or the ability to light a fire, too exhausted to swim 
again and too scared to cross the bridge on foot. On the second day, he found an abandoned raft and 
crossed the river, only to be carried downstream by the river and forced to jump back into the water to 
avoid arrest. Kuzey is an able bodied man in his 20s, who had served as a police officer in Turkey. As 
he told us, he was trained to survive such hostile circumstances and had studied the area extensively 
before he embarked on his journey. Despite that, he continuously described struggling to orient himself 
in the river maze, he had difficulty coping with the elements and the exhaustion and was continuously 
wondering “if he is going to make it”. During a nine-day-long pushback, he crossed the border five times 
and the river six times swimming, holding onto floating trees, barrels, or on rafts. He was violently 
pushed back to Turkey across it five more times. In total, he covered over 300 kilometres on foot, boats 
and in police vehicles, and travelled the entire length of the border. He was detained, beaten, he fell in 
the water, got stuck in the mud, lost in the fog and tangled up in the thorny branches of the riparian 
forest. He barely ate and slept during this time: 
 
I can’t lay on the ground because it was very cold so I literally sleep on my feet or my knees all the time. 
One night I couldn’t sleep because of the cold. All night I waited and stood still in the forest. It was really 
bad, I saw some hallucinations because of the cold. I thought I was hearing voices in the forest… 
 
Kuzey was strong, and lucky enough to have crossed in May instead of the winter months. He made it, 
and was kind and brave enough to share his story with us. His story of survival is one of many, but 
                                                   
Southeasternmost Land Borders of The European Union, Greece 2000–14”, Disasters (2019) 43:3, 459−477, 469. Since the 
publication of the paper this number has grown. In 2019 alone, the IOM placed 3 separate fatalities in the area, the highest 
concentration on the river for that year. IOM, Missing Migrants: Tracking Deaths Along Migrant Routes, available at: 
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/europe (accessed August 2019) 
335 Dr Yüksel Hoš, Twitter Post, February 28, 2020) available at: https://twitter.com/jxlhs/status/1233458340564520962 
(accessed March 2020). 
336 Forensic Architecture, “The Killing of Muhammad al-Arab”. 




survival is not always the case. Another witness Stefanos talked to within the context of his work with 
Forensic Architecture is Fady, a young man from Syria who travelled legally to Evros, as the holder of 
asylum from Germany. He travelled to find his younger brother, a minor, who had gone missing after 
falling into the river in his attempt to cross it. Fady had a different story to tell. Upon arrival to Evros, the 
police arrested him, confiscated his documents, and pushed him across to Turkey. Unable to return to 
Germany legally, Fady tried to enter Greece only to be pushed back to Turkey fourteen times over the 
space of two years. He eventually managed to enter Greece, where he spent two more years in hiding 
before he finally reached Germany. For Fady, as with so many others, the border assumed a thickness 
not only in space, but also over time, violently illegalizing him and forcing him to a life in limbo. Four 





The ability of the river to deter, kill, but also to make bodies disappear raises questions that require us 
to think of the river waters not only as vectors of harm339, but also as agents of concealment. This 
concealment is twofold. On the one hand, as we have discussed, the hostile characteristics of arcifinious 
riverine boundaries are mobilized in a practice that enables states to obscure their agency in relation to 
border violence. On the other hand, the same fluvial properties and the river’s capacity to transport is 
here mobilized not only to hurt, but also to obfuscate the very existence of this violence, to erase traces 
and ensure impunity for government actors. Mobilised as both weapons and sewers, rivers 
simultaneously kill, and carry away trace. 
 
This weaponisation of water as concealment is visible in the state in which bodies arrive at the cemetery 
in the Alexandroupolis Hospital morgue or the cemetery in Sidiro. As professor Pavlidis explains, unlike 
in the salty waters of the Aegean Sea, the murky waters of Evros decompose bodies quickly while 
holding them inside the river for longer periods, a process which is directly connected to the ecology of 
the river itself. Pavlidis says that many bodies, particularly the smaller bodies of children, like Fady’s 
missing brother, held in the river by sediment and trees, are never found. “The bottom of the river is 
very muddy,” he explains. “There are a lot of branches from the trees and the bodies get stuck… And 
the fish – we have all kinds of fish in the river, and they eat the skin post-mortem.”340 The process 
whereby bodies get disentangled from twigs and mud and surface downstream is also connected to the 
river’s hydrological cycle. Even though border deaths are most common in the winter months when the 
river is swollen and temperatures may fall several degrees below zero, many bodies of border crossers 
                                                   
338 For both cases see Forensic Architecture, “Pushbacks Across the Evros/Meriç: Situated Testimony”. 
339 Bousquet, et al, “Becoming Weapon”. 
340 Florian Elabdi, “The Untold Refugee Stories on the Edge of Europe”, Refugee Today, www.refugee.today/stories/the-untold-




are found in the spring and summer months, when the floods recede and bodies re-emerge from the 
river amongst the shoals, sandbanks and islands of the river, most commonly downstream, near the 
delta.  
 
During his narration of the brief history of the cemetery, Mufti Mehmet lamented how, over time, the 
profound trauma of witnessing and attending to disintegrating corpses caused the locals to stop 
attending the burials. Justifying themselves to the Mufti, many said that the smell and sight of the bodies 
“didn’t let them eat for a week”. “In the summer”, the Mufti whispered, a “melting (sic) body smells from 
kilometres away”341. As the Mufti’s stories, and Pavlidis’s archives reveal, when bodies are found in the 
river — if they are found at all — they are in a state where identification is almost impossible. Of the 
359 bodies Professor Pavlidis had received in his morgue when Stefanos visited him in November 
2018, only 103 had been identified. In addition to biometric and bureaucratic obstacles, like the lack of 
comprehensive transboundary DNA databases, attempts to match remains with families searching for 
a relative are often unsuccessful, because there are no personal effects to help link the remains to a 
place of origin or destination342. For this reason, Pavlidis keeps a detailed archive of objects found on 
or near the bodies he receives, hoping that one day it might help relatives tie the bodies to a missing 
person343. More often than not these include objects worn directly on the body, and made from materials 
that withstand decay from the water, like rings and lockets. According to Pavlidis this is because the 
fluvial processes themselves destroy most of the material evidence of the identity of the victim. Over 
time, the fibres of the clothes disintegrate, and get torn apart by the river animals or the bloating body 
itself. With them, disentangled from the body and covered by the mud are smaller objects that the 
people carried in their pockets, like identification papers, credit cards, and phones.  
 
Through his ground-breaking research of migration over the Sonora, Jason De León has interrogated 
the capacity of corpses to testify to the political nature of migrant fatalities344. For De León, “the political 
afterlives of bodies” - decomposing bodies, bodies scavenged by animals, missing bodies - perform 
a certain kind of agency within the border space of the “Sonora hybrid collectif”. There, “seemingly 
                                                   
341 Indeed, the smell of rotting flesh emanated throughout my border work, from the Mufti’s account, to my field visits with the 
young shepherd who had found the body of the Albanian man in the forest of Prespa, and the testimonies of fishermen who 
salvage drowned bodies from the Aegean Sea. It became a powerful trope that testified to the violence of the border regime; like 
the Sidiro locals, I am also left with a bad taste in my mouth. 
342 Jenny Edkins, “Missing Migrants and the Politics of Naming: Names Without Bodies, Bodies Without Names”, Social Research: 
An International Quarterly 83, no. 2, (Summer 2016): 359-389. Edkins notes how this post-mortem disjunction of body and name 
is a continuation of a practice that is common during undocumented migration, in death as in life. Cutting the cord that ties body 
and name, Edkins argues, undocumented migrants challenge their knowability vis-à-vis the state. Indeed, making Pavlidis’ work 
more difficult is the fact that many crossers who come from countries dispose of their passports before they cross the river. Many, 
who come from countries that the Greek government does not deem asylum-worthy, often throw them in the river directly, while 
others, fearing that the police will confiscate and destroy them, hide them in plastic bags in the bushes by the river with the hope 
of retrieving them one day.   
343 This archiving of objects retrieved from migrant bodies can be understood as another form of a “wild” or “contemporary 
archaeology”. Recently, scholars have increasingly begun to consider the objects left behind by migrants as forming part of a 
contemporary archaeology of migration. See Yannis Hamilakis, ed., The New Nomadic Age, Archaeologies of Forced and 
Undocumented Migration, (Sheffield: Equinox Publishing., 2019). 




‘natural’ physical, chemical, and biological processes of decomposition”345 perpetrate a second form 
of violence, this time against the evidence of border deaths. As a result, De León argues, “Corporeal 
destruction is often a deeply political act”. De León calls this operationalization of post-mortem bodily 
harm, necroviolence346, a force that departs from Mbembe’s concept of necropower and is 
“specifically about corporeal mistreatment and its generative capacity for violence”347.  
 
In the Evros, it is the river waters that act against evidence, both to do with the identity of the deceased 
and the event of death itself. The forces of the river, holding bodies in the mud or twigs, and releasing 
them, if at all, and transporting them downstream after large flood events, inscribe a timeline between 
the event and its reemergence as evidence. This combination of stasis and movement, periodically 
organized by the forces of the river, dislodges the event from its locale: the deadliest crossings are not 
necessarily where most bodies are found. The still waters in the empty graves at Sidiro remain as 
reminders of this double violence and as unintentional and temporary memorials to those buried close 
by, those still submerged and yet to surface, and those continuing to cross the turbulent currents of the 
river. 
Following the line that cuts the Evros/Meriç waters in two, this section enquired into the ways the waters 
are conscripted into the project of border defence. In the following section we will discuss the ways in 
which both the border, and the river, thicken. We will explore the border processes that come to play 
when the water shifts and floods beyond the cartographic line of the banks, blurring delimitation to scale 
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2.3. The Floodplain 




2.3.1. A Spectre: Floodwaters and Hydrodiplomacy 
 
A man kicks the ground trying to uncover the “blood of Greeks” in the soil. He demands that this blood 
was shed in order for Greece to be “free” and as such needs to be respected. His exasperated shouting 
makes much of what he says difficult to comprehend. Descending into a fit of nationalist fervour he is 
filmed secretly from behind a wire fence by a group he identifies as “Kurds, Syrians, Iraqis, Pakistanis”. 
These people are detained at the Fylakio registration and pre-removal detention centre in the very north 
of Evros. According to his lanyard, the man is an employee of the centre348. Kicking the ground, he 
mobilizes the soil as that which is to be defended.	Towards the end of the short video the official349 
utters the pivotal words: “Ok, Zagros going to go out. Go out, takes him, going to Turkey now.” In his 
broken English he suggests that these men should stop complaining about their detention because 
when they are released they will be picked-up once more and clandestinely pushed-back to Turkey 
across the Evros/Meriç river. As the official intimates, those who make it across the deadly waters do 
not necessarily escape the river’s ambiguous frontier, but are instead illegally sent back by masked 
operatives under the cover of night. 
 
Fylakio, Greek for “outpost”350, located near the Ardas river, is one the first villages reached when 
onrushing water from the Ivaylovgrad dam crosses the Bulgarian-Greek border. Some days before 
March 10th, word had been circulating among guards working in the detention centre that the dam 
would be opened to make the river more difficult to cross351. Whether the dam did open or not remains 
uncertain. The rumours circulating among border guards, and the alarm it sparked in riparian 
communities and migrants alike, speak to both the possible and the already present mobilisation of the 
river as an agent of terror352. If the release of water would have been a direct act of weaponisation of 
water against asylum seekers, the real or fake news of its release, surging across all three sides the 
Evros/Meriç/Maritsa valley and spreading over social media, do the work of deterrence.  
                                                   
348 Anna Nini, “Εθνικιστικό παραλήρημα υπαλλήλου του Υπ.Μετανάστευσης στο κάμπ προσφύγων του Έβρου  [Nationalist 
Delirium of Employee of Ministry Migration to the Evros refugee camp]” Vice News Greece, January 11, 2019, 
www.vice.com/gr/article/59v73a/e8nikistiko-paralhrhma-ypallhloy-toy-yp-metanasteyshs-sto-kamp-prosfygwn-toy-ebroy 
(accessed January 2019). 
349 On a field trip to Fylakio in November 2018, Stefanos visited the Centre and interviewed the same man, identified as Chris 
Michaelidis, then acting deputy director of the Centre. At the time he made the assurance that he was doing everything within 
his powers to ensure that human rights are respected within the centre. He gave Stefanos his business card, with the address 
of a hotel room in Orestiada, where he is still staying to this day. His presence in Evros, it seems, is as fleetingly permanent as 
that of the refugees he was tasked with keeping outside Greek territory. 
350 Like Prespa, several of the Evros’s villages were renamed during the early 20th century. Many of the new names 
(Akrinó/Frontier, Fylaktó/Guarded etc.) reflect their new role as frontier settlements.  
351 Stefanos was relayed this information by an Evros local who works inside the detention centre for a human rights NGO 
based in Athens. They were having dinner in a local restaurant and, although he was cautious about the people in the tables 
around them, he talked normally, yet always whispering the word “river”.  
352 In his work on the Paramilitary disposal, and downstream surfacing, of bodies in the Cauca river in Colombia, Ifor calls this 





The spectre of water surging downstream to consume the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa border was not an 
unusual concern for a region that is in a constant state of flood alert. Major flood events have increased 
in frequency over the last twenty-five years, leading to a once in a thousand-year flood in 2005, severe 
events in 2006, 2007, 2011, 2014, and 2015, and a “state of emergency” announced by the Greek 
Government in March and April 2018.353 Flooding in the region is closely tied to the transboundary 
politics of hydro-electric infrastructure. The majority of large dams and reservoirs in the basin are 
concentrated on Bulgarian territory (as many as seven hundred and twenty two),354 while Turkey has 
built sixty,355 and Greece just five (mainly for irrigation purposes, as opposed to energy production).356 
Flow variability is a central concern for hyrdrodiplomatic relations between Greece, Turkey, and 
Bulgaria and has been the subject of many transboundary agreements whereby upstream riparian 
nations either force or allow downstream riparians to adapt to seasonal changes in both wet and dry 
conditions. As we shall show in what follows, it is not only the flooding of the existing water course, 
however, which is involved in Greece’s watery border imaginary. 
 
 
A dam in Erythropotamos, a tributary of the Evros near the Greek / Bulgarian border, February 2019, Photo by authors. 
                                                   
353 Kostantinos Chouvardas, Christos Papapostolou, “Ποτάμιες Πλημύρρες και Διασυνοριακή Συνεργασία: Η Περίπτωση 
του Ποταμού Έβρου [River Floods and Crossborder Cooperation: The case of Evros River]”, Geographies, (2016) 27, 44-71. 
354 Angeliki Mentzafou, Vasiliki  Markogianni, & Elias Dimitriou, “The Use of Geospatial Technologies in Flood Hazard Mapping 
and Assessment: Case Study from River Evros”, Pure and Applied Geophysics, (2017) 174, 679–700, 680; Bulgarian dams are 
“mainly for hydropower production and secondarily for irrigation purposes and fish-breeding”. 
355 ibid, 680. 
356 Because of its significance as a border, and with little transboundary water management, the main course of the river in the 
Greece/Turkey section has no dams or artificial barriers. Rare for such a large river, this may make it an important habitat for 
fish. See Stamatis Zogaris et al., “Assessment of Riparian Zone And River Island Conditions In A Trans-Boundary Greenbelt: 





Recent attempts at hydrodiplomacy in the region include the 2016 “Joint Declaration Between the Government of the Hellenic 
Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey” signed by Prime Ministers Alexis Tsipras and Ahmet Davutoğlu as an 
annex to the EU-Turkey deal of the same month.357 This agreement incorporated multiple political and hydrographical issues 
that fold onto the fluvial frontier, including a Joint Action Plan to “stem migration flows”. Source: Hellenic Parliament Library. 
 
 
2.3.2. Anáchoma: Geoengineering the Border 
 
 
During the planning of the fence in 2011, the Hellenic Army General Staff also proposed a “120km long, 
30mt wide and 7mt deep” moat358. Officially an “anti-tank trap” functioning primarily as a defence against 
Turkish invasion, it is evident in the context of the increased crossings in 2011 that it would be a further 
technical barrier for border crossers. The plan imagines the conversion of what is already an 
anthropocenic river into a moat. The scale and form of this project is symptomatic of a medieval 
imaginary of violence pervasive of global border regimes. Where the river itself was not considered to 
                                                   
357 The EU-Turkey deal only referred to migration towards the Aegean islands. See “Joint Declaration Between the Government 
of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey”, Izmir, March 2016, available at: 
http://www.jeanpierrecassarino.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GR-TURK-Joint-Declaration-03-2016.pdf. (Accessed May 
2019). 




be quite deadly enough, this imaginary conceives of altering its course into a yet more deadly weapon. 
As a statement issued at the time by asylum rights NGO ProAsyl reads: 
 
These barriers will not keep people in need of international protection from trying to cross the border. 
Instead, they increase the danger of border-crossings and can lead to more persons losing their lives 
while trying to reach European territory and international protection.359 
 
The river and its imagined doubling as a moat instrumentalises the already treacherous route beyond 
the scale of ‘deterrent’ into an explicitly engineered space unconcerned with fatalities. Stepping back 
from the General Staff’s imagined moat, we argue that the Evros/Meriç already performs the arcifinious 
role of a moat at the EU’s fluvial frontier. The drawing of a fixed, yet imaginary line along the central 
course of the river effectively produced the river as a frontier, whereby its movements and muds become 
spaces where sovereign territorial imaginaries are projected with horrifyingly real effects. The proposed 
moat then features merely as a fantasy of the control of nature, while the river itself is produced as 
weapon by the imaginary of the bounded state. It also speaks to Evros as an engineered space and 
reveals the border regime’s deployment of the environment as metaphor and defensive technology. 
 
Where the river appears at first glance as a “natural” course it is, to greater and lesser extents, the 
result of centuries of small and large-scale engineering interventions. Beyond the river’s volitional shifts, 
the Evros/Meriç has been visibly straightened and engineered at numerous points. In 1936, an 
“agreement regarding the settlement of hydraulic works on both banks” was signed in Ankara360. Fifteen 
years later, in 1951, the two countries invited the Chicago-based Harza Engineering Company to 
undertake a study for flood defence in Evros. The study was completed in 1953 and signed and set in 
effect in Istanbul in 1955, along with a “Plan for the construction of flood defence works” and a 
“Settlement of the methods of mutual overview of the construction of flood defence works on Evros 
river”361. The first draining and alignment works were undertaken in the Evros Delta the next year, but 
the Harza plans were only partially implemented before their abandonment in 1964, leaving the banks 
of the Evros/Meriç to be engineered unilaterally and without coordination.
                                                   
359 Ibid, 3. 
360 ΦΕΚ Α' 474/27.10.1936 “regarding the settlement os hydraulic works on both banks of the Evros”. 







A map of proposed flood-defense works produced in 1953 by the Harza Engineering Company (top) and a cross section of the 





Driving through this cross-border landscape, one quickly understands that the floodplain of the 
Evros/Meriç/Maritsa is sculpted to either contain or facilitate movement, be it of military personnel, 
civilians, or water. Part of this manipulation comes in the form of flood defence berms, raised 
embankments that often act as roads in the floodplain. There are multiple types of berms, each of which 
is designed to perform distinct functions. Cutting through fields are raised, muddy roads that are 
designed as surpassable embankments (also referred to as “summer berms”) to enable movement 
during mild floods, which we often found ourselves driving over, playing hide and seek with border 
patrols and local vigilantes. These roads often double as military and anti-tank installations, with 
concrete tunnels running within and intermittent foxholes on either side of the raised berm. The rail line, 
also raised, that runs from Alexandroupolis to Ormenio, and into Bulgaria, and which features so 
prominently in Pavlidis’s spreadsheet of casualties, is designed as the main embankment362. Should 
this be breached, there is a system of tertiary berms, levees and canals to slow the movement of water 
into the plain. The concrete bridges that cross these canals are often built with gun emplacements and 
always have signs designating the maximum weight and number of armoured vehicles they can 
withstand. The new, 26 km-long fence will also, according to the Greek Minister of Citizens’ Protection 
Michalis Chrysochoidis, “take into account the geomorphology of the region, and will be constructed to 







Cross-section showing the hierarchy of flood-defence works in the Greek side of the Evros. Source: Greek Ministry for the 
Environment, Energy and Climate Change, Special Secretariat for Water. 
                                                   
362 The Orient Express used to run along these tracks, entering Greece at Ormenio, crossing into Turkey and back into Greece 
at the triangle of Karaağaç, and back into Turkey through Pythio.  
363 “Μ.Χρυσοχοΐδης, Εντός 8 μηνών ο Φράχτης στον Έβρο [M.Chysochoidis: The Evros fence will be ready within 8 months]”, 
Status fm, May 5, 2020, 1077statusfm.gr/news/99-news/9292-m-xrysoxoidis-entos-8-minon-o-neos-fraxtis-ston-evro-





Cross-section of the design for the new fence incorporating a berm. Source: Greek Ministry for Citizen Protection 
 
It is evident from these examples that a hierarchy is designed into the system of flood/border control to 
allow water, armies, and civilians to penetrate the frontier space to varying degrees. After almost a 
century of geoengineering processes, flood control and defence infrastructures in Evros are so intensely 
braided that they are impossible to disentangle one from another364. This spatial arrangement is 
consistent with the region’s reputation as Greece’s ανάχωμα (anáchoma), or embankment, against 
Turkish invasion, and more recently against asylum seekers – a reputation which was doubled down 
and amplified beyond the Greek borders when Ursula von der Leyen described Evros as Europe’s 
“shield”.  
While von der Leyen was referring to the Greek armed forces successfully sealing the border against 
asylum seekers, it is the berm, a versatile and ambiguous military-ecological technology, that is the 
physical embodiment of the ανάχωμα. But the military imaginary of Evros as an ανάχωμα also refers 
to the more nuanced politics of demographic engineering which we discussed in the opening section of 
this chapter, and which intends to produce a Greek Orthodox Christian population along the border as 
a demographic buffer — or embankment — against invasion and ethnic contamination. To a degree, 
                                                   
364 Tellingly, the construction of the new fence was inaugurated to coincide with the announcement of a new programme to monitor flood in 
the Evros. See “Τοποθετείται Πληροφοριακό Σύστηµα Έγκαιρης Προειδοποίησης Πληµµυρών στον ποταµό Έβρο µε πιλοτική λειτουργία 
[Pilot Informational Flood Warning System is being installed in Evros river]”, Evros News, October 17, 2020, www.evros-




the buffer zone which extends across the floodplain haunts the “Surveilled Zone” which shadowed the 
border until 1995, just like the berm haunts the “barre” that regulated movement. Checkpoints have 
since migrated from the roads connecting the Muslim villages on the hills of the Rhodope mountains to 
the riparian zone adjacent to the border. Corresponding to the engineered limits of the floodplain, border 
check-points are today almost always placed directly on top of berms to designate the edge of the 
military buffer zone that runs along the Greek side of the Evros border, also known as ZAP (Zoni 
Asfaleias Prokalypsis, Greek for ‘Zone of Security and Coverage’). 
As embankments of wet earth, berms are concentrations of these politics of containment. They are 
ground engineered in excess. They are routes of control through the floodplain for the Police, military 




The above diagrams show the extent of recent floods in 2010 (left, light blue area) and areas with high flooding risk in the 
Greek Evros catchment basin (right, hatched area), compared against a map approximating the extents of the military buffer 
zone that runs along the Greek side of the Evros border, also known as ZAP (Zoni Asfaleias Prokalypsis, white line). An oblique 
look at the diagram above helps to clarify the overlapping relationship between the infrastructure of flood defence, and military 
strategy in Evros. Source: Greek General Secretariat for Civil Protection. Map of ZAP by authors. 
 
 
2.3.3. “ZAP”: The Floodplain as Buffer 
 
Spanning from the trilateral border in the North, to the Aegean Sea in the south, and with a thickness 
that varies from a couple of hundred metres to a few kilometres from the river, the 10.000 km2 buffer 
zone is a densely surveilled space. Entry to the ZAP is strictly prohibited for civilians (except for a 
handful of locals who cultivate fields inside it), making it impossible to access the main course of the 
river without alerting suspicion and risking arrest. As humanitarian organisations have been reporting 




violations occur, including the repeated failure to rescue asylum seekers in distress, illegal forceful 
expulsions (pushbacks) of border crossers to Turkey, and shootings. 
 
 
A Trap Camera set up by the Turkish authorities near the river. Photo: Sent to author by P. (anonymised) 
 
A case on May 8, 2018 involving a group of fourteen people attempting to cross during a flood event 
speaks directly to the overlapping of flooding with the operations of the border. The attempt failed and 
resulted in one fatality. Once the group returned to Turkey, they attempted to contact Greek authorities 
with a picture of the ID card and the GPS location of the body. Greek police stated that the flooding was 
too severe to attempt a recovery, and over the next few days, no confirmation of the recovery of the 
body was received365. In other examples, the police have refuted the possibility of pushbacks because 
the water level is too high or the geomorphology makes it impossible366. In this way, the behaviour of 
water in excess is co-opted as an obviatory device; a mask in the construction of denial. The flood is 
an alibi for border violence. Consequently, the berms that mark the limit of the flood act as containers 
for this riverine geography of exception.367 The very flexibility of the river here contributes to the 
                                                   
365 Watch the Med, “14 Travellers attempt to cross Turkish-Greek land border, one dead person”, May 8, 2018, 
www.watchthemed.net/reports/view/859# (accessed May 2019.) 
366Dimitris Angelidis, “Μου πήραν τα χαρτιά, με πήγαν στο ποτάμι, και με πέρασαν απέναντι [They took my papers, took me 
to the river, and passed me across]”, EfSyn, February 12, 2018, www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/140103_moy-piran-ta-hartia-
me-pigan-sto-potami-kai-me-perasan-apenanti (accessed March 2019) 
367 As Pavlos Pavlidis told us in an informal interview, seasonal floods often also perform the opposite role. The rising waters 




production of an “indeterminate” space, both materially porous and shifting and thus difficult for 
trespassers to cross, and in which multiple modes of violence are perpetrated with impunity.   
The territorial and material ambiguity of this zone is further enhanced by the multiple actors – many 
unidentified – operating within the uncertain floodplain. Joint Operation Poseidon Land, Frontex’s Evros 
operation, began in 2011. The name conjures a pathologic mythology, casting border crossers as 
mortals committing the hubris of seeking refuge in Europe, while Frontex claims the role of chastising 
deity. Here, Poseidon, god of both the sea and rivers, intervenes at the land/water divide. In mythology 
where his trident struck the land, earthquakes, flooding, and drowning ensued. Echoing a crude sketch 
of the hydrologic cycle, Operation Poseidon Land transposes border violence in liquid form from the 
Aegean—where, as Stefanos will describe in the following part of the thesis, “Grey Rocks, Black 
Waves”, Operation Poseidon is enacted — to the headwaters of the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa and back down 
along its course368. The intentional flooding of the valley from the Ivaylovgrad dam brings Frontex’s 
troubling mythological sensibility into unequivocal reality. Within the floodplain, the trident takes the 
form of Frontex’s RABITs, the shadowy forces suspected of multiple cases of pushbacks and violence. 
As a 2012 ProAsyl report states: “There are many actors involved in the procedures of border patrols 
and screening, so ambiguity over the respective roles and responsibilities creates a gap in 
accountability and potentially permits impunity.”369 In addition to the multiple actors, impunity is likewise 
produced by the buffer zone’s folding of the excess represented by floodwaters into the excesses of 
sovereign territorial power. Here beatings are customary, official documentation is thrown into the river 
and, after seasonal floods, bodies wash up in the accretions of the border.  
 
This might be understood as the construction of an ecology of exception, adapting political philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben’s definition of the state of exception as the ambiguous zone between law and fact 
where the demands of a constructed status necessitas produce a space where state violence is enacted 
with impunity370. Likewise, critical border scholars Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr suggest 
that the exposure of border crossers to fatal forces is the operation of “the zones of exemption” where 
“sovereign power cease[s] to function.”371 However, in relation to the fluvial frontier, rather than a space 
of exemption, sovereign power does not cease to function but incorporates the river’s ambiguities in 
the production of impunity. The frontier reveals itself as an excess of law rather than its absence. 
Consequently, this is not the cessation of power’s function but its very purpose. The very drawing of a 
fixed yet imaginary border line along the central course of the river, and a second one along the limits 
                                                   
368 In March 2020, Frontex operations were scaled up to Rapid Border Intervention Evros 2020. 100 Frontex officers were 
deployed to the region on 12/03/2020. See Frontex, “Frontex launches rapid border intervention on Greek land border”, March 
13, 2020, frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launches-rapid-border-intervention-on-greek-land-border-
J7k21h?fbclid=IwAR1aiVP0_GvuzkpuAsjZoI-qVnk-74Or0H9G59fudmIihx7sYihFaEoij9Y (accessed March 2020). 
369 ProAsyl et al., “Walls of Shame”, 8. 
370 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. by Kevin Attell (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005) p.29. 
371 Rajaram & Grundy-Warr, “The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, And 




of its floodplain to delineate the buffer zone, effectively produce the river as a frontier, whereby its 
movements and muds become spaces where sovereign territorial imaginaries are projected. It is such 





2.3.4. “Like a Stone”: Regimes of Visuality in the Floodplain 
 
There are floodwaters in the meadow to the East leading down to the river. At intermittent points we can 
see the river from the road. This is a territory of wetness. The border is waterlogged. The tyres of all of 
the cars are thick with mud.  
 
South of Soufli and visible from the main road there is a sand stone landscape inhabited by shepherds 
and quarries. 
 
We stop at Pythio beneath a Byzantine fortress. It is positioned at a bend in the Evros with a perfect 
view of the floodplain. The floodplain produces a space of surveillance.  
 
Ifor’s field notes, February 2019. 
 
While we did eventually make it to the river in the delta, posing as birdwatchers372, as well as near the 
village of Dikaia, accompanied by M.373, a local activist whose family owns fields by the river, the sense 
of jeopardy was always palpable. Regular army bases and the constant relay of camouflaged trucks 
maintain an atmosphere of tension, and the sensation of being continually watched, or at the very least 
having our presence regularly noted. 
 
Indeed, the shallow gradient of the floodplain lends itself to military surveillance against the threat of 
Turkish invasion. Lookout points and outposts are installed on every other hill and elevated observation 
stations tower over the riparian vegetation on all sides of the border. Despite the importance of the river 
as a conservation area, large tracts of the banks are deforested. Ostensibly the trees are cut for 
agricultural purposes but as with all activity in the area, deforestation fits into military needs. Tellingly, 
the main periods of deforestation correspond to periods of hostility with Turkey, specifically following 
tensions in Cyprus during the 1960s, after 1986 in response to a skirmish between Greek and Turkish 
forces near Feres374, as well as at the time of writing, following the February/March events. For theorist 
Paul Virilio, in his work on the pervasive influence of speed on contemporary culture, land clearance 
and cultivation are part of “the receding of forest darkness” in the production of a militarised “field of 
                                                   
372 Parts of the Delta are accessible to the public, mostly through guided tours, due to its importance as a wetland and a 
sanctuary for avifauna. 
373 M. did not want to be named. 




vision.”375 Likewise, it is evident that the floodplain itself, in its gently rising topography, and its cultivation 
and deforestation, offers a relatively uninhibited view from the military border stations punctuating the 
riparian area. 
 
The bordering process of the bufferzone is not only exercised through deforestation but through 
botanical growth entangled in the presence of landmines within the floodplain. Although anti-personnel 
landmines were supposed to have been removed by 2008376, it is suspected, however, that annual 
flooding has dispersed mines downstream377. Here the river contributes its own unpredictable agency 
to the weaponisation of the landscape. While driving on the berms close to the river near Dikaia, we 
came across overgrown thickets of brambles and stunted trees surrounded by metal flags indicating 
the presence of mines. This botanical growth once again brought to mind Henrich Böll’s “question of 
Botany”. Here, however, the barbed undergrowth of the minefield measures the latency that precedes 
an explosion rather than the time that has passed since the destruction.378 
 
An anti-vehicle minefield in the buffer zone near the village of Dikaia, February 2019. Photo by authors. 
 
                                                   
375 For Virilio surveillance aims to “occupy, then organize, in a space dominating the trajectories of movement, keys to 
communication, river, sea, road, or bridge”. Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics (Édition Galilée, Paris.1977) trans. by Marc Polizzotti 
(Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006), 94. 
376 It is estimated that over 25000 anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines riddled the Greek banks of Evros between 1974 and 
2008. Niki Kitsantonis, “Land Mines and a Perilous Crossing into Greece”, New York Times, January 6, 2009, 
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/world/europe/06iht-mines.4.19133102.html (accessed October 2018). 
377 Pavlidis and Karakasi, “Review Of Deaths Owing To Migration”. 




In military jargon landmines are “situational obstacles” or “area denial weapons”. Rob Nixon identifies 
the association of mines with the concepts of terror, toxicity, and, indeed, as an “environmental and 
ethical pollutant.”379 Contributing to what Ifor describes in his own work as the construction of “fluvial 
terror”, the indeterminate yet lethal violence of minefieids is evident in the Mufti’s story where he 
describes the burial of dismembered limbs that outnumbered those of the bodies buried, as it is in 
Pavlidis’s calculations: since 2000 forty-nine border crossers lost their lives to injuries sustained from 
landmine explosions380. Through flooding, the river has unintentionally performed an agency of 
unearthing and then dispersing causality across geographic and temporal scales. In this way, the river 
becomes a mediator of the border regime’s more orthodox weaponisation. As we pass by the minefields 
M, our companion tells us: “Heavier than 40 kilos the anti-personnel mine blows, vehicles are 250.” This 
seems to be common knowledge for anyone who has fields in the region, or indeed lives by the river. 
The river’s unintentional dispersal of mines, alongside the 40 kg exerted weight of one leg, symbolises 
another violent confluence of the floodplain / buffer zone. Where elsewhere the body is susceptible to 
the inclination of the riverbanks, the point that a leg stops touching the river bottom, which Pavlidis 
describes as the second step from the bank when the water becomes 3 metres deep, here it is the 
weight of 40 kg that is calibrated against the human body.  
 
Amongst the minefields, and all over the floodplain, we met regular signs prohibiting photography which 
we tentatively ignored381. From the road parallel to the river where these signs are placed it is hard to 
see the water, other than as a break in the ploughed furrows of the fields below. Part of the surveillance 
regime is the control of images and image circulation. By restricting physical and, to a degree, digital, 
access to the river (beyond the restriction of photography, large areas of Evros are blurred in online 
mapping platforms to conceal military structures), the border regime intends on making any study of 
the floodplain and river beyond military purposes impossible. Indeed, this is the case in much of the 
scientific literature related to the region. Environmental studies in particular attest to restricted access, 
hence many of those consulted here specify methodological limitations and reliance on satellite imagery 
to assess riparian conditions382.   
 
                                                   
379 Nixon, Slow Violence, 221-227. Nixon Describes the slow violence whereby he “earth itself must be treated […] as armed 
and dangerous.” 
380 Pavlidis and Karakasi, “Review Of Deaths Owing To Migration”, 466. This accounts for nearly 15% of all bodies retrieved until 
November 2018, although none of these occurred after the landmine clearance of 2008. A rare post from 2003 on the activist 
forum athens.indymedia, available at: athens.indymedia.org/post/80790/ (accessed January 2020), includes photographs of 
migrants injured by landmines in Evros. 
381 To avoid having images deleted if stopped by the Police (a customary practice) we often chose specific routes to avoid 
interception. Similarly, we often hid our SD cards within loose parts of the internal plastic body of the car, and made the decision 
to offload and delete images from devices each night before returning to the field the next morning. When Stefanos visited the 
region in March 2020 he did not take a camera with him. When he used his phone to record, he sent the material over an encoded 
chat app and deleted it instantly. 
382 Angeliki, Mentzafou, Vasiliki Markogianni, Elias Dimitriou, “The Use of Geospatial Technologies in Flood Hazard Mapping and 
Assessment: Case Study from River Evros”, Pure and Applied Geophysics, (2017) 174, 679–700, 681. The denial of hydrologic 
study beyond military purposes also maintains an opacity in relation to civilian knowledge of the river. This is not only in terms of 
research but also in the implementation of non-military policy, for example the proposed greenbelt along the Evros corridor has 




Consequently, it is impossible to study the river, much less the border violence unfolding across it, 
without employing a practice tailored to circumvent these restrictions. As is often the case research 
limitations demand alternative entry points offering new and frequently enlightening perspectives on 
this complex material, political condition. One of the ways this limitation manifests in our research is 
through the materials we collected, such as concealed super-slow-motion filming through windows 
driving past police stations, audio recordings in the place of video, and very rare, if at all, shots of the 
river. 
 
"PHOTOGRAPHS ARE PROHIBITED" sign in the buffer zone, February 2019. Photo by authors. 
 
The control of access and image circulation within the floodplain/buffer zone is particularly potent within 
the context of illegal and often violent expulsions, or pushbacks, of crossers back into Turkey. 
Overwhelmingly, asylum seekers are arrested within the floodplain/buffer zone before they are able to 
register their asylum application and have their fingerprints taken in the Fylakio “reception centre”383. 
They are then arbitrarily detained for hours, until nightfall, in border guard stations or abandoned 
buildings inside, or on the edge of the floodplain/buffer zone, before they are taken to the river in military 
trucks and violently ferried across by masked and armed operatives. Despite several testimonies, 
including our own investigative work with Forensic Architecture384, the Greek government strenuously 
denies this practice, and has repeatedly denounced any such reports as “fake news”385. 
                                                   
383 Reception centres (KEPIs) were established in 2013, Fylakio as the pilot, with the aim of “screening” the nationality and 
validity of claims of new arrivals and aiding the process of removal. 
384 These limitations were also crucial in shaping the methodological approach employed in the investigations conducted by 
Forensic Architecture. Employing an interview technique called “situated testimony”, we used 3D modelling and game engines 
to aid witness memory in reconstructing obscure detention spaces, vehicles, officials’ uniforms, as well as the natural landscape 
and weather conditions the witnesses had experienced during their pushbacks. See Forensic Architecture, “Pushbacks Across 
the Evros/Meriç: Situated Testimony”. 
385 One of these denials, from the Greek Union of Border Guards, is particularly illuminating as to the role of image circulation 
within the floodplain. Accusing Forensic Architecture of serving the interests of the Turkish authorities and those of smugglers, 
the response comments on how the “so-called ‘evidence” captured in the video investigation does not correspond to pushback 
operations because it shows migrants being calm throughout, disembarking in an orderly fashion “In broad daylight, [in front of] 
cameras that happened to be there”. Beyond the implicit confession that pushbacks do take place in Evros, albeit in a more 





Perhaps nothing symbolises this design of obscurity within the floodplain more than the object of the 
smartphone. Testimony in Evros consistently recounts border police forcefully taking mobiles and 
throwing them into the river at the point of being arrested or during pushbacks. Before being pushed 
back to Turkey, Sarah and Soheila386, two Afghani citizens Stefanos interviewed with Forensic 
Architecture, a mother and a daughter, relayed that their belongings and mobile phones were 
confiscated by the police. A relative of theirs was able to hold on to her phone by hiding it in her child’s 
diaper. In another example, Kuzey describes how his mobile phone was thrown into the river in front of 
him: 
 
After we were taken to the Turkish banks we asked for our phones back. One of the police officers 
said, “ah yes your phones”, and threw both of them in the river. They jumped on the water like 
stones.387  
 
These testimonies, amongst others, demonstrate how the river has been deployed as a rudimentary 
mode of digital erasure. By breaking the electric device, the owner’s movements become difficult to 
trace. As the mobile enters the water the GPS signal cuts, all the photographs and contacts stored in 
its memory are wiped, the phone becomes inanimate, “like a stone” thrown into the river entering into 
its turbulences, and into its sediment life. Here the river, bearing perhaps thousands of mobile 
telephones, itself becomes an archive of digital erasure. 
 
In the case of the Evros, the submergence of the phones symbolises non-reception as the denial of 
access to the infrastructures of communication388. Pushbacks are exactly processes of non-reception: 
not having finger prints taken, denied the three-month leave-to-remain cards, unable to claim asylum, 
violently beaten, and exposed to the river and the mud of the river bank as they are left on the other 
side without a means of navigation. The pushback is the exact denial of reception - physical, 
administrative, emotional, and digital. Carried downstream in the sediments of the delta, at the threshold 
of the Aegean, smashed and waterlogged mobile phones accrete with the sands of shifting islands, 
while lithium from their batteries seeps into the freshwater ecosystem. 
 
                                                   
“be there” during operations within the floodplain/buffer zone. See  Panhellenic Union of Border Guards, “Απάντηση των 
συνοριοφυλάκων στην προπαγάνδα των διακινητών - Δελτίο Τύπου Π.Ο.ΣΥ.ΦΥ. [Reply of borderguards to the smugglers’ 
propaganda – press relrease]” December 13, 2019, available at: posyfy.gr/deltia-typou/item/895-diakinhtes (accessed December 
2019). 
386 Soheila and Sarah are not their real names. 
387 see Forensic Architecture, chaptered-video.forensic-architecture.org/kuzey; “First Pushback”. 





2.3.6. Beyond water: Other “Flows” 
The overlaps between a river that regularly floods and a territory where border crossers are at the mercy 
of systematic violence resonates troublingly with nationalist media and governmental rhetoric of “flows”, 
“floods”, or “surges” and the “stemming” of migrants movement.389 Naturalizing metaphors such as 
these emerge wherever border regimes are discursively or materially constructed to ensure the illegality 
of movement across borders, and in doing so, racially “other” border crossers. Indeed, hydrologic 
metaphors are evoked to draw a distinction between those who do not belong and those who do within 
an earthbound notion of territory. Returning to this form of nationhood evident in the Fylakio detention 
centre official’s exasperated cries evoking an earth bound by historic blood against the detainees who 
have crossed the river, and whose detention is conditioned by the continual possibility of forced return 
back across the river. In so doing, this particular detention regime feeds into the construction of the 
example of earth domesticated with blood against the exception: the river in which the “other”, 
prejudiced as “undomesticated”, emerges, dies, or through which is pushed-back. The sound of the soil 
scraped by the official’s foot, covered by his shouts, brings into sharp focus the paradoxical combination 
of ground and liquid engineered in excess and mobilised as defensive boundary of the earthbound, and 
blood-bound, notion of Greekness.  
 
Through our analysis, we are attempting to disambiguate the naturalizing metaphor by critiquing land-
based epistemologies and ontologies that produce ecological and human othering of movement 
deemed to be out of place. As we will discuss in the following, last section of the chapter, nowhere is 
this conflict between soil and water, state and “other” more evident than in the river’s Delta. There, the 
floodplain thickens and the riverine characteristics of flow, erosion, meander, mud and even airborne 
water particles are braided with military presence, agriculture and environmental conservation 




                                                   
389 Sandro Mezzadra analyses this metaphor within public discourse as the use of terminology from communication theory and 
sociology to render migration “objective” and separate from the “actions of subjects”. Sandro Mezzadra, “The Right to Escape”, 




2.3. The Delta: Night, Fog and Mud 




2.4.1. “Rotten Water”: Beyond the River Banks 
 
"in the morning, in the forest, there is a fog in the river and it makes you feel even more cold.” 
Kuzey 
 
South of the Greek village of Ferres and the Turkish town of Ipsala the river splits to form the Evros 
Delta. The Delta, where the river meets the Thracian Sea, covers a surface area of 188 square 
kilometres, most of which lies within Greek territory390. Except for the Turkish town of Enez, built directly 
at the river’s mouth, a series of military barracks built on both sides of the border, and a handful of DIY 
hunting and fishing cabins on the Greek side, the area is completely uninhabited. A protected 
conservation area, designated, like the Prespa lakes, as a wetland of international importance by the 
1971 Ramsar Convention391, the Delta’s saline waters, ponds, and islands are home to a number of 
migratory bird species.  
In March 2020, while the storks and pelicans were flocking in and the flamingos were preparing to head 
south for the summer, the Delta hosted a different kind of migration, with army and police units operating 
side by side with local, self-proclaimed “frontiersmen”, “guardians of the border,” and hunting clubs from 
all over Greece arriving to prevent what they understood to be an “intrusion” of “illegals” into Greece. 
Joining them were far-right and neo-Nazi militants from all over Europe and the US who had flocked 
there to demonstrate their support to the Greek and European border forces, and help them “safeguard 
Europe’s borders”. Showing little regard for human life, rifle in arm, these militias described their 
operations as “hunting” for refugees.392 Throughout March 2020, the Delta was the anáchoma in full 
action. A densely braided space of border violence and death, incorporating military personnel, neo-
Nazi paramilitaries, local farmers and hunters, as well as the very ecology of this deltaic marshland. An 
ecology which includes, but extends beyond, the waters of the river, into its mud, the cold temperature 
at night and meteorological conditions.  
It is during the winter and spring months that the morning fog that Kuzey describes shrouding the deltaic 
landscape is at its thickest. In March 2020 this fog conjured an old and menacing metaphor. As reported 
                                                   
390 As the 1926 Athens Protocol designated the eastern branch of the river as the border. 
391 The Delta is also protected by the 1975 Barcelona Convention, the 1979 Bern Convention the EU Directive 79/409 and the 
NATURA 2000 EU directive. 
392 The ongoing dehumanization of asylum seekers using both language and physical force permeates the region. Detainees in 
the recently exposed border guard centre at Poros, have described guards treating them “like animals.” Matina Stevis, Patrick 
Kingsley, ““We Are Like Animals”: Inside Greece’s Secret Site for Migrants”, New York Times, March 10, 2020, 
www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/world/europe/greece-migrants-secret-site.html?fbclid=IwAR23oG8A32LMnmnB6Y0E8T-




in the media at the time, the paramilitaries who were drawn to the area to hunt crossers “at night and 
in the fog”, were transposing the old Nazi directive “Nacht und Nebel” (“Night and Fog”) onto the Evros 
Delta393. Journalists on the ground also spoke of an “informational fog” covering the truth around events, 
referring to diverging accounts emerging from the two sides of the border and their inability to 
corroborate them due to the border being inaccessible to journalists and civilians394. As we have 
discussed, this clouded mediatic landscape is symptomatic of the floodplain/bufferzone, and is 
purposefully maintained to make the Evros unintelligible to non-military bodies. The fog analogy is 
particularly potent when considered against the numerous reports of secret pushbacks, arbitrary 
detention, torture and death in the Evros floodplain, which have been legally framed as “enforced 
disappearances”395. As in nazi Germany in the 1940s, people in the Evros disappear at night and under 
fog, be it physical or informational, often “nulius nomen”: without trace or name396. 
 
Rather than being a “natural” border, the Delta is an exemplary case of a border nature, where 
environmental elements, which are not deadly on their own, are made deadly by forcing people to 
traverse them under treacherous conditions. The diplomat Elias Dimitrakopoulos, in his 1988 treaty The 
Land Borders of Greece, describes this deltaic terrain: 
The Delta is unnavigable during spring and winter. The median depth of the river at the Delta is 2-3 metres 
deep and the flow rate is 3200 cubic metres/hour during the summer. The Greek bank is almost entirely 
swamp, while the Turkish bank is somewhat higher and steep, until the point where the Evros meets the 
Ergene river, where there is a swamp as well.397 
The demarcation committee’s decision to place the border on the eastern branch of the river is 
significant for border crossers today who are attracted to the area due to its remoteness and looser 
patrolling compared to the inhabited parts of the river banks. Fifteen kilometres wide, and filled with 
marshes and ponds, the Delta can take days to cross.  Returning to Sarah and Soheila, who spent 
three days in late November sub-zero temperatures at once trying to exit the Delta and evade the police. 
They detailed how they walked during the night and slept at day. 
 
Soheila: We used to walk during the night, the weather was very cold. It would rain, there was mud, we 
had children with us. There were many reeds along the way.  
Sarah: There are reeds, and there is a swamp underneath them, where rotten water gathers… 
                                                   
393Nello Scavo, “Tra Turchia e Grecia. Cani, doppiette, trattori e neonazi: la caccia ai profughi [Between Turkey and Greece. 
Dogs, shotguns, tractors and neo-nazis: the hunt for refugees]”, Avvenire, March 12, 2020, 
www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/cani-doppiette-trattori-e-neonazi-per-dare-la-caccia-ai-migranti-nuovi-scontri-al-confine-tra-
grecia-e-turchia (accessed March 2020).  
394 “Η ομίχλη της ενημέρωσης στον Έβρο [The informational fog in Evors]”, Avgi, March 6, 2020, 
www.avgi.gr/article/10838/10791589/d-tosides-e-omichle-tes-enemeroses-ston-ebro-echetiko- (accessed September 2020). 
395 GLAN, “Enforced Disappearance in Greece”. 
396 “Nacht und Nebel” was a directive issued by Adolf Hitler on 7 December 1941 targeting political activists 
and resistance members in World War II to be disappeared, imprisoned, or killed, while the family and the population remained 
uncertain as to the fate or whereabouts of the missing. The designation "NN" was also used to refer to prisoners and deportees 
("NN-Gefangener", "NN-Häftling", "NN-Sache") at the time. The abbreviation "NN" was otherwise well known in German to 
mean "nullus nomen" ("without name"). 




Soheila: Again, we stayed from morning to night in the forest. It was a huge forest and it was very cold. 
We couldn’t make a fire because the police would find us. 
Sarah: And then, two more nights, we were walking. And during the day we were sleeping. There was a 
lot of rain and snow. When we woke up, one night, the snow had set on us.  
Soheila: No matter how much we walked, we wouldn’t get closer… 
 
Kuzey, who also spent several days in the Delta, confirms the frictions posed by the deltaic terrain in 
his attempts to enter Greece: 
I crossed the first river, it was 80-90 metres wide, but I know that I need to swim one more river. It was 
two parts of river. When I reached the second river it was much deeper and longer than the first one, 110-
120 metres, something like that. The sun is getting down, it is really cold, I had nowhere to dry my 
clothes… I don’t want to cross the river again but I had to, because where I was there was nowhere to 
spend the night. In the morning I noticed that I was actually in a little island. 
 
As the above testimonies reveal, more so than anywhere else along the river course, in the Delta the 
border also exists beyond the river banks. It is in the reeds and “rotten water”, in the mud of the 
expanded flood meadows, as well as in the impenetrable riparian vegetation. For the border crosser, 
here drowning is not the only threat posed by the river. There is also the slower threat of wetness when 
emerging on the other side. In combination with night time temperatures, exhaustion, and the wearing 
of multiple layers of clothing that are drenched during crossings, wetness becomes deadly beyond the 
river channel. This is an ecosystem border constructed as a relational zone of flows, currents, ground 




Sarah’s muddy shoes during her attempt to cross the Delta. Photo: Sarah/Forensic Architecture. 
 
Mud, in particular, recurs in many crossers’ testimonies, who describe the point of stepping onto the 
ground as saturated and difficult to walk through and is often an unaccounted element in the arcifinious 





The first area I crossed the river has mud all over. It was mud all over my shoes, my clothes. I walked on 
the mud. Sometimes my feet go under the ground to my knees. It was hard to walk, there are plants 
everywhere. I grabbed some trees, I pushed myself out of the river using the branch, but that area had so 
many thorns, that’s the more difficult part, I need to walk in the forest. It was night, I couldn’t see, and 
whatever I touched it hurt me398. 
 
There is perhaps no more fitting a line to describe the weaponisation of the river ecosystem than 
Quzey’s memory of being hurt by ‘whatever he touched’. As he describes, this is an environment that 
is designed to hurt those who attempt to navigate it unauthorized. 
 
In the Delta, the river (and the border) take many forms. As Kuzey recounts in the opening quote, the 
border river is also in the air in the form of fog. Fog, like clothes sodden from swimming across the river, 
and combined with freezing winter temperatures, contribute to the threat of hypothermia for border 
crossers, which, after drowning, is the second highest cause of death at Evros. The violence of the 
deltaic border is one that has both a physical and temporal thickness, a latency. Kuzey explained to us 
how he did not want to leave the Delta with his clothes covered in mud and thorns because they would 
single him out as a refugee and undoubtedly lead to his arrest. He was thus aware that he was wearing 
the river/border apparatus on him and with it, evidence of his crossing it irregularly. We could even 
argue that, like the planned moat that was never realised, the blue paint sprayed on crossers during 
the March 2020 events is also redundant, and merely a facsimile of riverine processes already always 




The impenetrable riparian vegetation near the Evros Delta, February 2019. Photo by authors. 
                                                   




2.4.2. Where Land Meets Sea 
 
In her book The Black Shoal: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies, Tiffany Lethabo King 
introduces the geological formation of the shoal, “a place where the water is of little depth; a shallow, a 
sand-bank or bar”, as a spatial metaphor through which to disrupt what she perceives as a problematic 
binding of Indigenous studies to “imaginaries of land as territory” and their implied opposition to Black 
diaspora studies in the Americas, which she identifies as “overdetermined by rootlessness and only 
metaphorized by water”. Lethabo King sees the shoal as an interstitial and emerging space of becoming 
where the two “hermeneutical frames that have conventionally been understood as sealed from each 
other” can meet, a friction which can be used to offer new approaches to theorizing racial violence. For 
King, shoals open up a space of indeterminacy, unknowabilty. In their shifts, they create new, 
unexpected, topographies which are always in excess of attempts to map them. “The shoal requires 
new footing, different chords of embodied rhythms, and new conceptual tools to navigate its terrain.”399 
Even though we have purposefully steered clear of metaphors, choosing instead to scrutinize the rich 
and unrelenting materiality of the river and its tangible connections with systems of border defence, to 
think of the Delta as a “shoal” is an enticing, and geographicall valid, proposition. In Evros, and most 
visibly in the Delta, the violent discriminations reproduced by bordering states attempt to limit 
epistemological scope to stark divisions that maintain naturalised ethnic difference through equally 
naturalised boundaries: land and sea, inside and outside, citizen and intruder. Through our analysis of 
the Evros/Meriç riverine frontier we attempted to engage such forms of fluvial and riparian thinking to 
disentangle it. As we have discussed, water and border knowledges here overlap and fold into the 
management of the entire floodplain itself. Therefore, to think of the border through the Delta uncovers 
its production as a simple geographic and ethnic demarcation when it has always operated in dispersed 
and muddy ways beyond the reductive binarisms it tries to sustain.  
 
Through the heavy waters occasionally released by the dam, amongst the impacted earth of the berms, 
and under the veil of the heavy airs of teargas and pesticides, complex forces are deployed and emerge 
from the fog of the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa. The Deltaic shoreline, with its militarized banks and shifting 
sandbanks in which the chemicals that are released in the Evros waters upstream accrete400, is where 
these forces are most densely braided. It therefore becomes a prism through which we can attempt to 
understand the complexity of the river as a weaponized border nature.  
 
To confront the far-right that is currently assembling its forces rhetorically, environmentally, and in 
person in the Evros delta and all along the fluvial frontier, and to counter the obfuscating tactics long 
                                                   
399 Tiffany Lethabo King, The Black Shoals, Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies, (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2019), 4. 
400 D.I. Giannouli et al., “Morphological evolution of the Evros River Deltaic shoreline” (2014) Available at: geolib.geo.auth.gr › 




deployed by the police in their use of the river as alibi, requires perceiving the extent of the elements of 
the river incorporated in the violence of the border. This, in turn, involves a beholding eye that sees 
water (and border) beyond the river channel as clearly as it sees water flowing between the riverbanks 
themselves. An eye which sees the river as a spectrum, as dew in the field, as freezing fog, dried oxbow 
lakes, as mud and thorns in the riverbanks, and carried on the clothes and the bodies forced to cross. 
This mode of perception understands borders beyond the cartographic lines that power chooses to 
represent itself but as an always already expanded material and infrastructural spectrum of power, 
which, mobilised in the ways discussed here, is experienced as a space pervaded by violence. Through 
our enquiry into the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa, we tried to unpack these varying watery states for what they 
are: the riverine arsenal of a deadly defense architecture, humid instantiations of an entire region 
designed as a violent anáchoma. 
 
〜 
Projecting the median line of the Evros/Meriç’s main branch beyond the estuary, three nautical miles 
south into the Thracian Sea, the 1926 Athens protocol extended the border into the Aegean Sea. One 
hundred years later, the Evros fences, existing and planned, perform the same function, directing 
migrants into the Aegean waves.
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Part III 
Grey Rocks, Black Waves 
The Aegean: A Border Archipelago 
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 “to the archipelagos laden with palpable death” 
Édouard Glissant, The Poetics of Relation
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i.  Mawwāl 
 
 
“Ah, sea, give us love. Look at what is happening to us 
Don’t send your waves against us. We are Syrians. I swear, our story is a sad one 
Ah, you will not believe it, but our tears could drown even you 
Ah, sea, stop the waves. There are children on these boats, they are our memories. Our lives are on these 
boats. I swear, our tears could fill all the seas in this world 
Our children lost their innocence by your waves, they were killed in them 
Ah, sea, let your waves have mercy on us and let them treat us like they would treat a mother” 




The above words, with which I choose to introduce the final section of the thesis, were vocalised in the 
form of a mawwāl, a slow and rhythmic lament, improvised and sang by Alaa, a Syrian refugee, shortly 
after he had landed on a pebble beach of the southern shores of Lesvos, an island in the north-east 
Aegean Sea. The early morning sun, which for so many migrant crossings marks the moment of arrival 
on the Greek shores (vessels typically leave Turkey before the break of dawn and, assuming all goes 
well, arrive an hour later, shortly after sunrise) is slowly rising behind the person singing. The video was 
filmed at 07:40 in the morning, on the 12th of March 2016, at the height of “the refugee crisis”, and only 
four days before the signing of the infamous EU-Turkey deal that starkly reduced Aegean crossings. 
 
Alaa, singing, was one of the last people to cross the Aegean and continue onwards to northern Europe 
without waiting in limbo in the Greek islands. As the camera pans around him, one can see all the actors 
and material markers of “the crisis”: white rental cars and mini vans with logos of humanitarian 
organisations; buses parked, their engines running, waiting to take the newly arrived to a reception 
centre; groups of refugees, and people with high-visibility vests walking among them, offering dry 
clothes, thermal blankets, cups of tea and bottles of water. On the beach behind lay piles of discarded 
life jackets and deflated dinghies, which are being scavenged by locals, the so-called “crows”. And 
cameras, many cameras, turned towards the sea and the man singing.  
                                                   
401 The song was recorded in a cell-phone video and sent to me by Salam Aldeen, a humanitarian worker. It has since been 
uploaded on Youtube and is available under the title “Τραγούδι-θρήνος Σύριου πρόσφυγα [Mourning song of a Syrian refugee]”, 
in the following link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-0rGkx1OWI (accessed January 2019).  
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Alaa is singing his Mawwāl facing the Aegean Sea. He occasionally gestures towards it, pleading it to 
stop sending its waves against the boats carrying Syrians across the border. In the background, one 
can see coast guard vessels patrolling this very border, and behind them, within touching distance, the 
Turkish shores.  
 
During the “crisis”, the Aegean islands became the main entry point to the European continent and the 
remain one until this day; a dangerous landing site and an unwanted but necessary stopover on the 
way North. Sites for the documentation, interception and holding of migrants and refugees were 
established on both sides of the Aegean border, and a dense system of surveillance is now operational 
on these shores. The sea, the shores around it, and the skies above it402, are surveyed, recorded and 
narrated by a number of optic and sensory regimes. The Aegean, like the the entire Mediterranean 
basin - a sea that historically “signal[led] a world of mobilities, betweenness, instabilities, encounters 
and becomings”403 - is increasingly militarised by European authorities, and as such it has been 
rendered into a a “moat” to “Fortress Europe”. As I will discuss in this part of the thesis, it has been 
made to absorb, to deter, to hurt and to kill. 
 
Implied by the lament, but left outside the frame is the story of the man’s crossing of the sea. Α second 
video, filmed during Alaa’s first, unsuccessful attempt to cross into Greece by boat, helps provide some 
context. Before the group entered the Greek territorial waters, the Turkish Coast Guard caught up with 
them and started hitting their dinghy with spear-like batons in their attempt to puncture it. While they 
didn’t manage to sink the vessel, they eventually forced them to return to Turkey, only for the group to 
leave again a couple of days later. Seen in this context, the “sea” to which Alaa sings is, like the 
Evros/Meriç river, a constellation of actors and fields of agency. A liquid assemblage itself, it is 
transformed by its nesting inside the border assemblage, battered and moulded into shape by the 
natural elements, patrolled by coast guards and met and crossed under specifically dangerous 
circumstances, fleeing war, in hiding and under attack. 
When the man sings about waves, which ones does he mean, I wonder? Those that pushed his vessel 
to the Greek shores, or those caused by the Turkish coast guard vessel that forced them back? It is 
precisely on this blurred threshold between nature, law and military technology that this chapter will 
tread. 
 
I will approach this threshold through a close examination of two shipwrecks involving vessels that 
carried would-be asylum seekers to Greece, namely those that occurred between Farmakonissi island, 
and its neighbouring Agathonissi island, in the south-east Aegean Sea, in January 2014 and March 
                                                   
402 Drones, helicopters, airplanes and zeppelins are used to monitor the crossing from above. 
403 Philip E. Steinberg, “Of Other Seas: Metaphors and Materialities in Maritime Regions”, Atlantic Studies. No 10:2 (2016): 156. 
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2018 respectively. Due to their differing circumstances and their proximate location in the most heavily 
militarized and densely contested stretch of the Aegean border, I will argue, the two events provide a 
prism through which one can begin to interrogate the dynamics of sovereignty, mobility, and death in 










Still from a video taken during Alaa’s first, unsuccessful crossing. Source: Alaa via Salam Aldeen.
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“They Were Towing Us” 




   





Bariali Kadiri, from Afghanistan was sat on the deck. “About two hours after leaving Turkey, we arrived 
within 80-100 metres from the island [of Farmakonissi]. We were so close we could hear the waves 
break against the rocks. Then, the engine stopped. […] It was then that the [Greek] Coast Guard vessel 
approached us. They shone a searchlight towards us and gestured to us to go back. We tried to explain, 
waving, that the engine is broken. We held our babies up in the air, to show we were in need of help. 
The Coast Guard fired 4-5 warning shots to scare us off. Their vessel then circled us once, creating big 
waves, and then moved with great speed, first parallel and then diagonally to our bow, causing our 
vessels to collide.” What Kadiri is describing here is an operation of “aggressive deterrence”. The term 
(epithetikí apotropí in Greek) is colloquially used by the Greek Coast Guard to describe the process 
whereby their patrol speedboats manoeuvre dangerously close to the smaller, migrant vessels, with the 
purpose of creating waves that will act as a deterrent “wall”. Faced with the risk of sinking, migrants are 
eventually forced to turn back towards Turkey, without the Coast Guard ever having touched their 
vessel. This is an effective, if extremely dangerous patrol technique, that permits the Coast Guard to 
deny responsibility in the case of an accident. The boat Kadiri was on, however, with its broken engine, 
could not turn back. “The two vessels came side by side, with the Coast Guard’s engine facing our bow. 
Two people disembarked on our boat, pointing their guns at us. They ordered us to move away from 
them, towards the stern. They then tied a rope to our bow, and started towing us with speed towards 
the Turkish coast, and away from the Greek island, that was just in front of us. This lasted for about 15 
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minutes”404. What started as “aggressive deterrence” quickly escalated to a pushback operation, or, as 
is the case here, a “tow-back”.  
 
Another survivor, Ahmadi Mirwais continues: ‘‘The two coast guards stayed on our boat and kept 
pointing their guns at us. We were going so fast, our bow was almost in the air, and the waves caused 
by the Coast Guard started hitting our small vessel, which was taking in water from the sides and from 
the stern. In the end, the bow broke off, from the force of the towing.” Mirwais continues:  
 
The coast guards tied the rope again and left our vessel. They started towing us again really fast towards 
the Turkish coast, this time going in Zig-Zag. We were yelling, trying to make them understand that these 
manoeuvres were causing our boat to take in more water. I could hear the women and children in the hold 
scream that water was seeping in.405 
 
Then, according to all witness testimonies, the Coast Guard vessel stopped, approached the migrants’ 
small wooden vessel again –a 9-metre-long Turkish fishing boat called the Göznuru- and cut the rope. 
The Göznuru capsized and sank instantly, at 02:17, in the dark waters off the coast of Farmakonissi 
island, and about 500m inside the Greek territorial waters, in the Dodecanese archipelago. Once 
overboard, the migrants –Afghan and Syrian nationals- were treated with extreme violence; the coast 
guard crew reportedly kicked those who tried to climb onto their vessel back to sea and repeatedly told 
them to “fuck off” and “die”406. Eventually, 14 people made it onto the Coast Guard vessel – the 24-
metre-long combat boat ΠΛΣ-136 - before the rope that was used for the towing, loose as it was in the 
sea, got pulled in by the jet and caused the left engine to overheat and catch fire. It was then that the 
captain left the scene, abandoning the rest of the migrants to drown. Twelve bodies were eventually 
retrieved from the sea of Farmakonissi; three women and nine children407.  
 
The Göznuru was retrieved from the seabed and was forensically examined for signs of contact with 
the ΠΛΣ-136. Local engineers and naval architects were contracted, who deemed that no such signs 
were found, and that the Göznuru was liable to sinking, regardless of the conduct of the Coast Guard408. 
Other crucial pieces of possible evidence, such as radio and telephone communications, video footage, 
or GPS data for the Coast guard vessel, were never included in the court files. In assessing the case, 
the investigator only took into account the statements and information provided by the coast guard and 
                                                   
404 Maritime Court of Piraeus, “Testimony of Bariali Kadiri to Military Judge B”, January 30, 2014. Translated from Greek by the 
author. 
405 Maritime Court of Piraeus, “Testimony of Ahmadi Mirwais to Military Judge B”, January 31, 2014. Translated from Greek by 
the author. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Death in Farmakonissi was extremely gendered. This is owing to the fact that, according to survivors’ testimony, women and 
children were stowed in the hull, while men were on the deck. When the vessel capsized, the door to the deck was blocked and 
most women and children got trapped in the hull. In the central Mediterranean, a similar typology is seen to function through race. 
More affluent refugees from the Arab countries pay a higher fare to travel on the deck, while sub-Saharan Africans travel in the 
hull. 
408 Psarobas, Vassilios & Sliman, Fotios, “Report on the ΠΛΣ-136 and the Göznuru” February 7, 2014. 
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the military officers, while considering the survivors’ testimonies as “factually imprecise and lacking any 
substantial evidence”.  
 
Later that year, the human rights monitoring group “Migreurop” released a report referring to the Aegean 









       
The PLS-136 (left) and the Göznuru (right). Source: Farmakonissi case file.
                                                   










The broken bow of the Göznuru, and the burnt engine of the PLS-136, evidence of the violence of the towing. forensic 
examination by naval architects and engineers. 






Maps showing the locations where different bodies and objects were retrieved. 
21/01/2014. Source: Farmakonissi case file.
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“This Day, you Have to Forget it”  
Agathonissi, 37°25'54.91"N, 27° 4'37.03"E 
 
 
“I tried to speak about this day, they say “this day, you have to forget it”. They say “you called us today, 
not Friday”. They were fighting between each other. They shout to each other. You can understand they 
were saying to each other, “why didn’t you help?” You could tell they have a problem. We were saying to 
them “it was Friday”, they were saying “no, it was Saturday”.”410 
 
 
By “they”, here, Quassim, a man from Iraq, refers to the Greek Coast Guard on the small island of 
Agathonissi, also in the Greek Dodecanese, some ten nautical miles north of Farmakonissi. Quassim 
is one of the three survivors from a shipwreck that occurred in the early hours of Friday 16th of March 
2018, in the waters south east of Agathonissi, and only 6 nautical miles north of the sinking location of 
the Göznuru.  
 
According to Quassim, their small fiberglass vessel left the Turkish coast near the port village of 
Mavisehir at around 05:45, setting its course to the Greek border. On board were 22 people: a family 
from Iraq, sitting at the bow, another family from Afghanistan, at the stern, and two Turkish smugglers. 
They were told the crossing to the island would take 10’, without knowing exactly which island they were 
headed to. The sea was calm: winds in the Aegean usually subside at night, and pick up again in the 
morning. A few minutes after they left, they were spotted by a patrol vessel of the Turkish Coast Guard. 
At 06:35, the smugglers told them they had crossed the maritime border. Minutes later, about an hour 
after they had left the Turkish shore, and some 1.5 nautical miles inside the Greek territorial waters, the 
boat engine stopped. The vessel, which had already taken in water from the chase with the Turkish 
Coast Guard, started taking in even more. The passengers panicked, one of the smugglers fell in the 
sea, and, at around 06:45, the boat capsized.  
 
Darab, a relative of the Afghan family who was following the vessel’s location live on Whatsapp from 
his tent in the camp of Samos, where he had arrived a few months earlier, got in touch with the Greek 
authorities, to little avail. It was later revealed that three patrol vessels were deployed to the region, but 
these conducted a brief, and patchy, search and rescue operation. A full-scale operation was launched 
only after a local fisherman found bodies washing ashore the following morning, on March the 17th. By 
that time, nineteen of the twenty-two passengers had died, and three survivors had made it to the shore 
on their own. One of the three survivors, Fahima, lost her four children in the shipwreck, Quassim lost 
his wife, his year-old daughter and his 6-year-old son. 
                                                   
410 Author’s interview with Quassim. The excerpt is available at: vimeo.com/332802115/e7b340786c. 
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Messages sent by Darab to the Greek Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre reflect the geographical confusion that is the result 
of a combination between the authorities’ unwillingness to rescue, and the complex and contested geography of the 
archipelago. Source: Agathonissi case file. 
 
 
Contrary to the shipwreck of Farmakonissi, where the Coast Guard violently towed the Göznuru into 
sinking, the sea in Agathonissi was weaponised in a more indirect and subtle way, after the boat’s 
sinking, in the form of a deadly drift. As Fahima described in her testimony before the prosecutor, 
 
We tried to stay close to each other but the pressure of the water caused us to drift apart. When the dawn 
broke I saw 4-5 life vests floating on the sea, without bodies. I didn’t know how to swim, I just stayed afloat. 
Every one hour, I saw someone let go and disappear in the water. When the sun was high above our 
heads I realised that no-one from my family was alive.411  
 
During their recollection of the events, the survivors used the position of the sun to situate events in 
time. In their perceptual frame, distorted by the forces of the sea but contained by the rhythmic 
movement of the sun, this deadly drift lasted for twelve hours, from sunrise to sundown. After they made 
it to the shore, they spent another twelve hours unassisted, from sundown to sunrise. This duration, 
from sunrise, to sundown, to sunrise again, is erased in official records: to cover for their insufficient 
response, the Greek authorities to this day deny the shipwreck occurred on Friday the 16th, and officially 
register it as having occurred the next day, Saturday the 17th. Where in most maritime regions, such a 
denial could be credited to a lack in communication, the same is not possible in the dense, militarized, 
and thickly surveyed geography of the south-east Aegean. On the contrary, all three survivors to this 
day insist that a grey military vessel wearing a Greek flag approached them approximately one hour 
after they shipwrecked and stayed at a distance for hours, without offering assistance412.
 
                                                   
411 Maritime Court of Piraeus, “Testimony of Fahima Malek, with translator”, July 18, 2018. Translated from Greek by the author. 




Meteorological report confirming the time of sunrise and sunset on March 15-19, 2018. Bullet point number four reads “Possible 
differences due to local causes or weather phenomena occurring at a very small space and time scale cannot be calculated 
because we do not have such a dense weather monitoring system”. As I will show, this density of the Aegean geography, and 
the gaps in scientific knowledge these produce, contribute to ambiguities which are used to obfuscate the responsibility of coast 





Quassim and Fahima both identified the same vessel, the British-built Vosper Thornycroft Open Sea Patrol Vessel “ΠΛΣ-50 
Arkioi” as the vessel who approached them and did not offer assistance. To this day, the presence of this vessel in the vicinity 
of the shipwreck is unconfirmed. Source: Video stills, by author. Full videos are available at vimeo.com/332805558/5f589f2bd5 
(Quassim) and vimeo.com/332798392/2743d8b375 (Fahima). 
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The two shipwrecks, located six nautical miles and four years apart, span the entire duration of what 
came to be called the “refugee crisis”, and, however similar their outcome, they demonstrate a shift in 
the ever-volatile migration management policies in the region. With push-back operations no longer 
occurring in the Aegean at the time413, and set against a society that had grown accustomed to the sight 
of death at sea after years of “crisis”, the more recent Agathonissi case demonstrates that non-
assistance, as sanctioned by what I will describe as the “deep-state” of the Greek navy and coast guard, 
emerged as the closest alternative. As Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller have noted through their 
work on a different, but similar case, that of the “left-to-die-boat”414 in the central Mediterranean, 
abandonment at sea in Agathonissi suggests a shift from the more direct violence of the towing in 
Farmakonissi to “a form of violence that is exercised less by effecting a destructive force onto a given 
actor, than by creating the conditions in which the sea becomes a liquid trap and refraining to help those 
who are caught in it.”415 
 
Crucially, the two shipwrecks are among the most prominent incidents for which legal cases have been 
opened in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against the Greek Coast Guard. The 
Farmakonissi case, formally known as Safi and others v Greece, or no.5418/15, was submitted to the 
Maritime court of Piraeus416 by a consortium of lawyers representing the survivors in January 2014, and 
was dismissed by the prosecutor two months later, in March 2014.  It was submitted again for litigation, 
this time at the ECtHR where, at the time of writing, almost seven years later, the case is still pending 
resolution. In 2018, within my role as a project coordinator at Forensic Architecture, I held a series of 
meetings with the lawyers and began to research the court files and design the contours of a spatial 
investigation that would look into the role of the Coast Guard in the shipwreck. The project, which was 
to be undertaken in collaboration with human rights NGOs Refugee Support Aegean and Greek Council 
for Refugees never materialised, largely to do with Forensic Architecture shifting it’s focus to the 
Evros/Meriç river border. Having studied the court files thoroughly, and with permission from the lawyers 
and survivors to digitise and use the material in my research, I decided to attempt a close reading of 
the documents. Far from being a legal scholar myself, I chose to focus specifically on how questions of 
“natural” agency and violence appear in the files, and how these, I will show, are more often than not 
summarily absorbed by the body of the sea417. Despite the investigation never being completed, my 
engagement with the Farmakonissi case informed my understanding of the entanglement of border 
                                                   
413 As I mentioned in the introduction, this pattern has now changed one more, with pushbacks, or “drift-backs” being a daily 
occurrence in the Aegean. Drift is today weaponised even more explicitly, enlisted in the pushback process. This new technique 
is, for lack of space and time, not addressed further in this text.  
414 Forensic Oceanography, “The left-to-die-boat”, April 11, 2012, available at: forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-left-to-
die-boat, (accessed 2013).  
415 Lorenzo Pezzani, “Liquid Traces” in Forensis, The Architecture of Public Truth, ed. Forensic Architecture, (Sternberg, 2014), 
671. 
416 Piraeus is the main port of Athens, where the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and the headquarters of the Hellenic Coast Guard 
are based. 
417 The material from both cases is not in the public domain and is exhibited presented here solely for the purpose of this PhD 
thesis. 
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defence with the natural environment of the Aegean, and in many ways laid the groundwork for the 
investigation into the shipwreck in Agathonissi that followed.  
 
When the Agathonissi shipwreck occurred in March 2018, I met with two of the three survivors (the 
third, Saymaa, a woman from Iraq, asked to be repatriated immediately after the shipwreck) and a third 
relative and conducted filmed, semi-structured interviews418 in an attempt to reconstruct the events, 
identify those responsible, and further support the survivors’ testimony in court - the same court that 
had examined and dismissed the case of Farmakonissi four years earlier. I also collected evidence like 
GPS positions and chat histories from their phones that could be used as evidence. In early May 2018 
I travelled to Agathonissi, and the neighbouring, larger islands of Samos and Leros from where the 
criminally negligent rescue operation had been launched. Posing as an early-bird tourist, I trekked the 
island to understand the terrain, document military infrastructures that could have been used to spot 
and assist the shipwrecked people at sea419, and look for identifiable features in the survivors’ 
testimonies - to “ground truth”420 them - so as to prevent them from being discarded again as 
untrustworthy. In July 2018 I produced a preliminary field report and in June 2019 I completed a second, 
103-page-long investigative report which attempted a spatio-temporal reconstruction of the shipwreck 
and the subsequent drift of migrants at sea. Both reports were submitted to the Maritime court of 
Piraeus. In July 2020 the case was dismissed in usual fashion and, with local legal remedies exhausted, 
it was submitted anew to the European Court of Human Rights in October of the same year. The 
testimony, maps, and photos presented as my practice here are part of the evidence submitted. 
 
The analysis that follows is structured in two main sections. The first section, Grey Rocks, maps the 
two shipwrecks against the conflicts and violent state practices that have historically played out in this 
maritime region, as well as the Aegean’s carceral pasts and geologic presents, to demonstrate how the 
lines that are drawn and redrawn over the surface of the sea421 intersect with the interstitial and charged 
geography of the Aegean Archipelago to create an unstable maritime territory. I place particular focus 
on the “Sea of Samos”, a stretch of sea in the South-East Aegean that engulfs the islands of 
Farmakonissi and Agathonissi. This sub-archipelago of the Greek Dodecanese spans from the southern 
shores of Samos island in the north, to the island of Pserimos in the south. It is delimited by the islands 
                                                   
418 I call the interviews semi-structured because even though I arrived there with a camera, a tripod, a set of questions written 
down on a piece of paper, a translator and a lawyer, the interviews were conducted in the survivors’ intimate spaces, in the 
temporary flats they had been allocated from the asylum services. They chose where to sit, so as to feel more comfortable while 
revisiting a traumatic experience, and I intervened with the space as little as possible. I was offered tea, and as I was let in the 
people’s grief, the interview often turned to a conversation. I was rarely behind the camera, I paid little attention to the shot or the 
sound, I just made sure from time to time that the camera was running. A deliberate choice was made not to film the peoples’ 
faces, both due to the current ambiguity of their asylum applications, and to respect their right to opacity at a vulnerable moment. 
419 I was surprised to find that the main military base of the island, which hosts a radar, was looking directly towards the location 
of the shipwreck. 
420 “Ground truth” refers to the process of corroborating a piece of evidence (be it testimony or a satellite photograph) from a 
ground perspective, in this case, on-site. 
421 Suvendrini Perera, “Oceanic corpo-graphies, Refugee Bodies and the Making and Unmaking of Waters”, Feminist Review 
103, no.1, (March 2013): 65. 
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of Patmos, Leros, and Kalymnos, in the west, and by the coast of Turkey in the east. Removed from 
larger islands but filled with small rocks and islets, this small area is largely restricted to civilian 
navigation due to continuous disputes between Greece and Turkey and, like the Evros floodplain, has 
in recent years emerged as a hotspot of state violence and obfuscation thereof. As in Evros, tensions 
between littoral authorities here create a frontier that is governed by both an overlap and a vacuum of 
responsibility and jurisdiction, one that allows for the deflection of blame for migrant deaths. Any incident 
that occurs there -including migrant crossings- is considered a matter of “national security” for both 
littoral states and therefore a deep mantle of secrecy covers these waters422. Out of civilian view and 
access, this maritime space, like Evros, can be policed in ways that would not be possible elsewhere 
in the Aegean. It is through this entanglement of geography, law and history, I argue, that migrant death 
in the Aegean is rendered possible today.  
 
The second section, Black Waves, examines how this interstitial and historically charged materiality is 
mobilized as a defensive infrastructure within the context of contemporary migration at sea. I enquire 
into the manoeuvres, legal, operational, and military, in which the very matter of the archipelago –its 
waves, temperatures, rocks, and currents- is enlisted to perform the work of border enforcement, and 
reflect on a spatial and visual practice through which this matter can be decoded to reveal traces of 
state violence. As I have maintained throughout this thesis, I argue that the Aegean border functions 
less as a line on the water surface and more as an ecology, one that is enforced through law and military 




The passengers onboard the vessel that sank outside Agathonissi recorded a video upon departure, stating the date and 
place, anticipating its evidentiary value. They were instructed to do so by people who had crossed before them. Video Still, by 
author.
                                                   
422 Indeed, the scarce images of Farmakonissi come from videos of military drills or visits paid by high ranked army and 
government officials. When I called the Leros Coast Guard to ask for permission to go spearfishing there, it resulted in them 
taking my details and aggressively advising me to “go to one of the other rocks instead”. 
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3.1. Grey Rocks 
1433 – 0 m
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3.1.1. “Sharp like Razors”: Spaces of Conflict and Exile 
 
 
Prosecutor: In which territorial waters did the shipwreck take place? 
Quassim: As I mentioned above, at 06:35 the ones who steered the boat told us we had crossed into 
Greek waters. 
Prosecutor: Do you know where Greece and Turkey are?  
Quassim: I don’t know where Greece and Turkey are. 
Prosecutor: How did you then know you had crossed from Turkey into Greece? 
Quassim: I know because the two (2) drivers of the boat told us we had crossed the border. 
Prosecutor: How do you know they were not lying to you? 
Quassim: I don’t know if they were telling the truth or if they were lying.423  
 
 
In their testimonies before the prosecutor, the survivors of the Agathonissi shipwreck remembered the 
rocky shores where they beached. “When the three of us finally made it to the shore the sun was 
setting”, Quassim recalled. “Since none of us could swim any longer, the waves and currents pushed 
us all to this rocky shore” Fahima continues. “The man was the first to get out of the sea. Then he 
helped the Iraqi woman and me. Then he pulled the dead children…The man left to seek help, we 
couldn’t follow.”424 During our interview, Quassim and Fahima both described the rocks as sharp like 
razors, difficult to hold onto and even harder to walk on, sculpted as they were from the forces of the 
sea425.  
 
As with most rocky shores, the aegean islets are certainly hostile when approached from the sea, or 
when walked on without the necessary equipment. However, as I will discuss below, beyond their 
material make up, what makes these rocks particularly treacherous within the context of at-sea 
migration is their contested status between two sovereign states, as well as their long history as spaces 
of extraterritorial state violence. More than the waves that break against them, it is these rocks’ 
engulfement in territorial disputes and histories of exile that sharpens them into razors, dictating the 






                                                   
423 Maritime Court of Piraeus, “Testimony of Qassim Kadhim Saad Saad with translator”, July 17, 2018. Translated from Greek 
by the author. 
424 Maritime Court of Piraeus, “Testimony of Fahima Malek, with translator”, July 18, 2018. Translated from Greek by the author. 
425 The divers that were sent to look for the remaining bodies the next morning also described these same shores as 







The shores where the survivors of the Agathonissi shipwreck beached. In the background are the Turkish shores. May 2018. 
Photo by author. 
 
 
Lifejackets hanging from olive trees on the eastern shores of Agathonissi. May 2018. Photo by author.
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3.1.2. A Carceral Archipelago  
 
i. 74 BC - 1974 AC 
 
 
“The Romans knew what they were doing when they exiled criminals to this island. There is not a place 
that is more barren and unpleasant. There aren’t even the most common of plants in this place. We saw 
but big rats, perhaps of the same kind as the the ones that forced the inhabitants of this island to 
abandon it, as Pliny reports. Some other writers, to describe how miserable this place is, claimed that 
the rats resorted to chewing on the metal that came out of the mines. This is how we know that there 
must have been metal mines in Gyaros, but the soil seemed too harsh even for that.”426 
 
 
Thus wrote the French botanist Joseph Pitton de Tournefort of Gyaros, a small island in the Aegean 
archipelago. Tournefort travelled through the Aegean for two years, between 1700 and 1702. He was 
assigned to this task by King Louis XIV of France, and was accompanied by the German botanist 
Andreas Gundelsheimer and the botanical illustrator Claude Aubriet; the team was tasked with 
documenting the Aegean flora. Indeed, in his treaty ‘Relation d'un voyage du Levant’ Tournefort went 
on to describe a number of endemic plant species427, while offering a lucid account of his travels through 
what he often described as horrible, barren rocks ‘separated by great tempests'. However, Tournefort 
did not stop at recording plants. For each island the team visited, he offered thorough descriptions of 
the topography, military infrastructure, demographic composition, and history of the place. Under the 
guise of science, Tournefort took on a side-mission, one of early military reconnaissance, highlighting 
the strategic and long contested character of the Aegean Sea, which the very title of the report positions 
beyond his familiar European territory, and in the Levant. Beyond the superficial similarities to my mode 
of border research, the above passage is especially relevant here because Tournefort, with the 
sensitivity of a botanist and the vigilance of a military surveyor, lays bare the contingency of centuries 
of island incarceration to the harsh terrain of the Archipelago. 
 
 
A map of “Gattonisi, Fermako et altre” in, Marco Boschini, L’ Archipelago, 1658. Source: Gennadius Library of Athens. 
                                                   
426 Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, Relation d’un voyage du Levant, (Amsterdam: Aux dépens de La Compagnie, 1718). 
427 Many of these species were recorded for the first time by Tournefort, and hence still bear the name tournefortii. 
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Some seventeen centuries earlier, in 74 B.C., the ancient Greek historian Plutarch in his Parallel Lives 
tells that a young Julius Caesar “was captured, near the island Pharmacusa [Farmakonissi], by pirates 
from Tragaia [Agathonissi], who already at that time controlled the sea with large armaments and 
countless small vessels”. According to Plutarch, Caesar was held in Pharmacusa for 38 days. During 
his imprisonment, he promised his captors that, once freed, he would have them all crucified. Indeed, 
once the ransom was paid, and he eventually arrived to the coast of Asia Minor, Caesar put together a 
fleet, and returned to Pharmacusa to crucify every last one of them. However anecdotal, Plutarch’s 
story offers what an early example of imperial force exercising its right to kill in this sub-archipelago. It 
also introduces a long history of Aegean islands as places of exile and confinement428. 
 
Attempts to extra-territorialize captivity in islands, away from sovereign, but also from social, territory 
have been well documented by historians and geographers alike. From leper colonies, to slave ships 
and floating detention centres run by the US Department of Defence and Coast-Guard429, or off the 
shores of Italy430, or in Lesvos431, captivity at sea has historically been used internationally as a means 
of incarcerating “the politically intransigent who need to be kept out of vision, hearing and access”432.  
 
In the Aegean archipelago, island prisons multiplied in the 20th century, as the islands became the 
quarantine zones par excellence of the successive military governments that assumed power in Greece 
from the 1920s onwards. There, “undesirables” – Pontic Greek refugees who fled Turkey after the 1922 
Greek defeat in the minor Asian campaign; partisans of the DSE in the Greek Civil War; ethnic and 
religious minorities, and other dissidents were exiled, and held under a status that was officially 
described as “administrative displacement”. These islands, most notable among which was the island 
of Makronissos433, a stone’s throw from Attica, often also functioned as forced labour camps, with 
inmates being forced to construct their own prisons, or monuments glorifying the Greek state. This 
coercive task had a “corrective” character, seeking to exorcise through labour what the state saw as 
deviant political beliefs, and replace them with a nation-oriented ideology. Following the WWII, these 
were the only camps in Europe “this” side of the iron curtain, prompting media at the time to report of a 
“Greek Dachau”434. The practice survived until the fall of the colonels’ junta in 1974, when the last camp 
                                                   
428 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, Caesar, (Vol.VII of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1919), 443.  
429 Seth Freed Wessler, “The Coast Guard’s Floating Guantanamos” New York Times, November 20, 2017, 
www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/magazine/the-coast-guards-floating-guantanamos.html (accessed April, 2019). 
430 Richard Braude, “Italy has turned cruise ships liners jails for migrants”, Jacobin, November 14, 2020 
www.jacobinmag.com/2020/11/italy-migrants-cruise-lines-ships-prisons-coronavirus (accessed November 2020). 
431 “Greek Navy ship on Lesbos houses latest island migrants”, Arab News, March 4, 2020 
www.arabnews.com/node/1636936/world, (accessed March 2020). 
432 Laleh Khalili, “Carceral Seas”, in Okeanos ed. Cory Scorzzari, Daniela Zyman (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2017), 51. 
 
433 Tournefort also visited Makronissos and wrote that it ‘must have been separated from [the neighbouring island of] Evoia by 
great tempests’. 
434 Georges Rigassi,	‘’Makronissos, le «Dachau» des communistes grecs: Des expéditions punitives et des tortures en 1949 sur 
l’île des déportés opposants au regime’’, Le Temps, October 23, 2015,  
www.letemps.ch/monde/makronissos-dachau-communistes-grecs (accessed April 2019). 
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in Gyaros island, that hosted dissidents to the regime, closed permanently, and the inmates were 
transferred to the mainland. Some of these islands, like Gyaros, remain off limits to the public, with the 
structures built by inmates still standing as architectural testimony to this not-so-distant exiled past435. 
Yet their residue haunts contemporary Greek life and politics: In Greece, the phrase “to the dry islands” 
still survives as the synonym of isolation and exile, and, as I will discuss in what follows, it is increasingly 
evoked against migrants436. 
 
 
   
The cover of Geοrges Lambrinos’ Le Dahau Americain en Grèce, 1949 (left) and a photograph of Makronissos camp in the 40s 





ii. Hauntings: #makronissos 
 
 
Hours after the infamous refugee camp of Moria, in Lesvos, was destroyed in a devastating fire in 
September 2020, #makronissos became the number one trending hashtag on Greek twitter. It was used 
by thousands of far right accounts who demanded that the government rehouse the people who had 
been displaced by the fire, over 15000 of them, in closed detention centres in the “dry islands” like 
Makronissos. The infrastructure was already there, people claimed, all it would take is some renovation, 
and migrants would be out of sight for good. These horrifying cries had not emerged out of nowhere. 
                                                   
435 This isolation means that today these islands have become a sanctuary for endangered marine and bird species, like the 
monachus monachus monk seal which thrives in Gyaros. Their use as spaces of detention across history has also contributed to 
unique ecologies developing in these rocks, which are now hotspots for biodiversity and endemism. A striking example is the 
presence of a black snake (hierophis viridiflavus carbonarius gyarosensis) in Gyaros. The island is the only recorded habitat for 
the species in outside Italy or Croatia, and it is widely accepted that it was introduced by the Romans who used the island as a 
prison, in order to control the mice population, which Tournefort so graphically refers to in his accounts. See Herpetophauna.gr, 
‘hierophis viridiflavus: black snake of Gyaros’ available at: www.herpetofauna.gr/index.php?module=cats&page=read&id=159 
(accessed August 2020).  
436 Dimitris Christopoulos, “Exiles in the Aegean: a year after the EU–Turkey deal”, Open Democracy, March 17, 2017 
www.opendemocracy.net/en/exiles-in-aegean-year-after-eu-turkey-deal/ (accessed March 2017). Just as the phrase “to the 
mountains” is the synonym of resistance against the Axis forces in the Second World War, and the royalist forces in the Greek 
Civil War.  
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Over the past decade, in the Aegean, the archipelago of island prisons of decades past had been 
haunted through the securitization of contemporary migration. Following the increase in refugee 
crossings, these islands emerged as ideal sites for the containment of migration, mainly due to their 
function as sites of “first arrival” and interception, and their relative distance from the Greek mainland. 
Today, asylum applicants who are accommodated in the Aegean islands are not allowed to travel to 
the mainland until their asylum application is assessed, a process which can take from several months, 
up to a couple of years. More than the hotspots – camps for the registration and detention of migrants 
- that are operational in the islands neighbouring the Turkish shore, it is the islands themselves that 
function as a camp. In this process, the border is displaced from the sea between the islands’ eastern 
shores and the Turkish coast, to the heavily policed ports and ferry terminals, and the entire island437. 
At the time of writing, there are five present-day “island prisons”438 in the Aegean, one of which is on 
the island of Leros439, some 8 nautical miles west of Farmakonissi, and another in Samos, some 10 
nautical miles north of Agathonissi.  
Long before the Moria fire, the narrative of installing reception facilities in uninhabited islands was being 
reproduced by the media440 and in the parliament441. When a new, closed reception centre was 
eventually set up to accommodate (and contain) the refugees displaced by the fire, this was built on top 
of a former army shooting range next to the sea, in a small peninsula battered by the wind and waves. 
After a few days in the facility, migrants began to unearth used bullets and unexploded mortars. It was 
later revealed that the site is contaminated with lead, once again stressing the latent potentiality of state 
violence in these borders, from the scattered munition in the hills of Prespa, to the minefields of Evros, 
all the way to the Aegean442. 
                                                   
437 This is a condition that is subject to constant change. In an effort to decongest the islands, the geographic limitations were 
temporarily lifted in 2018, allowing some refugees whose asylum application had been processed and approved to travel to the 
Greek mainland, only for the islands, and the camps themselves, to “close” again with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
438 By “island prisons” here I refer to the five islands of Leros, Lesvos, Chios, Kos and Samos, where the so-called “hot-spots” 
have been set up.  
439 Leros is an island that has been marked by a succession of stories of confinement and imprisonment. From the Italian colonial 
rule, to camps for political prisoners and violently displaced children from mainland Greece (including Prespa), to its notorious 
mental healthcare facilities, to active off-limits military sites and, of course, the hotspot, Leros persists as a disciplinary apparatus. 
These are sites that haunt the Farmakonissi tragedy. The Coast Guard vessel that sank the Göznuru was stationed in the gulf of 
Lakkí, where all the aforementioned facilities are located. The survivors’ testimonies were taken and falsified in Leros, inside the 
Coast Guard’s headquarters in Ayia Marina, housed in a rare architectural specimen of Fascist rationalism, that functioned as 
the police headquarters during the later period of Italian rule. In Partheni, a military facility in the north of Leros that staffs the 
outpost of Farmakonissi, some 500 left-wing citizens were kept as political prisoners during the 1967-74 colonels’ dictatorship. 
One of the two vessels that responded to the distress call of the Agathonissi shipwreck also left from Leros. For an excellent 
analysis of the layering of violence in Leros, and the role of Architecture in maintaining it, see the catalogue from “Leros, Island 
of Exile” exhibition, by Platon Issaias, Beth Hughes and Yiannis Drakoulidis, in Manifesta 12, Palermo, where a preliminary 
version of this research was also presented in November 2018. See also Félix Guattari, De Leros à la Borde, (Paris: Éditions 
Lignes, 2012). 
440 “Exotic Greek islet off Lesvos proposed as migrant detention center” Greek Reporter, February 21, 2020 
greece.greekreporter.com/2020/02/21/exotic-greek-islet-off-lesvos-proposed-as-migrant-detention-center/ (accessed February 
2020). 
441 Including the neo-nazi Golden Dawn, who, in 18/03/2016, two days after the signing of the EU-Turkey deal, proposed for 
asylum seekers to be held in Makronissos for two years upon entry. 
442 Human Rights Watch, “Greece: Lead Poisoning Concerns in New Migrant Camp”, December 8, 2020 
www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/08/greece-lead-poisoning-concerns-new-migrant-camp (accessed December 2020). 
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Vice-Minister of Defence, Alkiviadis Stefanis, presents an architectural plan of a “model facility” drawn over the uninhabited 
Dodecanese island of Levitha. November 20, 2019. source: Efsyn443. 
 
As I have argued earlier in this thesis, haunting can be a powerful prism through which to understand 
the agency these layerings of state violence have on contemporary migration. For the geographer 
Alison Mountz, reflecting on what she calls the “enforcement archipelago” of island detention spaces, 
haunting “does geographical work that reveals dimensions of sovereign power enacted offshore, well 
beyond mainland territory”444. The same can also be argued for the opposite: the sovereign power 
enacted offshore always returns back to mainland territory. Indeed, the American historian Lauren 
Benton locates island penal colonies as focal points within a larger imperial project. “Island solutions to 
problems of imperial sovereignty” Benton points out, are part of “dispersed attempts to construct a 
legally coherent disciplinary order.”445 Specifically within the context of political exile in the Aegean, the 
Greek archaeologist Yannis Hamilakis has documented how islands like Makronissos were rendered 
into spaces where the regime “exorcised” left-wind beliefs from the inmates through force and 
ideological indoctrination, and replaced them with the the essentialist discourse of national continuity 
and ancestral glory. In Makronissos, also known as “The New Parthenon”, Hamilakis argues, “the 
panopticism of classical antiquity (the watchful eye of History and Destiny) merged surveillance with 
spectacle.”446  
Therefore, while it is certainly important to consider the Aegean islands as “bounded” spaces designed 
to exclude bodies and ideas from the public sphere, one should not lose sight of the network that is an 
archipelago. The Aegean islands communicate with each other and with the mainland of Greece and 
Turkey respectively, and the violence enacted there seeps outwards. It is perhaps not incidental that, 
                                                   
443 Dimitris Terzis, “Πρόσφυγες εξόριστοι σε ξερονήσια [Refugees exiled in dry-slands]”, EfSyn, November 21, 2019 
www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/219850_prosfyges-exoristoi-se-xeronisia (accessed November 2019). 
444 Alison Mountz, The Εnforcement Αrchipelago: Detention, Ηaunting, and Αsylum on Ιslands, Political Geography 30, no.3, 
(March 2011): 119. 
445 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 212. 
446 Yannis Hamilakis, “The Other Parthenon: Antiquity and National Memory at Makronissos”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 
20, no.2 (October, 2002).  
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as Mountz explains, “islands and archipelagos recur in critical thought to spatialize understandings of 
power and politics beyond the spaces of islands.”447 From Solzhenitsyn’s “Gulag Archipelago”448 which 
referred to the network of forced Soviet labour camps in Siberia; to Foucault’s “carceral archipelago”449, 
a metaphor for the mechanisms of knowledge and discipline related to the modern carceral system, 
and its repurposing by the geographer Derek Gregory450 to describe the dispersed “Black Sites” of the 
US Department of Defence; to Eyal Weiman’s archipelago of extraterritorial occupations in 
Israel/Palestine451, and to recent academic and journalistic work on island detention speaking of a 
“refugee archipelago”452, the archipelago functions as a spatial device to understand landscapes of 
state control. It is through maritime migrant crossings that all of these forms of state violence fold into 
the Aegean: An archipelago within an archipelago within an archipelago within an archipelago within an 
archipelago (ad infinitum).
                                                   
447 Alison Mountz, Political geography II: Islands and archipelagos, Progress in Human Geography 39, no.5 (October 2015): 
636–646. 
448 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, (Paris: Éditions du Soeil, 1973). 
449 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 293-304. 
450 Derek Gregory, “Vanishing points: Law, violence, and exception in the global war prison”, inViolent Geographies: ed. Derek 
Gregory. and Alan Pred. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 205–236.  
451  José Luis Pardo,  Thomas Keenan, Shimon Naveh, Keller Easterling, Lluís Ortega, Tariq Ali, Giorgio Agamben, Rafael, 
Vilasanjuan, Eyal Sivan, Teddy Cruz, Eyal Weizman, Stephen Graham, Zygmunt Bauman, Josep Ramoneda, Anselm Franke, 
Arxipèlag d’excepcions / Archipelago of Exceptions, Sobiranies de l’extraterritorialitat / Sovereignties of Extraterritoriality  
(Barcelona: CCCB, 2007). 
452 Daniel Howden, Apostolis Fotiadis, “The Refugee Archipelago: The inside story of what went wrong in Greece” Refugees 
Deeply, March 6, 2017, https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/03/06/the-refugee-archipelago-the-inside-story-of-
what-went-wrong-in-greece (accessed March 2017). 
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i. Isole Italiane Dell’ Egeo, 1912 – 1947 
As in the Evros Delta, in archipelagos like the Aegean, binary divisions between land and water are 
never entirely possible453. Locked as it is between the mainlands of Greece and Turkey, the Aegean 
resembles a big lake, one that covers 214,000 square kilometres in area, and measures about 600 
kilometres longitudinally and 300 kilometres latitudinally. Seafarers in the Aegean almost never lose 
sight of land. At their nearest - the 800-metre-wide Mycale Straight between Samos and the Turkish 
Dilek peninsula - the Greek islands come so close to the Turkish mainland that border crossers who 
wanted to avoid smugglers have successfully attempted to swim it454.  
 
       
A map of the Mycale Strait with sketched-in territorial waters and swimming directions (left)455, and a photo of Mycale strait 
(right), with Samos on the left, and Turkey on the right, May 2018. Photo by author. 
 
 
In order to understand ongoing maritime events in this dense space – never entirely sea, nor entirely 
land - whether these involve shipwrecks of vessels carrying migrants, the movement of container cargo, 
or hydrocarbon prospecting, one indeed needs to first understand the ways in which this uneasy space 
between Greece and Turkey has historically been configured.  
                                                   
453 The American geographers of the ocean Philip Steinberg and Kimberley Peters have shown how territorial manoeuvres that 
are deployed to enclose maritime spaces are often confounded by the materiality of water. Their oceanic epistemology is 
developed in stark contrast to jurist Carl Schmidt’s famous axiom that “the sea resists charaxis”, arguing that oceans, lacking in 
clear points of reference and resisting permanent habitation, cannot host a lasting legal order and will always deflect state 
attempts to establish sovereignty over its surface. See Philip Steinberg, Kimberley Peters, “Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: Giving 
depth to volume through oceanic thinking” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33, no.2 (April 2015) 247 – 264, and 
Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2003) 
46-47. 
454 The same is true for animals. In the early 20th century a leopard, a species that had been extinct in Greece for centuries swam across the 
channel, only to be killed by locals. It is now embalmed and exhibited at the Samos museum. The story is referenced in the novel “To Kaplani 
tis Vitrinas” by the Greek writer Alki Zei. See Alki Zei, To Kaplani tis Vitrinas (Athens: Metaichmio, 2011). 
455 The map was posted on facebook and archived by Thomas Keenan and Sohrab Mohrebi’s “It is obvious from the map” 
research project.  
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The Dodecanese waters, shores, islands, and rocks have always been sites of intense contestation. 
Their present territoriality, however, is specifically dependent on the arrangements that came into being 
after the 1912 Italo-Turkish war, when they were occupied by the Kingdom of Italy and were 
administered as Isole Italiane Dell’ Egeo (Italian Islands of the Aegean)456. Italian interest in the 
Dodecanese was rooted in strategic purposes. Τhe islands were intended to further Italy’s long range 
imperial policy, with the deep coves of Leros and Patmos used as bases for the Italian Navy. Under 
Fascist rule, from 1923 onwards, the juridic state of the islands was an intermediate one between a 
colony and a part of the Italian motherland: a possedimento (a possession). The Italian language was 
compulsory, and Italian Racial Laws were introduced. Seeking to establish a Mediterranean-wide 
continuum between the Roman empire and the Fascist regime, Mussolini held that the islands had 
merely returned to its ancestral home after being annexed by Italy, and conducted a series of ambitious 
infrastructural and archaeological projects in the archipelago.  
 
 
Residents of the Dodecanese island of Astypalaia in traditional costume to welcome the Italian King Vittorio Emannuele III. 
Source: astypalaia.wordpress.com 
 
Italian maps showing military positions and weapons range in Leros. Source: “Leros, Island of Exile” exhibition catalogue. 
Courtesy of Thanassis Paraponiaris. 
 
                                                   
456 The annexation was formally recognized by Turkey some ten years later, with article 15 of the 1923 treaty of Lausanne. 
Following WWI, Italy agreed twice, in the Venizelos–Tittoni agreement of 1919 and the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, to cede the 
islands to Greece. However, due to the Greek defeat in the Minor Asia campaign of 1919–22, these agreements were never 
implemented. The isolated island of Kastellorizo was temporarily occupied by France in 1915 and eventually came under Italian 
control in 1921. 
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However, the precise location of the maritime border between the Italian possedimenti and Turkey, was 
never fully clarified. As elsewhere, the 1923 Lausanne treaty left the two countries disputing sovereignty 
over a number of islets, and the territorial waters around them. These disputes were addressed in the 
1932 “Convention between Italy and Turkey”, or the “Ankara Convention”, and, crucially, in 
an appendix signed in December of the same year. In this appendix, the two countries drew the border 
on a map following thirty-seven points which were equidistant between Italian and Turkish 
territory457. The appendix, however, was never deposited at the League of Nations in Geneva, and as 
a result Turkey rejects its validity to this day. 
The Dodecanese changed hands when Italy capitulated in the World War II in 1943. They were 
temporarily occupied by Nazi Germany until the end of the war, after which they came under provisional 
British administration. In 1947 they were the last territory to be ceded to Greece with article 14(1) of the 
Paris Treaty of Peace. The inconclusive nature of these recurring treaties is still audible within what 
international diplomacy has come to call “the Aegean Dispute” between Greece and Turkey458.  
 
 
Treaty of Peace with Italy, Section V, Article 14, Paris, 10 February 1947, ceding the Dodecanese islands to Greece.
                                                   
457 Points 33 to 37 refer to the waters between Farmakonissi and Agathonissi. ‘Agreement between Italy and Turkey of January 
4, 1932’ and ‘Agreement between Italy and Turkey of December 28, 1932’, available at: 
www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/italturc.htm (accessed March 2019). 
458 Andrew Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute” The International Institute of Strategic Studies 19, no.155 (1979), 23. 
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During the series of negotiations that sought to translate these vague colonial-time maritime boundaries 
to a contemporary legal map of the sea, the border line that separated the Kingdom of Italy and the 
Ottoman empire was inherited by the young nations of Turkey and Greece (which was considered to 
be the successor state to Italy), on the basis of uti possidetis459. To this day tensions arise over 
inconsistencies in the Paris treaty, and the Ankara convention upon which it was premised. As the 
lasting tensions between the two countries show, sections of the maritime border remain de facto grey: 
unresolved, overlapping, and only unilaterally respected460. 
The two first provisions in the treaty of Paris have become central to the dispute461. First, Italy agreed 
to cede sovereignty for fourteen inhabited islands named in the treaty, “as well as their adjacent islets”. 
Given the abundance of uninhabited rocks in the Aegean, and the disputed 1932 border line, the term 
“adjacent islets” is interpreted differently by both countries, and, as a consequence, the island chain 
slips away from attempts to order, map and claim it. Of the thousands of islands and rocks462 in the 
Aegean Sea, only two hundred and twenty seven sustain permanent habitation. As a result, Greek 
territorial claims over many are contested, particularly the ones that are equidistant, or closer, to the 
Turkish mainland, like Farmakonissi. The territorial waters that surround these rocks are also heavily 
contested. These contestations are particularly important to consider within the context of migrant 
crossings, as they also dictate the ways in which search and rescue (SAR) operations are conducted 
in the Aegean. The two states have registered largely overlapping SAR zones, claiming a monopoly not 
only on violence but also on the right to rescue migrants at sea463. 
Tellingly, on March 17, 2018, one day after the Agathonissi shipwreck, Turkey issued a NAVTEX 
(Navigational Telex)464 restricting access to a plot of sea around the Agathonissi shipwreck, primarily 
                                                   
459 uti possidetis (translating ‘as you possess’) is the principle in international law under which newly independent states inherit 
the boundaries of colonial division. Suzanne N. Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti 
Possidetis, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s university press, 2002). 
460 The Greek government strenuously denies the existence of “grey” areas in the Aegean, maintaining that the border is resolved 
and only unilaterally contested by Turkey. See Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations”, available 
at: www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/maritime-boundaries, (accessed May 2018). 
461 Treaty of Peace with Italy, Paris, February 10, 1947, Article 14, Section V-Greece (Special Clause), available at: 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-0311.pdf (accessed May 2017). 
462 Estimates regarding the number of islands in the Aegean vary depending on how an island is defined. 
463 In an informal conversation I had with a former Chief of Staff of the Greek Ministry of Migration (anonymised here at their 
request), they recounted how, during the governmental debriefings, their delegation was always “treated as the child in a room 
full of adults”: ministers of Defence, Energy, External Affairs, Admirals, Intelligence Service. According to the interviewee, these 
“adults” were delighted with Greece being the host country for FRONTEX Operation Poseidon, as it functioned as what they 
thought to be further legitimization of Greek sovereignty over these waters. 
464 A Navtex is a service for delivering navigational and urgent maritime safety information to ships. 
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inside Greek territorial waters. Greece responded with a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen)465 of its own, 
launching one of the largest rescue operations in recent memory. Ironically, this mobilisation came 
twenty-four hours after the shipwreck, when most of the people on board had already drowned.   
 
As Lorenzo Pezzani notes within the context of the central Mediterranean, also in the Aegean, “complex 
and overlapping jurisdictions at sea play a fundamental role in creating the conditions that structurally 
lead to the death of migrants.”466 In this dense maritime space, attempts to place vessels and, indeed, 
blame for human rights violations often hinge on cartographic resolution. Such is the indeterminacy of 
these waters that the precise position of the border line itself is often subject to cartographic 
imprecisions, and therefore elusive to GPS navigation devices and the various online map platforms 
routinely used by migrants crossing it. As becomes evident in the dialogue between the prosecutor and 
Quassim with which I open this section, the location of migrant vessels vis-a-vis the border, and the 
assigning of responsibility for rescue (or non-rescue) is a tricky task. This is confirmed by Darab, the 
relative of the Afghan family who was tracking the trajectory of the vessel from the Turkish coast to 
Agathonissi on Google Maps: 
 
Darab: When I saw this point here (points to map), I thought that they passed [the border]. Because I was 
just imagining with myself, I didn’t know how much water was in the Turkish side and how much in the 
Greek side. 
Me: You didn’t have a line [on your map]… 




Darab plotting the course of the vessel on a map of the maritime area between Agathonissi and the Turkish coast near the 
village of Mavisehir. Video still by author.
                                                   
465 The Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) coincides with the Exclusive Economic Zone claimed by Greece. Therefore, when 
Greece exerts its right to perform rescue from the air in this region, it indirectly claims sovereignty over both the sea surface and 
the seabed underneath. See Christos Sazanidis “The Greco-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean Airspace”, Hellenic Review of 
International Relations 11, (1980) 87–122. 
466 Pezzani “Hostile Environments”. 




The second, contested, provision in the treaty of Paris states that the Aegean islands ‘shall be and shall 
remain demilitarised’. After Paris, the islands remained demilitarized for a decade. Since the 1960s, 
however, the Aegean, along with Evros, is where the majority of Greek troops have been stationed. A 
series of military facilities -outposts, airports, naval bases, missile launching sites and radar stations- 
are operational in most of the Aegean islands, including a handful of NATO bases, which have played 
an active role in the “war on terror”, and the less celebrated “everywhere wars”468 of the US Department 
of Defence469.  
 
The militarization of the Aegean dispute peaked in early 1996, with the incident in Imia/Kardak, a pair 
of rocks lying 3.8 nautical miles west of the Turkish coast and 3 miles North of the Greek island of 
Pserimos, over the jurisdiction of which the two countries came on the verge of armed conflict after the 
running aground of a Turkish bulk carrier on one of the rocks470. Already heavily militarized, facilities in 
the Aegean rocks have since multiplied: the military outposts of both Farmakonissi and Agathonissi 
were built in 1996, immediately after the Imia/Kardak crisis.  
 
Imia/Kardak therefore marks a turning point in the construction of the contemporary militarized regime 
in the Dodecanese archipelago. As such, this specific period in the recent history of the Aegean merits 
a closer look in this thesis. Below, using the Imia/Kardak rocks as a prism, I will dwell on that brief 
moment in the mid 1990s, in order to discuss how this space is so effectively kept out of public view, 
and to enquire into the ways that non-human ecological and geological processes play into technologies 
of territoriality in the region today. This, I hope, will shed further light into the processes whereby this 








                                                   
468 The geographer Derek Gregory uses the term “everywhere war” to describe the less overt, durational and geographically 
dispersed wars of the US government. Derek Gregory, “The Everywhere War” The Geographical Journal, 177, no.3, (September 
2011) 238-250. 
469 Most important among them is the Souda Bay Naval Base in Crete, the largest and most prominent naval base for the United 
States and NATO in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, featuring the only deep water port in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean 
Sea that is suitable and capable of maintaining the largest aircraft carriers. 
470 For an account of the incident from the Greek side, see the memoirs of Admiral Christos Liberis, Christos Liberis, Πορεία σε 







Maps demonstrating the spatial dimension of the “Aegean Dispute” (left), and the overlap in SAR areas in the Aegean. Source: 
Wikipedia and US Coast Guard. Despite the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) granting 
countries the right to extend their territorial waters to a twelve-mile distance from the nearest land, territorial waters in the 
Aegean are still set at six miles for both countries. Turkey has opposed a possible extension that, according to their view would 
lead to a disproportionate increase in Greek-controlled space, and would all but deny Turkish ships access to international 
waters. As a result, Turkey has refused to become a signatory member of the UNCLOS and does not consider itself bound by 
it, thus treating it a res inter alios acta, that is, a treaty that can only be binding to the signing parties but not to others471.
                                                   
471 See, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Outstanding Aegean Issues”, available at: www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-
issues---aegean-sea---the-outstanding-aegean-issues.en.mfa, (accessed May 2018), and “US Coast Guard manual for SAR 
areas”, available at: www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/IMO%20Maritime%20SAR%20Regions.pdf, (accessed May 
2018). 
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3.1.4. “Vrahonisides”: A More-than-Human Frontier 
 
 
Imia/Kardak, along with many of the Aegean rocks, lack human habitation, not only owing to their 
location at the heart of the Dispute, but also due to the same qualities that made these rocks attractive 
as spaces of exile: their adverse geomorphology and meteorological conditions. Rough seas separate 
them from larger, inhabited islands, most of them lack a natural port, receive little to no rainfall and hold 
no water or soil. They are the only places in Europe that classify under Kôppen Desert climate472. In 
Greek language, these islets are called Vrahonisides, an ambiguous geography between a rock 
(vrahos) and an islet (nisida).  
 
It is through the Imia/Kardak crisis that the role of the natural environment in the conflict was first 
foregrounded: representatives of both governments in international fora unearthed maps and 
arguments, conjured from the disciplines of history, geology, and marine biology to trace a lineage of 
sovereignty on these rocks and water. In a document carried by the Greek Prime Minister at the time, 
Costas Simitis, after scrolling through pages of Russian, Turkish, Italian, British, French, and American 
historical maps that ascribe the islets to Greece, one finds a page containing a memorandum on “the 
environmental dimension” of Imia/Kardak. It reads: 
 
1. Since 1984, Greece has conducted studies in the area of the rocky islets of Imia, either on private or 
national basis, without Turkey having ever expressed any reaction whatsoever. These initiatives have 
instigated the registration of this area, as a community biotope, that is, a region requiring ‘special 








Naval charts of Imia region submitted by the Greek government to international fora, 1996. 
Source: Costas Simitis Foundation Repository. 
 
                                                   
472 The Köppen climate classification, is named after the Russian climatologist Wladimir Köppen.  
473 Untitled Document, Costas Simitis Foundation Repository.  
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Greek Minister of External Affairs Georgios Pangalos (middle), joined by Minister of Defence Gerasimos Arsenis and 
government spokesperson Athanassions Reppas during a televised press conference produce a Turkish map that shows Imia 
in Greek territorial waters, January 1996. With his finger on the islets, Minister Pangalos said: “Of course this map does not 





More recently, Greece’s inclusion of Imia/Kardak in the EU “Natura 2000” programme stirred reactions 
from the Turkish side, prompting the spokesman for the Turkish Foreign Ministry to comment that “this 
is not the first time Greece has sought to exploit [environmental] programmes in the Aegean”475.  
 
Indeed, in the mid-90s the Greek government had drafted a programme that aimed at establishing a 
number of marine protected areas in the Aegean with the intent to secure territory in the archipelago476. 
The plan was drafted during the Administration of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in 1994-95, but 
was never actualised, partly due to the severity of the Imia crisis. The obvious goal of this venture was 
to claim sovereignty over these rocks and the territorial waters around them as a fait accompli, without 
ever resorting to military means. It involved setting up basic infrastructures on every single rock of the 
Aegean: a metal flag with the Greek colours, basic docks, huts, a small church, and a few tanks filled 
with water and gasoline, enough to accommodate environmentalists and students who wanted to study 
their unspoilt flora and fauna. Eventually, the goal was to settle a permanent inhabitant/guardian on 
every rock. This plan was drafted jointly by the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Maritime Affairs, 
as well as the Ministry of Agriculture, which conducted a series of meteorological and botanical studies 
to determine what types of plants and crops could survive in these harsh terrains to secure the “insisting 
presence of unique ecosystems”477.  
                                                   
474 The press conference is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0S3QcJIo_0. 
475 “Greece Exploits EUs Natura 2000 program through new law”, Ahval News, April 1, 2018 ahvalnews.com/greece-
turkey/greece-exploiting-eus-natura-2000-program-through-new-law-turkish-foreign-ministry (accessed May 2018). Sometimes, 
however, the “environmental dimension” highlighted by the Greek government acts against the militarisation of the rocks. In 2005 
the islets of Anydro and Petrokaravo, belonging to the same Wildlife Refuge as Imia/Kardak and Farmakonissi, became the first 
areas in Greece where military exercises using live ammunition were stopped for environmental reasons, due to their importance 
as breeding grounds for the endangered Eleonora Falcons. See “Live ammunition threatening biodiversity” Archipelagos Institute, 
www.archipelago.gr/en/combating/live-ammunition-threatening-biodiversity/ (accessed May 2019). 
476 The use of marine conservation zones as instruments of territoriality is a well documented practice worldwide. See, for 
example, Gray J. Noella, “Charted waters? Tracking the production of conservation territories on the high seas”, International 
Social Science Journal, 68 no. 229-230 (October, 2018). 
477 “Έστησαν Ελλάδα στις βραχονησίδες / Installing Greece on the rock-islets”, To Vima, January 20, 1996.  
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In researching state-making technologies deployed on these rocks, I am reminded of the work of Eyal 
Weizman and Fazal Sheikh on a different shoreline, the “conflict shoreline” of the Negev Desert in 
Israel/Palestine. “The threshold of the state”, Weizman argues, “is not only a natural condition but is 
defined as an interplay between meteorological data, patterns of human use, and plant species”.478 Not 
too dissimilar from Israeli state attempts to “make the desert bloom”479, the rock-island colonization 
project was pitched as a romantic retreat to the natural, untamed Greek extremities, and, of course, a 
nation-constructing endeavour. A “Union of Rock-Island Frontiersmen” was founded and a number of 
incentives were offered for people to apply, which many did. Farmakonissi, which was at the time 
without a military barracks and therefore uninhabited, was included in this plan. The programme was 
short lived. It was abandoned after the Imia incident, and, to this day, it remains largely unknown. 
Beyond a handful of cut outs from newspapers at the time that enthusiastically report on its progress480, 
an interview that was reportedly given by then Greek minister of Defence Manolis Beteniotis to the CNN, 
and, one would imagine, some decaying concrete docks and rusting flagpoles, there is no other 
evidence of its existence or its completion status481. 
The conversation was recently revived due to increasing speculation on the presence of hydrocarbons 
in the Aegean seabed, and was once again masked as a conservation effort. In a 2017 communiqué to 
the press, the Greek Vice-Minister of Maritime Affairs at the time, Nektarios Santorinios, stated that:  
 
The Secretary of the Aegean and of Island Affairs is making great efforts to populate twenty-eight small 
islands in the Aegean Sea, with the ultimate goal that these islands will develop some independent 
financial activity, mainly for reasons of national security. Our target is to use the existing infrastructures 
from the 1990s, of course adding some minor works, in order to render these islands inhabitable, so that 
they can sustain activities like the observation of natural wealth, the facilitation of the work of 
environmental organizations, groups, researchers from abroad, with the ultimate goal of adding to the 
touristic development of Greece.482  
 
As vice-minister Santorinios almost gives away, if these rocks could be proven to sustain human life 
and permanent financial activity through environmental tourism, that would mean that the Greek 
                                                   
478  Eyal Weizman, Fazal Sheikh, The Conflict Shoreline: Colonialism as Climate Change in the Negev Desert, (Göttingen: Steidl, 
2015), 10. 
 
479 “make the desert bloom” refers to the state-sanctioned agricultural programme to cultivate parts of the Negev desert in 
Israel/Palestine. This land modification programme involved casting the desert landscape as previously uninhabitable, and 
therefore, erasing the Bedouin populations that had lived in it for centuries.  
480 Generously provided to me by the historian and investigative journalist Tasos Kostopoulos. 
481 When, in 2011, two members of parliament asked the relevant ministries to confirm its existence, the request bounced around 
different offices for weeks, only for the MPs to receive one-liner replies stating that none of the ministries had knowledge of such 
a plan. My own attempts to locate documents confirming its existence have so far been unsuccessful. See for example the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs’ reply to a question posed my far-right MP Kyriakos Velopoulos:: 
https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/7325332.pdf.  
482 Communiqué from the Greek Vice-Minister of Maritime Affairs, Nektarios Santorinios, 12/07/2017, translated from Greek by 
the author. 
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Government could lay claim on the continental shelf around them483. Further than securing Greek 
sovereignty on the rocks, the frontier that the “frontiersmen” would tame would extend vertically, out to 





Setting up metal Greek flags in the rock-islets of Kalolimnos, Vatos, and, then-uninhabited, Farmakonissi, southeast Aegean 




                                                   
483 This is according to the provisions set forth by the 1997 UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), 
available at: www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home, (accessed April 2019). See also Nevin Asli Toppare, A Legal 
Approach to the Greek Turkish Continental Shelf Dispute at the Aegean Sea (Ankara: Unpublished Master’s Thesis,  
Department of International Relations Bilkent University, 2006). 
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3.1.5. Below the Surface: Territory as Volume 
 
 
The tectonic plates of the Aegean Sea (AS) and Anatolia (AT), surrounded by the Africa (AF), Arabia (AR), and Eurasia (EU) 





Taking Minister Santorinos’s cue, I want to break from simplistic understandings of the Aegean dispute, 
and migrant crossings, as events that simply play out in the two-dimensions offered by traditional 
cartography, and instead “dive” underneath the water surface to close this section with a brief note on 
the importance of geology in these contexts.  
While Greece founds its claims on the political geography of the archipelago, claiming a cultural and 
historical continuum of Greek habitation, Turkey resorts to geology. As a manual of the Turkish military 
academy claims, the Turkish position is that “there is scientific proof that the Aegean Sea was formed 
by the submersion of part of the Anatolian peninsula”.485 Turkey therefore understands the Aegean 
islands as what Deleuze would call continental islands, born out of, and belonging to, the Asian 
continent. For Deleuze, “continental islands are accidental, derived islands. They are separated from a 
continent, born of disarticulation, erosion, fracture; they survive the absorption of what once contained 
them”.486  
“A distinct line in the seabed”, the manual continues, “which forms an ‘S’ from north to south, splits the 
                                                   
484 Peter Bird, “An updated digital model of plate boundaries”, Geochemistry Geophysics Geosystems, 4 no.3, (March 2003). 
485 “Hîzmete Özel Har Akademileri Komutanligi Yayinlarindan, Ege Ada, Adacik Ve Kayaliklarinin Cografi-Tarihi-Hukuki Durumu 
Ve Uygulanan Politikalar”, May 1996, Turkish Military Academy manual, Annex 6, 123-137, in Alkis Kourkoulas, Ιμια, Κριτική 
Προσέγγιση του Τουρκικού Παράγοντα, [Imia, A Critical Account of the Turkish Factor], (Athens: I.Sideris, 1997), translated 
from Greek by the author. 
486 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2015), 9. 
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Aegean Sea in two. This zone (…) forms the boundary that separates the two tectonic plates”487. 
Therefore, for Turkey, the Greek islands that are east of this line are not entitled to a continental shelf 
– a term understood differently by geologists and jurists, but generally denoting the continental margin 
which is between the shoreline and the shelf break - and instead form part of the Turkish/Anatolian 
continental shelf. As such, Turkey holds that expressions of sovereignty over the Aegean surface 
cannot directly “confer control of the resources beneath”488, over which it lays an equal claim. In the 
Aegean, politics, as the geographer Kathryn Yusoff notes, are “subtended by geology” 489.  
It is through this entanglement of geology with politics, that the right to explore the Aegean seabed, 
mostly for hydrocarbons, recurs as a point of contestation between the two countries. As early as 1976, 
when the Turkish oceanographic vessel RV MTA Sismik 1 “Hora”, under the escort of warships, entered 
the Aegean to conduct seismic surveys, the prominent Greek politician at the time, and later Prime 
Minister, Andreas Papandreou, asked for it to be sunk490, prompting Henry Kissinger, then US Minister 
of Foreign Affairs to intervene, and assure his Greek counterpart that, 
the exploration of “Sismik 1” will not affect the legal claims of the two countries over the 
continental shelf. Moreover, Turkish exploration in the contested areas will not involve contact 
with the seabed.491’ 
At the time of writing, in late 2020, tensions between the two countries over the right to explore for 
hydrocarbons in the Aegean seabed are as high as they have ever been. Compounded by successive 
global financial crises, war sirens rang anew when the Turkish oceanographic vessel Oruç Reis began 
conducting seismic surveys off the Greek island of Kastellorizo. 
The above historical cartography of the “Grey Rocks” of the Aegean serves to illustrate how this 
maritime space, wedged between tectonic plates and nation states, and materially multiple, is constantly 
configured across three dimensions.  In this archipelago, to borrow from Stuart Elden, “Struggles for 
space and resources are no longer fought on a planar level”. Rather, “contestation has depth, and 
                                                   
487 The Aegean Sea Plate is a small tectonic plate located between southern Greece and western Turkey. Its southern edge is 
a subduction zone south of Crete, where the African Plate is being swept under the Aegean Sea Plate. To the north is 
the Eurasian Plate. See Meier, T., et al. "A Model for the Hellenic Subduction Zone in the area of Crete based on seismological 
investigations", in The Geodynamics of the Aegean and Anatolia , ed. Tuncay Taymaz and Yildirim Dilek (London: Geological 
Society , 2007), 194–195. 
488 Jon Phiillips, Order and the Offshore: The territories of Deep Water Oil Production, in Peters et al., Territory Beyond Terra., 
51-68. 
489 Kathryn Yusoff, “Geologic subjects: nonhuman origins, geomorphic aesthetics and the art of becoming inhuman” Cultural 
Geographies, 22 no.3 (2015): 383–407. 
490 “«Βυθίσατε το Χόρα»: Όταν Ελλάδα και Τουρκία έφτασαν στα πρόθυρα πολέμου στις 6/8/1976, ‘Sink The Hora’: When 
Greece and Turkey Came on the Brink of War on 6/8/1976’, To Vima, August 6, 2020 
www.tovima.gr/2020/08/06/politics/vythisate-to-xora-otan-ellada-kai-tourkia-eftasan-sta-prothyra-polemou-stis-6-8-1976/ 
(accessed October 2020). 
491 US Minister of Foreign Affairs Henry Kissinger to Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrios Bitsios, 09.08.1976 (Wikileaks 
STATE 196890). Emphasis added. 
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territory has volume”492. The question of contact, as Henry Kissinger’s letter revealed, is crucial in 
interrogating notions of territory, agency and sovereign violence in this archipelago. Whether involving 
oceanographic vessels and the sea bed, or coast guard vessels and migrant dinghies, as is the case 
with the two shipwrecks under examination, and the more recent “drift-backs” which are not covered in 
this thesis, contact emerges as yet another point of contention, and a threshold for the violence enacted 
between states and bodies to be recognized as such.  
As I will demonstrate in the following section, “Black Waves”, these questions of agency, compounded 
by territorial disputes and ghostly histories of island detention accompany migrant vessels over the 
surface of the sea, and, in the case of an accident, follow them to the seabed, where objects, legislations 
and extractive imaginaries meet, and wherein, according to the slogan, “lies the security of every 
European”.
                                                   
492 Stuart Elden, “The Significance of Territory”, Geographica Helvetica,  65, no 1, (2013): 68. Airspace in the Aegean is also 
severely contested, but, for lack of space, will not be analysed here in depth. 
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3.2. Black Waves 
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“What is the word for bringing bodies back from the water? From a ‘liquid grave’? […] The gravestone or 
tombstone marks the spot of internment, whether of ashes or the body. What marks the spot of 
subaquatic death?”  




The wreck of the Göznuru was lifted from its resting ground at a depth of seventy-four metres in the 
Aegean seabed, 2.4 nautical miles north-east of Farmakonissi, on February the 18th by the 
oceanographic vessel Φ/Γ ΘΕΤΙΣ494. When the naval architects who were contracted to forensically 
inspect the Göznuru for signs of contact with the Coast Guard vessel entered its hold, they found the 
body of a child that had been trapped there during the sinking. Eight more bodies of women and children 
had been retrieved by divers from inside the same hold and another two, belonging to a woman and a 
child, had been found floating a few miles north of the sinking location a day after the shipwreck, by the 
Turkish Coast Guard. A last body, belonging to a woman, was found several days later on a southern 
shore of Samos island, having been carried some 20nm north by the prevailing south-eastern winds. 
The coroner’s reports describing the state these bodies were in after their month-long encounter with 
the sea are gruesome: they detail missing flesh, fish bites and accumulations of algae. 
Νecroviolence, which, as I discussed in the previous chapter, refers to Jason De Leon’s analysis of the 
corporeal mistreatment of migrant bodies495 here does the work of erasure, to be sure. But when 
examined against the geography of the Aegean Sea, it can be also understood to perform a second, 
more nuanced, task. Contrary to the vast Sonora desert, other Mediterranean crossing routes that occur 
through open sea, or Evros/Meriç, with its twigs and muds holding bodies inside the river, in the dense 
Aegean archipelago it is very rare for people to disappear altogether. Even in the uncommon cases 
where they are not immediately retrieved from the sea or carried by currents to a nearby shore, drowned 
bodies almost always eventually surface, albeit often at a stage of decomposition where they cannot 
be identified by their relatives. As Haglund and Sorg note on maritime taphonomies, after drowning,  
 
the body sinks to the sediment surface of the benthic zone. As decay ensues, gases are generated in the 
body and it ascends to the surface, which may take days or weeks, depending on the season and the 
                                                   
493 Philip NourbeSe, Zong!, (Conneticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2008), 201. The idea of the Mediterranean Sea being 
conceptualized as a grave has not been without debate. For a critique see Naor Ben-Yehovada, “Is the Mediterranean’s Seabed 
a Grave?” Brown University, March 13, 2017 www.youtube.com/watch?v=CINCo-aizOM. 
494 A similar request to retrieve the vessel in Agathonissi in order to determine the precise location of the shipwreck was 
rejected by the authorities.  
495 De León, The land of Open Graves, 69. 
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water temperature. While submerged, then in various parts of the water column, and again once raised, 
the body will be scavenged by large and small animals, as well as algae.496  
 
In the context of maritime migrations, these surfacing bodies carry with them the embodied testimony 
of the perils of these crossings and the violence that is inherent to the European border apparatus. 
Rather than performing a “politics of disappearance”497, necroviolence is here tasked precisely with 
making death visible. It produces a harrowing exhibit that haunts would-be border crossers waiting on 
the shores of Turkey and often deters them from attempting a similar route. A subtler form of “aggressive 
deterrence”, but a horrific one at that. 
 
In the watery edges of the European Union bodies are not simply submerged, I argue, they are 
subsumed, both by the sea itself, and by the “excess of law”498 that is produced at the European Frontier, 
in the Aegean, as in Evros/Meriç. In this way, bodies become constituent, and constitutive, of the larger 
ecology that is the European external border assemblage. Tragically, this is also true in the material 
sense. As the American theorist Christina Sharpe points out in her seminal work “In the Wake”, drowned 
bodies dissolve into organic chemical substances and stay in the water for long periods of time, a 
duration which she calls “residence time”. Reflecting on death by drowning in the middle passage, 
Sharpe claims the bodies of black slaves who were thrown overboard into the Atlantic are still materially 
present in the ocean in the form of nutrients499.  
 
Dissolving into the contested materiality of the Aegean sea, the bodies of asylum seekers drowning in 
this external border of Europe, whether trapped inside the hull of Göznuru, or washing up in the coves 
of Agathonissi, represent what cultural studies scholar Joseph Pugliese terms “geocorpographies”, a 
“violent enmeshment of the flesh and blood of the body within the geopolitics of war, race […] empire”500. 
As such, they are locatable within the complex territorial processes in the Aegean region, pertaining 
both to the European project of security, and to littoral disputes between Greece and Turkey. Returning 
to NourbeSe Phillips’s verse at the top of this section, they also become legible through their 
embeddedness within longer histories of forceful displacement across not only the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Seas, but also across maritime regions globally. To exaqua them (as Phillips coins the 
aquatic equivalent of exhumation) is to probe these entangled histories, both global and local, and to 
                                                   
496 William Haglund and Marcella Sorg, “Human Remains in water Environments”, in Advances in Forensic Taphonomy: Method, 
Theory, and Archaeological Perspectives, eds., William Haglund and Marcella Sorg, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2001), 201-218, 
quoted in Elaine Stratford and Theresa Murray, “The Body of the Drowned: Convicts and Shipwrecks”, in Peters et al., Territory 
Beyond Terra, 171-172. 
497 De León, The Land of Open Graves, 69. 
498 Julie Evans, “Where Lawlessness is Law: the Settler-Colonial Frontier as a Legal Space of Violence”, Australian Feminist Law 
30, no.1, (2009): 3-22.  
499 Christina Sharpe, In the Wake: on Blackness and Being, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016), 58. 
500 Joseph Pugliese, “Geocorpographies of Torture”, ACRAWSA e-journal 3, no.1, (2007): 12. 
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3.2.2. Continuums: The “Black Aegean” 
 
 
The distribution of dead bodies inside the wreck of the Göznuru seems to reflect a continuum in 
typologies of involuntary maritime border crossings, which is best explained by a people smuggler 
interviewed by the Italian anthropologist Maurizio Albahari: “Passengers have to stay below deck, even 
if they vomit” he says. “The centre of gravity on the boat has to stay low. One has to be tough with them, 
because if they come up there is a risk of sinking.’’502 It is this embodied feeling of claustrophobia, 
sickness and fear, and the imminence of death by drowning that connects the bodies trapped in the 
hold of the Göznuru to those that were crammed and shackled inside the slave-ships of the middle 
passage. Edouard Glissant’s description of the slave-ship hold as “the belly of the of the boat […] 
pregnant with as many dead as living under the sentence of death”, a “womb abyss”503 echoes in the 
Aegean.   
 
As Christina Sharpe proposes, “what we are facing today is a new declination of an old and repressed 
issue that haunts and composes the European project of modernity itself: the ‘black Mediterranean’ is 
a constituent unit of analysis for understanding contemporary forms of policing Europe’s borders”.504 
For Sharpe, here recasting what Paul Gilroy has called the “Black Atlantic”505, “the semiotics of the slave 
ship continue”506 through contemporary racialized existence. They are  ghosted by refugee crossings 
(and deaths by drowning) in the Mediterranean, as they are by mass incarceration and police killings of 
black people in the US507. 
                                                   
501 Kate S. Coddington, “Colonial Territorial Imaginaries: Maritime Mobilities and the ‘Tow Backs’ of Asylum seekers” in Territory 
Beyond Terra, eds. Kimberley Peters, Philip Steinberg, Elaine Stratford, (London & New York: Rowman & Littlefield 2018). 
502 Maurizio Albahari, Crimes of Peace, Mediterranean Migrations at the World’s Deadliest Border, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 97. 
503 Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 6. 
504 Sharpe, In the Wake, 58.  
505 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
506 Sharpe, In the Wake, 21. 
507 Following the killing of George Floyd by the Minneapolis Police in June 2020, activists and scholars were quick to point to the 
continuums between the predicament of black and other racialized and illegalized bodies in the US and the Mediterranean. See 
for example Achille Mbembe, ‘Le Droit universel à la respiration [The Universal Right to Breathe]’, AOC Media, April 6, 2020, 
aoc.media/opinion/2020/04/05/le-droit-universel-a-la-respiration/ (accessed June 2020). And Judith Sunderland, “Under Water 
or Under Knee, We Can’t Breathe” Human Rights Watch, June 11, 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/11/under-water-or-under-
knee-we-cant-breathe?fbclid=IwAR1FwUnmS0qwVlT_4eEXDSmBhQi_gtdD3xF4VN9AlCw2ExZyY0LE7fL81wk (accessed 
October 2020). In Athens, a graffiti painted by the train tracks read: I can’t breathe, in Minneapolis, in Evros, in Omonoia (Omonoia 
being a notorious police station in Athens where several migrants have mysteriously died in custody). 
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The entrance to the hold of the Göznuru, Lakki, Leros, 07/02/2014. Source: Farmakonissi case file. 
 
 
If, in this section of the chapter, I choose to place particular emphasis on the consonances of the 
contemporary migrant condition with the history of the transatlantic slave trade, it is not to attempt direct, 
and reductive, parallels between the horrors of the Middle Passage and the perils of forced 
displacement across the Mediterranean. Such an attempt would be reductive for both, relativizing 
slavery and denying the agency of people who manage to flee war zones508. Instead, and in full 
knowledge of my own delicate position as a white (albeit arguably on the “wrong” hues of white) 
European researcher situated on the safe side of the border, I attempt to draw from, and build upon, 
the extensive black and postcolonial literature that has for years been concerned with understanding 
the entanglements of ships, racialized bodies and the materiality of the sea, to inform my own perception 
of this entanglement within the context of contemporary migration across the Aegean, an archipelago 
that is, like the “Black Atlantic”, unambiguously “laden with palpable death”.  
 
Oceanic processes recur across post-colonial studies as analytical devices, metaphors for tropes of 
existence beyond the earth, and its bounded notions of territory and nationhood. However, if one is to 
read this literature against the unforgiving materiality of the Aegean border archipelago, or what we 
might reluctantly attempt to call the “Black Aegean”, two displacements are necessary. First, the binary 
division between earth and water must be undone, as it fails to capture the interstitiality of this uneven 
geography. Second, one must move beyond the metaphor, and the charged histories of the sea, and 
instead engage with the physical, material and geographical properties of the different components 
that make up this harsh terrain; the waves that sink migrant’s vessels, the rocks, cliffs, beaches and 
reefs, where drowned bodies and wrecks wash ashore, and the currents that carry them there. This 
reading of the metaphor through materiality is what lends this section of the thesis its title: “Black 
Waves”. 
                                                   
508 Maurice Stierl, “Of Migrant Slaves and Underground Railroads: Movement, Containment, Freedom”, American Behavioral 
Scientist, 64 νο.4, (2020): 456-479. 
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An archipelagic practice also requires looking at the body itself, however painful a sight that might 
present, and to examine its multiple entanglements with the ground, or the water, vis-à-vis state 
attempts to control, cartograph and legislate over it.  
 
 
3.2.3. Archipelagic Causality: “Drowning Inside Sea Water” 
 
 
However gruesome, the reports drafted by the forensic pathologists who examined the eleven bodies 
of the Göznuru in the island of Leros, lack a perpetrator. They determined the cause of death as 
“drowning in water” or “drowning due to excessive inhalation of water” without enquiring into how this 
drowning occurred509. Four years later, and within the context of the preliminary investigation into the 
Agathonissi shipwreck conducted by the Coast Guard of Samos, the coroner at the General Hospital of 
Samos was asked to determine “a) whether the deceased had died from natural, sudden, or violent 
causes and b) If their death was found to be violent, what is the evidence towards it”. Using a blue ball-
point pen to fill in the few blank spaces in a standardized form, the coroner filed the deaths under 
category 21, titled “regarding a violent death”. This category had three subcategories in multiple-option-






Under “cause”, he, like the coroner who had examined the Göznuru’s bodies four years prior, wrote: 
“drowning inside sea water”510. The answer, confined within the pre-determined linguistic boundaries 
and boxed-in answers of medico-operational bureaucracy, seemed pre-determined. Upon receiving 
these forms, the Coast Guard in Samos wrote to the registry office in Agathonissi to close the case: 
“His/Her death seems to have been caused by sea water”511. At long last, the perpetrator had been 
found.  Reading through these seemingly mundane documents, one can begin to see the contours of 
the anxiety of state institutions to conceal their responsibility for deaths at sea. Questions of violence 
and agency are addressed and summarily answered, photocopied and scanned time and again by court 
clerks to the point where they are barely legible. Following Susan Schuppli, the papers themselves 
serve as “material witnesses”512 to the event of evidence; they are mundane analogue codifications of 
border violence.  
                                                   
509 Death Certificates issued in the island of Leros, 22/01/2014-17/02/2014. Translated from Greek by the author. 
510 Death Certificates issued in the island of Samos, 20/03/2018. Translated from Greek by the author. 
511 Letter from the Greek Coast Guard to the Agathonissi registry office, 23/03/2018. Emphasis added. 




                
Part of the Samos coroner’s report, listing the deaths as an accident (left). Cropped photo showing the gloved hand of a Coast 
Guard officer holding a tag for body No.9 from the Agathonissi shipwreck (right). Source: Agathonissi case file. 
 
 
A few days after the Farmakonissi incident, an anchorman of the most popular channel at the time in 
Greek TV commented in the evening news: “I do not accept the responsibility. It is not our fault if they 
take their families and try to cross the Aegean in a flimsy boat in mid-winter. Of course they will drown. 
I am not saying they should drown, but it isn’t our fault”. “After all it is the smugglers that put them into 
these vessels”, his co-host agrees513. As Maurizio Albahari comments on the trial that followed the 
shipwreck of the Katër i Radës, a vessel that sank in similar circumstances to the Göznuru, while 
carrying Albanian migrants to Italy across the straight of Otranto in 1997, 
 
Relationships of causality are here simplified; causes of death are conveniently conflated and 
responsibility is shifted from the border agencies to smugglers, to the flimsy boats, to the unforgiving 
elements.514 
 
Death “inside sea water” is to be expected, the anchorman shouts in the TV screen. However 
questionable his motives and rhetoric, the anchorman is not far from the truth. From 2014 to 2020, 
drownings constituted 70 percent of global migrant deaths515. In the Aegean sea alone, 1224 people 
have drowned since 2014516. And yet, to claim that the sea alone is to blame for these deaths, to 
attribute it with full personhood and agency, is an act akin to Persian King Darius’s mythical flogging 
the waters of the the North Aegean with 300 hundred lashes, after his invading armada was destroyed 
in a storm in the waters off Mount Athos517. As is the case with Evros/Meriç, operational and medical 
language here work in tandem with the sensationalist language of the media to register the saline waters 
                                                   
513 Mega Channel news, January 23, 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKRK3Zvmh3w. In Greek, translation by 
the author. 
514 Albahari, Crimes of Peace, 96. 
515 Laura Lo Presti, “Like a Map Over Troubled Water: (Un)mapping the Mediterranean Sea’s Terraqueous Necropolitics”, e-flux, 
May, 2020, www.e-flux.com/journal/109/330800/like-a-map-over-troubled-water-un-mapping-the-mediterranean-sea-s-
terraqueous-necropolitics/ (accessed September 2020). 
516 Per IOM data, Tracking deaths along migratory routes, Missing Migrants, 
missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean?migrant_route%5B%5D=1377 (accessed November 2020). 
517 This story is related by the 5th century BC writer Herodotus, in his “Histories”. 
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of the Aegean as the victimizer of border crossers, and use it to obfuscate the actions, policies and 
legislations that work to weaponise it. Concealed by these reports are the ways in which sea water is 
actively enlisted in territorializing practices, and vested with violent agency to expand the capacities of 
border defence. As Pezzani and Heller note of the central Mediterranean, “migrants do not only die at 
sea but through a strategic use of the sea”518. 
 
In the Aegean, the “pressure of the water” that Fahima described pulling the group apart in the sea off 
Agathonissi, carries not only bodies apart from each other but also contact further apart from trace519, 
distancing perpetrator from victim, and event from evidence in a similar way to the flow of Evros carrying 
bodies downstream. As I argued earlier in this thesis, in any attempt to discuss these complex 
relationships of border causality, a dialectic approach will always fall short. One needs to stay close to 
the “melting” of cause and effect into each other, but also, specifically within the context of the 
archipelago, into the viscous body of the sea, over which these pelagic crossings (and stoppages) 
occur. To do that we need to replace dialectics with what the Barbadian poet Kamau Brathwaite has 
described as tidalectics520: a mode of enquiry that is cyclical rather than lineal, rhythmic, oceanic and 
abyssal rather than fixed in land, and encompassing the multiple intersections between bodies, sites, 
regions, legislations, territories and situated histories and presents of exile. Only then can we begin to 
exaqua the power relations that constitute the archipelago. Drawing from Eyal Weizman’s concept of 
“field causality”, I will call this form of causality, both situated and mobile, and specific to the materially 
viscous “field” that is the Aegean archipelago, archipelagic causality.  
 
In what remains, I will attempt to flesh out this proposal. I will attempt an analysis of these archipelagic 
forces that converged to weaponise the sea on the night of January the 20th, 2014, and in the early 
morning hours of March the 16th, 2018. These, I will discuss, include (but are not limited to) designed 
architectures, specific operations of border patrol, as they do oceanic processes.
                                                   
518 Pezzani, Liquid Traces, 659. 
519 See Adrian Lahoud “Floating Bodies” in Forensic Architecture (ed.), Forensis. 
520 Kamau Brathwaite, The Arrivants: A New World Trilogy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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On 24 January, 2020, six years after the sinking of the Göznuru, the Greek military issued an invitation 
to tender for the construction of a “floating defensive system” with the purpose of addressing the “urgent 
need to repel increasing refugee flows”. According to the description, the floating barrier, would be 1,5 
kilometres long. It would rise at least 50 centimetres above the sea surface on a calm day, and would 
continue for another 60 centimetres below it. It would be modular, made of 25-50 metre pieces, and 
orange in colour, with reflectors to make it visible in the sea both during the day and at night. Its net 
would have an opening of 20 milimetres and could withstand a force of 130 kilopond, the equivalent of 
a one-tonne vessel hitting it at a speed of 13 knots521. Its anchors would go 120 metres deep into the 
sea bed, allowing it to be installed as a pilot project off the northern shores of Lesvos island, with the 
plan to extend it along several other parts of the maritime border522. 
 
Following the publication of this tender, several human rights organisations criticised the project as 
dangerous and inhumane523. Moreover, the geography and geopolitics of the Aegean, with a border line 
that spans over a thousand, contested, kilometres, and is continuously intersected by global maritime 
trade routes, render the project all but impossible. Even though the government pledged to have this 
floating fence installed by July 2020, at the time of writing, in late 2020, the plan remains unrealised. 
Given its incomplete status, it is likely that the Greek government’s announcement of this floating barrier 
was yet another moment in what the American border scholar Nicholas De Genova has called “the 
border spectacle”524: a performance of state sovereignty and exclusion at the nation’s confines.  As is 
the case with the unrealised, 120-kilometre-long moat along the Evros border, and many other border 
fences, I argue that this floating barrier is merely the rendering-visible of an architecture of border 
defence that is already in place and which relies on the very forces this barrier will be designed to 
withstand: the forces of the sea.  
 
Whichever metaphor one goes with, a wall, a shield, or a moat, the Aegean Sea is an interstitial 
defensive architecture in and of itself. To paraphrase Jason De Leon’s enquiry into a more-than-human 
                                                   
521 I thank Yankos Pesmazoglou for this calculation and for being available to answer all my thermodynamics-related questions. 
522 Greek Supreme Military Command, “Πρόσκληση Συμμετοχής σε Διαπραγμάτευση για την Προμήθεια Πλωτών 
Προστατευτικών Συστημάτων προς Κάλυψη Κατεπείγουσας Ανάγκης Οφειλομένης σε Γεγονότα Απρόβλεπτα στην 
Αναθέτουσα Αρχή, Εξαιτίας της Αδίρητης και Επέιγουσας Ανάγκης Ανάσχεσης των Αυξημένων Προσφυγικών Ροών 
[Invitation to Tender for the Supply of Floating Protective Systems to Cover the Urgent Need Resulting from Events Unforeseen 
to the Tendering Authority, Due to the Urgent Need to Repel the Increasing Refugee Flows]”, Januaty 24, 2020. 
523 “Greece: “Floating wall” to stop refugees puts lives at risk”, Amnesty International,  January 30,  2020 
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/greece-floating-wall-to-stop-refugees-puts-lives-at-risk/ (accessed January 2020). 
524 Nicolas De Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant Illegality, the Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Exclusion”, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 36, no. 7, (2013). 
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border wall to which I alluded in the previous chapter, the Aegean border is equal parts military, 




i. Archive of Operations525 : Xenios Zeus, 2012-2014 
 
 
“We must make their lives unliveable. They should know, as they come in [the country] they are going to 
be imprisoned. Otherwise we are ineffective, we are becoming the most attractive place for immigrants.” 
 
 
The quote, uttered a month before the Farmakonissi shipwreck, famously belongs to the chief of Greek 
police at the time, Nikos Papagiannopoulos, from a leaked briefing he gave to police officers526. 
Papagiannopoulos’ words were meant to clarify the scope of Operation Xenios Zeus. First implemented 
in 2012 and named after the ancient Greek god Zeus – patron of the stranger and God of hospitality 
(the Operation literally translates as “Hospitable Zeus”), the operation was designed to “restore order 
and security” in the centre of Athens and to “close the country’s borders” to flows of “low quality illegal 
aliens” (lathrometanastes)527. Document checks based on racial profiling were initiated in the streets, 
detention centres and the Evros fence were built and push-back operations in the Aegean and 
Evros/Meriç regions became routine practice528. The xenophobic rhetoric unleashed by Xenios Zeus 
responded to a displacement of the public opinion towards the far-right during the austerity years, which 
was epitomized by the emergence of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn529. In so doing, the government sought 
to appease the frustration of a growing body of financially strained and unemployed electorate, and 
deflect it onto the bodies of racialized “others”. At the apex of the financial crisis, therefore, migrant 
death and incarceration under Operation Xenios Zeus served as a decoy, a ritualized spectacle through 
which the state reinforced its power over its citizen and non-citizen subjects. With fascist ideals not only 
gaining electoral ground, but at the same time penetrating the Greek security and armed forces – 
                                                   
525 Frontex used to maintain a, now defunct, “Archive of Operations” page on their website. The use of the term here nods to 
that. 
526 translated from Greek by author. See Amnesty International Press Release, December 19, 2013, 3.bp.blogspot.com/-
oVIQEFzYSdU/UrPjVUgTqkI/AAAAAAAADRg/DCc_rph7DSM/s1600/DELTIO+TYPOU+AMNESTY.jpg, (accessed April 2019). 
527 All quotes belong to Nikos Dendias. Minister of Internal Affairs at the time. See “Δένδιας: Ο Ξένιος Ζεύς δεν έχει τέλος 
[Dendias: no end in sight for Xenios Zeus]” Kathimerini, October 2, 2012 
www.kathimerini.gr/15521/article/epikairothta/politikh/dendias-o-3enios-zeys-den-exei-telos (accessed April 2019). 
528 Pro Asyl, “Pushed Back: Systematic Human Rights Violations Against Refugees in the Aegean Sea and at the Greek-Turkish 
Land Border”, November 2013, available at: https://www.proasyl.de/en/material/pushed-back-systematic-human-rights-
violations-against-refugees-in-the-aegean-sea-and-the-greek-turkish-land-border/. 
529 For many activists, and human rights organizations, the three-day-long “pogrom” unleashed by Golden Dawn batallions against 
migrants in the streets of central Athens in May 10-13, 2011, was the seed that birthed ‘Xenios Zeus’. See Human Rights Watch, 
“Hatred in the Streets: Xenophobic Violence in Greece”, July 2012, https://www.hrw.org/el/report/2012/07/10/256338. 
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including the Coast Guard - to a great degree530 the Farmakonissi shipwreck came as little surprise. 
Rather, it is locatable in the overlap of the two “crises” that defined political modalities in Greece during 
the 2010s: the “financial crisis”, and the “refugee crisis” for which it served as a predecessor and a 
warning. 
 
This anti-immigrant climate produced new ecologies of living that were felt as acutely in the centres of 
Greek cities as in the country’s borders. Already militarised within the context of the dispute between 
Greece and Turkey, with “Xenios Zeus” the Aegean archipelago was further configured into what 
Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller have critically called a “hostile environment”531. For Pezzani and 
Heller, expanding a term that was used to describe anti-immigation legislation introduced by the UK 
home office at the same time as “Xenios Zeus”,  
 
the environment, understood as a political effect rather than a simple ‘natural’ background to human 
action, stops being simply a site of power, and becomes one of its modes of operations. It is not only that 
the weather itself is being weaponised, as migrants are made to die of cold or heat; but that forms of 
racialised violence have become, in a certain sense, as pervasive as the climate.532 
 
These socio-atmospherics of power are similar to what Christina Sharpe describes as the “weather”: 
“the totality of our environments”533. For Sharpe, writing on black existence in the US, this is a weather 
that is anti-black, and anti-blackness is today as pervasive as climate. At the external borders of the 
EU, the skin colour palette expands to include (or exclude) other hues of non- white. 
 
Uncannily, when asked to explain why they were towing the Göznuru towards the Turkish coast, the 
crew of ΠΛΣ-136 replied that it was due to the weather, which made the towing towards Farmakonissi 
dangerous. To be sure, the crew was referring to the strong southerly winds blowing that day, but their 
statement could also be interpreted against the operational framework of “Xenios Zeus”. Indeed, the 
waves that sunk the Göznuru that night were birthed by both weathers. After spending a month in the 
depths of the Aegean Sea both the wreck, and the bodies trapped inside it, also weathered, bearing the 
corporeal testimony of the intended hostility of Operation “Xenios Zeus”.
                                                   
530 Polling stations in Athens where policemen vote registered upwards of 50% for the Golden Dawn. see Barnaby Phillips, 
“High police support for Greece's Golden Dawn”, Al Jazeera,  December 20, 2012, 
www.aljazeera.com/blogs/europe/2012/12/52586, (accessed April 2019). 
531 part of this research was presented at an homonymous exhibion curated by Lorenzo Pezzani. See 
www.argekunst.it/en/2018/10/30/lorenzo-pezzani-hostile-environments/. 
532 Pezzani, “Hostile Environments”. 
533 Sharpe, In the Wake, 104.  
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ii. Archive of Operations: Poseidon Sea, 2008-Present 
 
 
Xenios Zeus drew on a long-standing nationalist discourse that produces the modern Greek state as 
the descendant of Ancient Greece534 and rightful inheritor of the Aegean Sea. This discourse is today 
carried forward through Frontex’s Operation Poseidon Sea, named after the ancient Greek god of the 
sea, and brother of Zeus. The first Poseidon Operations, Poseidon Sea and Poseidon Land, were 
launched in 2008, with a focus on safeguarding Greece’s –and by extension, Europe’s external- sea 
and land borders respectively. The roots of Operation Poseidon, however, like those of FRONTEX itself, 
can be traced back to the 1985 Schengen agreement which aimed at “abolishing checks on the 
movement of persons at [the] ‘internal’ borders [of Europe] by transferring checks to [its] ‘external’ 
frontiers”535, therefore introducing a regime of differentiated mobility between the European core and its 
margins, and “frontierizing” the Mediterranean region. Following the erection of the Evros/Meriç fence 
in 2012, and the subsequent increase in maritime crossings, the agency scaled Poseidon up to what is 
at the time of writing called Operation Poseidon Rapid Intervention. 
 
The infamous EU-Turkey deal of March 2016 further served to solidify the Aegean Sea. With this 
agreement, the rocky shores of the Greek islands and the Turkish coast were to be the walls of “fortress 
Europe”, and the Aegean Sea, its moat.  
 
Coming four years after the Göznuru, the shipwreck in Agathonissi is the direct result of this solidification 
of the Aegean. By 2018, crossing this stretch of sea had become an extremely difficult and, by 
extension, dangerous endeavour. More military assets from countries all over Europe were deployed to 
the Greek Aegean, while the Turkish side of the border was suddenly patrolled with equal intensity (a 
change which is reflected in the witnesses testifying that their vessel took in water while being chased 
by a vessel of the Turkish coast guard). With Greece and Turkey being equal partners in the agreement, 
pushbacks were no longer a possibility for the Greek coast guard. Abandonment at sea emerged as 
the closest alternative. 
 
When considered against the deadly drift of the two families from Iraq and Afghanistan towards the 
eastern coasts of Agathonissi, or against the waves that sunk the Göznuru, the very name of the 
Operation, Poseidon Sea, points to a force that is not simply assembled to patrol and operate on the 
surface of the sea, but also, like Poseidon himself, aspires to harness the very matter of the archipelago, 
and to form it into shape to materialize forms of territory and agency.  
 
                                                   
534 See Katerina Rozakou, “Solidarians in the land of Xenios Zeus, Migrant deportability and the radicalisation of solidarity”, in 
Critical Times in Greece, ed. Dimitris Dalakoglou and Georgios Agelopoulos. 
535 William Walters “Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border” Environment and Planning” D: Society and Space 20 
no. 5 (October 2002): 561-580. 
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Poseidon’s operational mythopoetics echo the very etymological origin of the Aegean Sea. According 
to one account, the sea took its name from the ancient Greek word αιξ (prononced aix), which stands 
for goat. This is because, according to linguists, the ancient Greeks used to describe the breaking 
waves of the Aegean as goats, in the same way that in English they are described as “white horses” 
and in French as “mouttons” (sheep). A second, more obscure explanation of the name holds that the 
word comes from the ancient Greek αἰγίς (aegis). Aegis is a word which can assume many meanings. 
Coming from the verb ἀίσσω (aïssō), meaning “to rush or move violently”, aegis can stand for “violent 
windstorm”. In ancient Greek mythology, Aegis was also Zeus’s protective shield. Through this 
etymological ambiguity, the Aegean, both wave and shield, emerges as a materially unruly space, the 
violent movements of which are explicitly integrated into strategies of border defence. They enhance 
the capacity of border agencies and they shield, to use the EU commissioner Ursula von der Leyen’s 
words, European territory from unwanted visitors.  
 
It was the latter myth that prompted the US navy to name its Lockheed Martin-produced integrated 
naval weapons system “Aegis”536. Also forming part of NATO’s European missile defence system, the 
Aegis system is today carried on over 100 NATO ships, several of which take turns to patrol the Aegean 
against migrant crossings: full circle.  
 
A 2014 US Navy recruitment poster, featuring US warships and airplanes arranged in V shape and 
cutting through the sea and sky respectively, best captures this double bind between tempest and 
defensive weapon. It reads:  
 
Sometimes we rush in after the storm,  
Sometimes we are the storm 
 
Reflecting on this poster, critical geographers and authorities in the field of “landscape infrastructures” 
Pierre Bélanger and Alexander Arroyo comment in their book Ecologies of Power how “it is this cross-
scalar capacity and trans-media fluency that distinguishes [the US Army’s] multi dimensionality and 
mutability from any other forms, forces or fields of operations in the world.”537 I argue that, in the last 
decade, this ability to shapeshift between elements and scales, to mutate from culture to nature and 
back, has also become a key component of mechanisms of border defence at Europe’s frontiers. As I 
will argue below, operational capacities under Poseidon are nowadays equally calculated in military 
assets as they are in winds, currents, temperatures and waves. 
 
 
                                                   
536 Lockheed Martin, “Aegis: The Shield of the Fleet”, www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/aegis-combat-system 
(accessed December 2020). 








Slides from a power point presentation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), which combines 
meteorological, oceanographic, satellite and other cartographic data in order to “enhance situational awareness and improve 





Frontex executive director, Fabrice Leggeri, gesturing over an operational map of the Aegean. Source: Frontex.
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iii. Winds, Currents, Temperatures: A Deadly Drift 
 
 
Prosecutor: Do you know how many hours you stayed in the sea? 
Quassim: Yes, I know that I stayed from 07:00 in the morning until just before it got dark, 
Prosecutor: This time of the year, the sea temperature is 16 degrees Celsius. How do you explain the 
fact that you survived for so many hours in the water?538 
 
 
The strategic use of the body of the sea to effect harm, and erase trails of responsibility for such harm, 
is evident in both court files. In the case of Agathonissi, as the above dialogue demonstrates, the main 
preoccupation of the state from the outset was to disprove the survivors’ claim that the group could 
have spent twelve hours in the water, and twelve more on the rocky shore. In what evolved more like 
an interrogation and less like the gathering of testimony, arguments to do with the material makeup and 
the bodily effects of the archipelago were used to frame the survivors’ feat as an impossibility. 
Scrutinized against meteorological and cartographic data, the group’s deadly drift was also used to 
contest the time and location of sinking. Pages upon pages of forecasts of wave heights, wind speeds 
and current directions were fed into a software designed for search and rescue, called SARIS539, to plot 
the possible drift trajectories of the survivors. The model determined that the coordinates given by the 
migrants as the location where their vessel sank were not correct, because in this case the people 
would have drifted north instead of west, to the island.  
However, both the software and the weather reports that were fed into it failed to take into account the 
dense geography of the Aegean, and the effects of the scattered land masses on the forces affecting 
the drift. Designed for coast guards that operate in the open sea, the software returned trajectories of 
drift that cut over peninsulas and islands, continuing north-east into the Turkish mainland. Similarly, the 
weather reports covered large areas of the Aegean, not accounting for the microclimatic conditions 
between the different islands. Pursuing accountability became again a matter of resolution. With the 
help of a physical oceanographer540, Dr. Richard Limeburner, we determined that the tool used by the 
Coast Guard to calculate the drift was inaccurate, and that the drift of the shipwrecked people to the 
eastern shores of Agathonissi was possible, occurring at a speed of 0.32 knots (0.16 metres per 
second)541.  
                                                   
538 Maritime Court of Piraeus, “Testimony of Qassim Kadhim Saad Saad”. 
539 The “Search and Rescue Information systems” (SARIS) v2.0x. SARIS is a search planning tool designed for coastguards to 
plot search areas and target trajectories at sea according to oceanographic and meteorological data.  
540 Dr. Limeburner is Physical Oceanographer Emeritus, at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, MA, USA.  
541 Our findings were unsurprisingly dismissed by the prosecutor as “subjective”. 
 209 
 
Drift model produced by SARIS software, plotting a course that cuts over the Turkish mainland. Source: Agathonissi case file. 
 
 
 Drift model produced by Dr. Richard Limeburner, plotting the course of the bodies in the sea towards the coasts of Agathonissi. 
In Dr. Limeburner’s model, Windage ammounts for 1.2 nautical miles and near surface currents for the remaining 2.6 nautical 
miles. Windage describes the drift of a body with a lifejacket at sea. It is calculated according to the wind direction as 2% of the 
wind speed in miles per hour.
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Further than the drift trajectory, the three survivors’ very ability to survive for so long in the cold sea was 
presented to them as evidence to counter the veracity of their claims, as was their spending a night on 
the rocky shore with wet clothes and without the tools to start a fire. The wetness of their clothes was 
perused, and deemed excessive for people who alleged to have spent 12 hours ashore. The weathering 
of the bodies that had drowned in the cold water was also used as evidence against the claims of the 
three survivors542. When the coroner was asked to determine how long a period the bodies he examined 
had spent in the sea, he responded:  
 
According to forensic bibliography, a person can last a maximum of seven hours in a 16-degree Celsius 
sea. In 24 hours in the water (sea) the maceration in the palms and feet is so advanced that the skin 
begins to detach from the flesh. In the bodies that I examined, I did not see this. On the contrary, 
maceration was still in the initial stages. This is evidence that the bodies stayed in the water for some 8 
to 12 hours.543 
 
A resident of Agathonissi and captain of the fishing trawler “Agios Nikolaos” echoed the coroner’s 
analysis. He claimed,  
 
Over the years I have collected over 60 bodies, in different bodily conditions, in rigor mortis, 
decomposed bodies, dismembered bodies. But these ones were freshly drowned.544  
 
The legal question became one of bodily thresholds vis-à-vis the forces of the sea. Conjuring and 
assessing different types of knowledge, both epistemic and situated, the prosecutor concluded that the 
shipwreck had happened twenty-four hours later than when the survivors claimed, and that the people 
had drowned and drifted ashore a mere couple of hours after that545. The only knowledge that was not 
heeded was that of the people that experienced this deadly drift. 
 
Both survivors I spoke to remembered the cold vividly. They both separately recounted how, after hours 
of holding on to an inflatable ring, waiting for the currents to take them to the shore, their limbs went 
numb. Darab, who was in the island of Samos, told me that, as the hours passed, he was getting 
increasingly worried that his family would not survive in the cold water, and decided to go into the sea 
to feel the temperature for himself, 
 
In the evening, once I got to the Samos beach, I wanted to check the water, how cold it is. So I go into the 
water, I put my head three times in the water, I realised it is very cold.  
 
                                                   
542 No photos from the forensic examination were included in the court documents, making it impossible for the lawyers to 
examine the veracity of the forensic reports. They only photos included were the ones taken by the Coast Guard upon rescue, 
which I choose to not reproduce here. 
543 Death Certificates issued in the island of Samos. 
544 Testimony of A.K. before the Prosecutor of Samos, March 27, 2018. 
545 This conclusion was also inconsistent with coroner’s report who calculated that time to 8-10 hours. 
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When I visited the island a month and a half later, Ι also went into the sea. The waters were still freezing, 




iv. Waves: Liquid Topographies of Border Defence 
 
 
In the Farmakonissi case, with sovereign violence being mediated by the forces of the sea, the threshold 
shifted away from interrogations of bodily endurance, to more straightforward questions of agency. Did 
the 1.5-metre-high waves of the Aegean Sea sink the small vessel, as the coast guard claimed? Was 
death in the rough, 7 beaufort, winter seas off Farmakonissi “to be expected”? Or were the waves 
released by the 24-metre-long coast guard vessel’s 1400hp hydro-jet engines in full throttle to blame 
for the sinking, as the survivors claimed? And, if so, were these waves products of nature, or of culture? 
Can the two be distinguished in the context of the Aegean border nature?  
 
Since oceanography emerged as a distinctive field of military study with the publication of U.S. Navy 
Lieutenant Matthew F. Maury’s The Physical Geography of the Sea, in 1855546, the ability to quantify 
and calculate waves as liquid topographies had been central to military projects. Through technologies 
like Argo floats, remote-sensing satellites, wave buoys, and ship sensors547, and despite their temporal 
and physical volatility, waves are researched as physical objects and are, to a degree, treated as 
structures in their own right. They are indexed vertically, in strata, from crest to trough, and measured 
for their “significant wave height” (the vertical distance between crest and trough), “wave length” (the 
distance between successive peaks or depressions), velocity and “wave period” (the average time it 
takes for two consecutive wave crests to pass through a fixed point)548. A separate vocabulary exists to 
describe these deformations: “swelling”, “wave breaking”, “white-capping”, “bottom friction”, “refraction” 
and “shoaling” are a few of the terms used. As the military geographer John Collins notes, “waves and 
winds not only make ships surge, sway, heave, roll, pitch, and yaw in heavy seas, but introduce great 
structural stress.”549 Such was the structural stress that caused the bow of the Göznuru to break during 
the zig-zagged towing, and the vessel to ultimately capsize. One can only presume that the well-trained 
coast guard crew were aware of the effects their manoeuvres would have on the smaller Göznuru. 
                                                   
546 Matthew Fontaine Morrey, The Physical Geography of the Sea, (London: Sampson, Low, Son & Co, 1855). 
547 Jennifer Gabrys, “Ocean Sensing and Navigating the End of this World”, e-flux, www.e-flux.com/journal/101/272633/ocean-
sensing-and-navigating-the-end-of-this-world/ (accessed October 2019). 
548 Copernicus, “Ocean surface Waves Indicators for the European Coast for 1977 to 2100 Derived from Climate Projections”, 
available at: cds.climate.copernicus.eu/cdsapp#!/dataset/sis-ocean-wave-indicators?tab=overview (accessed August 2020). 
549 Collins, Military Geography, 60. 
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“Effects of wave action on ship stability”. Source: John Collins, Military Geography. 
 
 
A patrol vessel of the Greek Coast Guard performing an aggressive deterrence manoeuvre against a dinghy filled with 
migrants. Source: Youtube. 
 
 
Waves in the south-eastern Aegean, where the two shipwreck occurred, are claimed and measured 
separately by both littoral countries. During the period of 1994-2000, Turkey carried out a NATO-funded 
project, called NATO TU-WAVES project, with the purpose of establishing “a reliable wave atlas” of the 
Turkish coast550. On the Greek side, the Hellenic Centre for Marine Research also uses a combination 
of buoys, Argo floats, ferry box data and satellite imagery to “record the physical, biological and chemical 
parameters of the Greek seas”. This system is, unsurprisingly, also called “Poseidon”551. As these 
studies suggest, the shading effect of the Turkish coast and the Dodecanese island chain means that 
waves along the south-east Aegean border are smaller and less powerful than in those that occur in 
the central and southern Greek Aegean552. These border waves are therefore less like mountain ridges 
                                                   
550 This was done through a wave gauging network of six stations of directional wave buoys. See 
www.medcoast.net/modul/index/menu/NATO-TU-WAVES/91 (accessed June 2020). 
551 Hellenic Centre for Marine Research, http://poseidon.hcmr.gr (accessed November 2016). 
552 Maximum wave heights, above a mean height of 0.96m and a mean power of 5.2 kW/m, have been found to occur more 
frequently in the central Aegean, between the islands of Ikaria and Mykonos, some 50nm west of the location of the two 
shipwrecks, as well as at its the southern edge, between the islands of Karpathos, Kasos and Crete. Navid Jadidoleslam et al., 
“Wave power potential assessment of Aegean Sea with an integrated 15-year data” Renewable Energy”, 86, (February 2016): 
1056. 
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and more like a rugged terrain of hills, depressions and ravines. The analogy is therefore less one of 
an unsurpassable sea wall, as it is one of an attritional, slow, and repetitive defensive architecture that, 




The SeaWatch buoy used in the Poseidon network (left) and the multi-parametric M3A station of the Cretan Sea (right). Source: 
Hellenic Centre for Marine Research.  
 
 
When it comes to examining the provenance of certain deadly waves, I argue, the loaded recent history 
of the archipelago renders futile any attempt to distinguish nature from culture. Waves in the Aegean 
are always some kind of natureculture. Or, better yet, to use the term coined by the American 
anthropologist of science Stefan Helmreich to describe “those processes commonly understood to be 
organic, biological, meteorological, geological, and oceanic that [are] tailored to social projects and 
endeavours”553, waves here become a kind of infranature. Helmreich indeed describes waves as 
objects that have long been mutated by human activities. They belong to “an oceanic infrastructure for 
travel, commerce, or energy exchange”554 while also functioning as markers of anthropogenic climate 
change on a planetary scale. In encounters like the one between ΠΛΣ-136 and the Göznuru, waves are 
merely “sculpted into further infrastructural form”555. Molded by the coast-guard, they assume the role 
of “architectural materials, physical processes folded into systems of communication and control”556, in 
this case tasked with regulating mobility along the external borders of the EU. 
  
Waves are therefore not only physical, but also political objects: they have a history. If they are 
understood in their full complexity, Philip Steinberg and Kimberley Peters argue, “as forces, as vectors, 
as assemblages of molecules and meanings, as spaces of periodicity, randomness, instability and 
                                                   
553 Stefan Helmreich, “How to Hide an Island” in Daniel Daou and Pablo Pérez-Ramos (eds.) “New Geographies 8: Island”, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard Graduate School of Design, (2017): 86. 
554 Stefan Helmreich, “Waves. An anthropology of scientific things” Transcript of the Lewis Henry Morgan Lecture given on, Hau: 
Journal of Ethnographic theory 4 no.3, (October 2014): 265–284.  
555 Helmreich, “How to Hide an Island”, 84. 
556 Ibid. 
 214 
transformation, and as volumes (depths) and areas (surfaces)—then waves, and the wet ontology they 
exemplify, may be exceptionally well suited for understanding the politics of our watery planet.”557 It is 
this quality of waves as prisms of history and politics that keeps me close to the waves of Farmakonissi 
here. Rearranging the liquid matter of the Aegean, giving it depth and shape, they present themselves 
as key analytical devices for this thesis, which I use to “solicit questions about (…) whose stories will 













On March 16th, 2018, between 10:21:02 and 10:40:29 am local time, two small satellites belonging to 
Planet Labs’s fleet of “doves”559 flew over Agathonissi, and snapped a series of pictures of the island 
and the sea around it. One of these pictures, taken at 10:22:17, about four hours after the shipwreck, 
captured three vessels; two of them circling the island and one moving parallel to the border, inside 
Turkish territorial waters. At a resolution of 3 metres per pixel, the 10 to 20-metre-long vessels are 
hardly visible in the photographs, occupying all but three or four pixels. Instead, it is their movement 
that registers in the photograph, visible by the tracks the vessels leave on the water surface.  
In fluid dynamics, these tracks are called wakes. Like a wave, a wake has its own architecture. It 
consists of a characteristic wave pattern in the form of a V-shaped region behind the ship, known as 
the “Kelvin wake”560, and a “turbulent wake” along the track of the ship. Around and directly behind the 
                                                   
557 Steinberg and Peters, “Wet Ontologies”, 261. 
558 Schuppli, Material Witness, 5. 
559 Planet Labs is a private earth imaging company. They deploy small satellites which they call “doves”. 
560 Named after the British Physicist Lord Kelvin who first explained the physics of ship wakes in 1887. 
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ship (what is known as the “local wave disturbance region”), the wake is a complex combination of bow 
and stern waves, eddies, currents, and foam. At the outer edges of this wedge (called the "cusp line" 
or "Kelvin arm"), the waves are often highest. From about 3 ship lengths behind the ship (known as the 
“free wave pattern region”), the Kelvin wake consists of two kinds of waves: “transverse waves” (crests 
across the ship's track) and “divergent waves” (crests roughly parallel to the ship's track, moving 
outward). Underneath the water surface, a wake is comprised of an equally complex stratification of 




The hydrodynamic structure of wakes (left), and simulations of wake heights based on different sea and vessel speeds (right). 
Source: Melsheimer, “Ship Wakes Observed with ERS and SPOT”. 
 
 
When seen from the point of view of a satellite, this wake architecture becomes an index that allows us 
to reverse engineer the characteristics of the machine or body that birthed it. The shape and opening 
angle of the wake, for example, betrays the vessel speed and shape562. Combined with aerial 
photography, wakes offer themselves for purposes of maritime surveillance, as diverse as military 
planning, the control of fisheries, or, as is the case here, human rights investigations. When examining 
cases of shipwrecks in the Aegean, where the precise trajectories, or the very presence of coast guard 
vessels at sea, are often undisclosed by authorites, wakes become a ripple on the sea surface through 
which we can contest the obscurity that covers these militarized and off-limits waters. They become 
what Pezzani and Heller have described as a “liquid trace”563, the inscription of a migrant crossing, or 
a shipwreck and its aftermath, on the sea’s surface. 
 
I scrutinised the satellite photograph from that morning in order to understand and identify the vessels 
visible. Based on their calculated speed and size, and trajectory. We therefore attempted a taxonomy 
of the wakes visible. The choice of the term taxonomy is deliberate here, as it captures this double-
                                                   
561 Christian Melsheimer, “Ship Wakes Observed with ERS and SPOT, Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing”, 
2001, crisp.nus.edu.sg/~research/shipwakes/shipwakes.htm (accessed April 2020), and Trond Helge Torsvik et al, 
“Identification of ship wake structures by a time–frequency method” Journal of Fluid Mechanics, 765 (February 2015). 
562 Björn Tings et al “Extension of Ship Wake Detectability Model for Non-Linear Influences of Parameters Using Satellite Based 
X-Band Synthetic Aperture Radar” Remote Sens. 2019, 11 no. 5, (March 2019): 563. 
563 Pezzani, “Liquid Traces”, 2014. 
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entendre of wakes as physical objects that are created at the intersection of natural and machinic 
processes. Taxonomy traditionally refers to the categorization and partition of nature for the purpose of 
scientific research. As a tool at the disposal of colonial naturalists, taxonomy has historically been 
deployed to rationalize racism and to create distinctions between the colonisers and the natural 
environment, as well as colonial subjects. A lesser know use of the term, however, lies n military 
vernacular, where the term is used as an indexing tool to encompass the domains of weapons, 
equipment, and tactics564. Encompassing both worlds, a wake taxonomy therefore refers to the analysis 
of physical wave processes with the purpose of indexing and identifying military assets.  
 
Through this analysis, I found that the wakes visible belonged to two vessels of the Greek coast guard, 
ΠΛΣ-171 and ΠΛΣ-612, and a third, unknown vessel of the Turkish coast guard, all three of which had 
been deployed to look for the survivors of the sunken vessel. None of the vessels carried AIS565 tracking 
data transponders, an omission which is common among coast guards in the Aegean, who prefer to 
operate in the shadows of optic systems and far from civilian scrutiny. I compared these wakes to the 
trajectories the commanders of the Greek vessels had manually plotted before the prosecutor, and 
found them to be often more than a nautical mile apart. Such an inconsistency prompted questions 
regarding the veracity of the commanders’ claims, as well as the prosecutor’s conclusion that, had there 
been a shipwreck on March the 16th, these vessels would have had located it. These questions were 
left unanswered. Manipulating the image further in order to look through the clouds that obscured part 
of the sea surface, longer wakes that were invisible in the raw image, began to surface566. A recent 
history of movement presented itself in the form of waves.  
 
 
   
The trajectories of Coast Guard Vessels ΠΛΣ-171 and ΠΛΣ-137 as plotted by their commanders before the prosecutor. 
Source: Agathonissi case file 
 
                                                   
564 Russel W. Fenske, “A Taxonomy for Operations Research”, Operations Research, 19, No.1 (February 1971): 224-234. 
565 Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a standard automated tracking system used for vessel navigation. 
566 This analysis was undertaken in collaboration with Jamon Van Der Hoek, assistant professor at the school of Earth, Ocean 
and Atmospheric, Oregon State University, and expert in satellite imagery analysis. The technique used is called Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). It is a process that filters the three bands of the image (red, green, blue) and removes any 







The trajectory drawn by the commander of Coast Guard Vessels ΠΛΣ-171 (in blue) compared to a satellite image from that 








Principal Component Analysis of a satellite photograph reveals a circular wake cutting across the border. This serves as further 
proof that this unidentified vessel belonging to the Turkish Coast Guard could have been performing search and rescue. 
Through further analysis it was found that the vessel was cruising at a speed of 29.02 knots. GIS analysis by author and Jamon 
Van Der Hoek, satellite photograph by Planet Labs.
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A wake, for Christina Sharpe is more than “the track left on the water’s surface by a ship; the disturbance 
caused by a body swimming, or one that is moved, in water; the air currents behind a body in flight; a 
region of disturbed flow; in the line of sight of (an observed object); and (something) in the line of recoil 
of (a gun)”. Wakes “are processes; through them we think about the dead and about our relations to 
them; they are rituals through which to enact grief and memory. Wakes allow those among the living to 
mourn the passing of the dead through ritual (...).” “In the wake”, for Sharpe, “the semiotics of the slave 
ship continue”.567  
 
Through encounters like the one between the ΠΛΣ-136 and the Göznuru, or non-encounters like the 
patchy search and rescue operation conducted by ΠΛΣ-171, ΠΛΣ-612 and ΠΛΣ-137, waves (and 
wakes) emerge as a fundamental component of the larger infrastructure that defines the Aegean 
carceral archipelago. Following Sharpe, I argue the wakes of the Coast Guard vessels captured in the 
satellite photo are two dimensional representations of the contemporary military-humanitarian complex 
that sustains the necropolitical architecture of Fortress Europe. These turbulent inscriptions on the sea’s 
surface therefore churn the situated violent and contested histories of the Aegean with the residue of 
past colonial regimes and recent military interventions in Africa and Asia. They are, in this sense, part 
of the imperial legacies that shape the politics of European migration today.  
 
In the context of Aegean crossings, these legacies are manifest in the form of an ever-increasing 
securitization of the archipelago, be it through murderous coast guard patrols and push-back 
operations, modern forms of strategically prolonged incarceration and quarantine in remote islands, or, 
finally, the externalisation of the very border and its displacement beyond European territory, to the 
Turkish shore, via the EU-Turkey deal. The wakes examined here are both ripples of the “war on terror”, 
of past and present histories of colonial occupation and state violence, and building materials of the 
contemporary “war on migration”568. They contain the longue durée of state violence in the Aegean.  
 
This part of the thesis sought to offer a critical reflection of such a practice.
                                                   
567 Sharpe, In the Wake, 21.  





Farmakonissi is a compound place name. The word farmakon, or pharmakon, in Greek, stands for 
“remedy”, but it can also mean “poison”, or “colour”. The second component, -nissi, stands for “island”. 
According to the legend, Farmakonissi took its original name, Farmakoussa - she who holds remedies 
(or poisons, or colours) - from Hippocrates of Kos, the ancient Greek “father of medicine”, who used to 
visit the island to collect herbs. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida, in his text Plato’s Pharmacy, 
addresses this double etymology of the word pharmakon. “The pharmakon would be a substance”, 
Derrida writes, “with all that that word can connote in terms of matter with occult virtues, cryptic depths 
refusing to submit their ambivalence to analysis.”569 It is in liquid – “the element of the pharmakon” - 
that, for Derrida, “opposites are more easily mixed. [...] And water, pure liquidity, is most easily and 
dangerously penetrated then corrupted by the pharmakon, with which it mixes and immediately 
unites.”570  
 
This section sought to demonstrate how different jurisdictions and violent histories in the Aegean Sea 
layer and and overlap with the interstitial materialities of the archipelago to produce an uneven 
geography, where the circulation of both people and information is subject to violent state practices. 
The two shipwrecks of Farmakonissi and Agathonissi were chosen as paradigmatic objects of study, 
as folds on the Aegean surface upon which the forces and contestations discussed above crystallize 
and become legible. Both incidents in turn testify to a deep state continuum that “refuses to submit its 
ambivalence to analysis”.  
 
Indeed, as I was going through the Agathonissi court files, I stumbled upon a piece of paper, the site of 
which made me shiver. It was the testimony of one of the high-ranked coast guard officials who were 
in charge of coordinating the rescue operation from inside the maritime rescue and coordination centre 
(MRCC) in Piraeus. His name was Ioannis Myloulis. He was the captain of the ΠΛΣ-136 that, four years 
before the failed rescue operation in Agathonissi, had sunk and abandoned the Göznuru in the dark 
waters off Farmakonissi. Having been found innocent from the maritime court of Piraeus, he had been 
transferred to the search and rescue coordination centre where he presumably still works. If anything, 
this culture of impunity has only made matters worse for border crossers. Two years after the 
Agathonissi shipwreck, and six years after that in Farmakonissi, in October 2020, the human rights 
monitoring NGO “Mare Liberum” stated that “the Aegean Sea has become the stage of daily human 
rights violations and a black box of information”571. 
 
                                                   
569 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: Continum, 2004), 150. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Mare Liberum, “The daily horror of pushbacks”, October 7, 2020, mare-liberum.org/en/news/the-daily-horror-of-pushbacks/ 
(accessed November 2020). 
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Occasionally, the surfacing of bodies and boat remains from the “cryptic” Aegean depths disrupts this 
equilibrium of obfuscation and confronts researchers with non-discursive traces that lend themselves 
to analysis, as well as with a set of ethical questions to do with one’s response to witnessing the 
routinization of loss of human life at sea. To paraphrase Hans Blumenberg, and his seminal treaty into 
the sea as a metaphor for human existence572, this surfacing renders us, researchers, activists, 
humans, into spectators to these shipwrecks. In order to take up the task of upholding truth claims and 
calls for accountability in this archipelago we must develop a type of political and spatial practice that 
can account for the multiplicity of actants that make up the Aegean border nature, human and non-
human alike. An epistemological turn is therefore necessary; a reciprocal shifting of attention from 
subject to object (and back); from object to field (and back); from figure, to ground or, rather, to sea 
(and back), through the body of which violent acts are enacted and upon which they register. When 
prompted with the right tools, rocks, winds, temperatures, currents and waves can be read against the 
grain to corroborate or negate human testimony, and can offer a ripple through which the obscure 






Farmakonissi island observed from the shores of Agathonissi island, May 2018. Photo by author.
                                                   







Moving between different locations in an otherwise continuous corridor of border violence, this thesis 
has considered the complex and violent relationship between border enforcement, non-human nature, 
and border communities. The main line of inquiry investigated the concept of the “natural border”, which 
is often understood to be a passive, yet impermanent, backdrop against which territory is “naturally” 
partitioned, and is thought to occupy the opposite side of the operational spectrum than border fences 
and armed border guards. Contrary to these beliefs, this thesis argued that nature holds a certain 
agency within the border apparatus and is not separate from, but deeply entangled with built border 
architectures and military force. 
Refraining from essentialist and immanentist readings of agency as “natural”, this thesis argued that 
contemporary border regimes are enforced not just by nature, but by a constellation of legislations and 
technologies that penetrate, rearrange, and weaponise natural environments. The hybrid results of 
these interactions were theorized in this thesis as “border natures”. Through this enquiry, the notion of 
the “natural” border emerges as a volumetric, multiscalar, sequential and atmospheric construct, 
wherein realtionships of causality are deep, multidirectional and entangled, involving an array of actors 
and actants. These, I have shown, are relationships crafted across space, as they are across time: the 
border has both geographical breadth, and duration, and is constantly evolving.  
Crucially, these relationships, or kinships, between borders and nature, are unevenly distributed across 
different occupants of border zones. Not all lives and bodies are violated equally at the world’s borders. 
It is the dispossessed, displaced and “othered” communities that endure the results of this lethal 
entanglement, and it is states that cultivate it to further their reach and to obscure their responsibility for 
the violence it unleashes. Such a power imbalance is contingent upon an equally asymmetrical access 
to knowledge of border zones, to their nuanced histories and materialities, as well as to the technology 
required to survey them. State bodies that measure, delineate, and guard borders are the ones that 
know them best. While this may be a sad realisation, a parallel, collective knowledge of borders has 
emerged in recent years. This is a knowledge which is situated, and is assembled first and foremost by 
the people who cross them, and further enriched by those who stand in solidarity. 
A critique such as the one offered in this thesis is important for forging radical political claims within and 
across this collective. As Gaston Gordillo notes, “what may feel intuitive for a body facing a mountain 
[or a wave, or a river – in this case that it is not the mountain/wave/river per se that kills, but the 
conditions under which it is met] does not necessarily translate into theoretical clarity”573, or collective 
action. And yet, it is precisely through such a material and corporeal understanding of borders that 
                                                   
573 Gordillo, “Terrain as Insurgent Weapon”, 61. 
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states design their deterrence strategies. This theoretical enquiry seeks to mediate the distance 
between what is felt and what is archived, and in so doing, to counterbalance the power asymmetries 
between border agencies and border subjects. 
Considering such non-linear forms of violence, the practice-based component of this thesis revolves 
around questions of trace, accountability, and solidarity. This has necessitated a diverse approach, 
ranging from forensics, cartography, film making, archaeology, camera trapping and botany. The result 
is a critical spatial practice that attempts to draw upon the theoretical arsenal developed in the thesis in 
order to sense, dissect and render visible (or audible) the ways border violence is enacted through, and 
concealed behind, environmental processes. 
The thesis initially asked the question: how does a border reconfigure an entire ecosystem? Probing 
the thick, variegated cross-border landscape of Prespa/Prespa/Prespës, I investigated the ways in 
which “nature” has been allowed to flourish at the expense of historical memory and cultural “otherness”. 
I considered how the mountainous environment responds to historical events related to the construction 
of the modern Greek nation, and examined the traces these environmental rearrangements leave 
behind to unearth part of the region’s troubled, and undead, pasts. Different forms of life, both human 
and more-than, appear in the text and practice as witnesses to testify to the state processes by which 
they are affected. Through this enquiry, Prespa emerges as a space where seemingly contradicting 
elements like transboundary conservation efforts, technologies of surveillance, and border crossing, 
coexist to create a laboratory of sorts for different forms of border violence, and a prism through which 
contemporary processes can be understood. Several strategies that are today central to efforts to 
weaponise nature at the Greek border, I show, were first introduced and implemented here.  
In part II, in my collaboration with Ifor Duncan, we enquired into the role of river water in the politics of 
death at the border. We considered how a complex collection of riparian infrastructures, shifting 
riverbanks, flooding, evaporating, and ongoing hydro-diplomatic impasse has been mobilised to make 
the Evros/Meriç/Maritsa river a strategic and durable obstacle, not only for invading forces, but also for 
border crossers. Playing on the “naturalness” of the river, the border regime here folds together 
environmental and military technology to de-humanise those neglected by states and the EU. By 
investigating the inundating design of the fluvial frontier, this part attempted to identify the invisible 
engineering of the ecosystem, which incorporates the river’s own flow, muddiness, fog and seasonal 
flooding in its production of a “naturally” hazardous frontier.  
The final part of this dissertation has explored how the interstitial and historically charged materiality of 
the Aegean archipelago is mobilized as a defensive architecture against contemporary migration at sea. 
Reflecting on a spatial and visual practice that attempts to decode this expressive materiality to reveal 
the histories of border violence it might hold, the thesis enquires into recent, explicit efforts to weaponise 
it, and contests prevailing imaginaries that paint the sea as the sole victimiser of border crossers. As I 
maintain throughout the thesis, this shows that very drawing of a line on the sea surface sets into motion 
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a lethal ecology, one which holds the longue durée of state force in the archipelago, and which is 
presently enforced through law and military strength, as it is through winds, waves, currents, 
temperatures and marine life.  
Despite the profound specificities that each of these liminal border spaces presents, what remains 
consistent is a condition of deadly violence that is produced and erased by an overlap of social, 
historical, geopolitical, territorial and material conditions. Across mountains, rivers, and seas, the border 
regime shatters lives and bodies574, hides their material traces, and when these surface as corpses (or 
ruins from within a forest), it employs a naturalising rhetoric that casts death and decay as an expected 
natural outcome, rather than its inherent prerogative. In all three cases, the way in which populations 
are governed and persons are destroyed at the border has a direct relationship with how the natural 
border environment is known and managed. 
This condition is, lamentably, not unique to the cases presented in this thesis. As more walls are erected 
across the world’s borders, and the technologies for their enforcement multiply, border crossers are 
pushed deeper into hostile terrains than ever before.  
On the 28th of February 2020 thirteen people died in a snowstorm in the Anatolian plateau in the 
province of Van, between Iran and Turkey575. A couple of months later, on the 1st of May 2020, 45 
border crossers drowned in the Hari river between Iran and Afghanistan, after being forced there by 
Iranian border guards576. Many of the people who contested the borders this thesis examines, would 
have had to cross both the above to reach here. Should they manage to leave Greece, the treacherous 
“green” route of the Balkans awaits. Alternative routes into Europe involve the arctic route that takes 
asylum seekers from Russia to Finland through the thick, freezing taiga forest, the Atlantic crossing 
from southern Morocco to the Canary Islands, or, what is perhaps the deadliest of all, across the Sahara 
Desert, through the central Mediterranean, and over the Alps, where mountain guides double as 
rescuers for migrants because, in their words, they “want to avoid finding bodies when the snow 
melts.”577 Beyond Europe’s fortified borders, between the mid-1990s and 2019, over 3200 people have 
lost their lives crossing the Sonora Desert from Mexico into Arizona578, and countless more have 
drowned in the Rio Grande river and the Carribean Sea on their way to the US, or crossing the Indian 
Ocean and the Timor Sea into Australia. 
                                                   
574 Mbembe, Necropolitics. 
575 “13 migrants froze to death on Turkey-Iran border”, Ahval News, February 9, 2020, www.ahvalnews.com/turkey-migrants/13-
migrants-froze-death-turkey-iran-border (accessed February 2020) 
576 Marion McGregor, “Iranian border guards drowned 45 Afghan migrants, investigators say”, Info Migrants, May 8, 2020, 
www.infomigrants.net/en/post/24615/iranian-border-guards-drowned-45-afghan-migrants-investigators-say (accessed May 
2020) 
577 Saskya Vandoorne and Melissa Bell, “Snow may hide dead migrants on Alps route”, CNN, January 18, 2018, 
edition.cnn.com/2018/01/18/europe/alps-migrants-border-crossing-intl/index.html (Accessed December 2020) 
578 “Hostile Terrain 94”, The Undocumented Migration Project, www.undocumentedmigrationproject.org/hostileterrain94 
(accessed September 2020) 
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The same operationalization of geography is fast becoming a pattern for states seeking solutions theis 
“problems” of migrant detention. In December 2020, the government of Bangladesh began relocating 
Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to a fourteen-year-old sandbank in the mouth of the Ganges river579. 
In September 2020, faced with an increase in “small boats” crossings of the English channel, and 
drawing from the Australian government’s notorious offshore detention programme580, the UK Home 
Secretary explored the construction of asylum processing centres in the British overseas territories of 
Ascencion and St.Helena islands in the South Atlantic581.  
Inversely, when such camps are installed outside the remit of the state, nature is enlisted, and often 
modified, to supress them. After the notorious Calais “Jungle” in France was cleared of people and 
structures in 2016, the area it was built upon was proposed to be “returned” to a neighbouring nature 
reserve so as to prevent the return of migrants582. A few kilometres away from the “Jungle”, an area 
which hosted a smaller camp is currently being deforested to prevent migrants from seeking shelter in 
the woods again583. Deforestation also presently occurs in the US-Mexico border, where centuries old 
organ pipe cacti are being felled584, springs are drained585, habitats are splintered586 and mountains are 
levelled in the wake of Donald Trump’s border wall. In the Western Sahara, the earth is being moved 
by the Moroccan government to construct a 2,700 km sand berm that will separate Moroccan-controlled 
territories from the partially recognized state of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. These global 
entanglements of natural environments and anti-immigration policies corroborate the notion of a “border 
nature”. 
                                                   
579 Bhashan Char, as the island is called, surfaced only in 2006. See “Bangladesh: halt relocation of Rohingya refugees to remote 
island”, Amnesty International, December 3, 2020, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/bangladesh-halt-relocation-of-
rohingya-refugees-to-remote-island/ (accessed December 2020) 
580 Australia maintained offshore detention facilities in Nauru and Manus islands until 2018 and 2017 respectively, and still 
maintains one such facility on Christmas island in the Indian Ocean. 
581 “Priti Patel looked at shipping UK asylum seekers to south Atlantic”, Financial Times, www.ft.com/content/ff1dc189-5531-
4d81-8d17-7f332596f2cd (accessed September 2020) 
582 Hanna Rullmann, “Fort Vert: Nature conservation as border regime in Calais”, Statewatch, February 2020, 
www.statewatch.org/media/documents/analyses/no-353-calais-hostile-environment.pdf (accessed March 2020) 
583 Calais Food Collective, Twitter Post, “Deforestation continues in another camp in Calais, meters away from refugee's living 
space”, December 1, 2020, www.twitter.com/CalaisFood/status/1333858600561872902 (accessed December 2020) 
584 Mia Jankowicz, “Contractors working on trump’s border wall are pointlessly blowing up chunks of Arizona that they will not 
have time to actually build on, campaigners say”, Business Insider, December 6, 2020, www.businessinsider.com/arizona-
mountains-blasted-for-trump-wall-no-time-build-2020-12 (accessed December 2020) 
585 Logan Williams, “The Dissapearance of Quitobaquito Springs: Tracking Hyrdological Change With Google Earth Engine”, 
Bellingcat, October 1, 2020, www.bellingcat.com/resources/2020/10/01/the-disappearance-of-quitobaquito-springs-tracking-
hydrologic-change-with-google-earth-engine/ (accessed October 2020) 
586 Samuel Gilbert, “Trump’s border wall construction threatens survival of Jaguars in the US”, December 1, 2020, Guardian, 
www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/dec/01/trump-border-wall-threatens-jaguars-revival-arizona-sky-
islands?CMP=share_btn_tw (accessed December 2020) 
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The emergence of migrant bodies from the melting snow in the Alps can also be interpreted to allude 
to a broader condition: that of climate change. Border natures, contingent as they are upon interactions 
between landscapes, humans and other life forms, offer a prism through which to evaluate this shared 
planetary predicament.  
This has been, I acknowledge, the “elephant in the room” for this thesis: too important to ignore and too 
big to address in passing. I have only tangentially touched upon it, preferring to dedicate the limited 
space granted by the format of the PhD to the present condition, and the layered histories that enable 
it. At the very least, I can begin to address it in this final part of the text, therefore signalling a potential 
future direction for this work. 
 
While I have chosen to probe plants, waterways, ice, sediments, and waves, to reveal their agency in 
violent acts that take place in the present such an enquiry can equally be calibrated to signal towards 
the future. Changes are already visible in the border environments that I investigated in this thesis, and 
these will only accelerate. As the Rila Mountains where the Maritsa springs receive less and less 
snowfall every year, the flow of the river will become increasingly unstable, and, by consequence, the 
territory scripted on the basis of its median line will be harder to define. New islands will be revealed, to 
be claimed by the tree littoral countries. The same is true for the Prespa lakes, where the recess of lake 
waters is increasingly felt. As the sea levels rise the river will become saline farther upstream from the 
Delta, in turn affecting the plants and animals that populate it, as well as the process whereby bodies 
decompose in its waters. Some of the “grey” Aegean rocks will eventually become reefs. An ongoing 
spike in water temperatures creates unprecedented anomalies on the surface of the Aegean, affecting 
wave and current patterns, and inviting “invasive” species that had previously been unable to cross the 
Suez Canal into the Mediterranean587. Such is the impact of climate change on the mobility of marine 
life that in 2020, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a document which features centrally 
in the “Aegean dispute”, was updated to include a provision for the establishment of mobile marine 
protected areas, the boundaries of which will be flexible across national jurisdictions so as to respond 
to the movements of the species they would be designed to protect588.  
 
As the emerging figure of the “climate refugee” suggests, this new climatic regime will necessitate 
movement on an unprecedented scale not only for plants and animals, but for human communities as 
well, in turn affecting how borders are crossed, and enforced. Consequently, a de-naturalised critique 
of “natural” borders, which focuses on the geographies on which they are established, but which also 
                                                   
587 Fittingly, marine scientists call these species “Lessepsian migrants”, named after Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French engineer 
who designed the Suez Canal. 
588 I am indebted to James Bridle for sharing his upcoming, yet untitled, book with me, from where I sourced this information. 
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extends to include the political model of national sovereignty these bound and engender, is as 
imperative as it has ever been. Ultimately, to think against, and beyond, borders is to think beyond the 
state. But, crucially, this is a critique that is preoccupied with the defence of the inalienable right to 
movement and self-determination for all living organisms, humans and non-humans alike. A simple 
axiom, therefore, lies at the heart of this study: if there is one thing that is natural about the world’s 
borders is their very transgression.
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Appendix: Portfolio of Practice* 
 
*The Practice for this thesis employs an array of different media. For reasons of brevity the portfolio 
only includes one photo for each piece, along with a brief description. For the full portfolio of 
practice visit the website www.border-natures.xyz, built specifically for the purpose of this PhD 




Ghost Habitats – Traps 








Traps is an ongoing project which explores the use of “trail” or “trap” cameras as a filmic medium for 
evidencing state violence in the trilateral Pespa/Prespa/Prespës national park. With human testimony 
either coerced or exiled, the project employs the tool of the trap camera, commonly used by 
conservationists and border guards alike, to represent the effects state governance has had on the 
communities and the natural environment in this border region. In doing so, the project considers the 
entanglements between nature, culture and technology in border zones, and probes the role of non-
humans - animals, forest communities and changes in meteorological conditions - in bearing witness to 
violent, yet gradual, border processes.  
 
Selected videos can be accessed at: www.border-natures.xyz/ghost-habitats.
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Ghost Habitats – Wild Archaeologies  







Wild Archaeologies (title TBC) is an ongoing project concerned with the documentation of the ruinous 
infranatural landscapes of Prespa. Using drone and ground photography, the project employs a 3D 
scanning technique called photogrammetry to create accurate three dimensional models of several 
human-modified, and presently abandoned, locations in the Greek Prespa region. The locations 
“scanned” at the time of submission include the former villages of Sfika/Besfina, Kranies/Drenovo, 
Moschochori/V’mbel, as well as a number of defensive positions from the Greek civil war. The project 
interrogates the capacity of 3D imaging technologies to document spaces that have undergone 
nuanced, so called “natural”, erasure, and to create a digital archaeological counter-archive which will 
carry the unpast pasts of the region to the present. 
 
Drone Photography with Marianna Bisti. 
Samples from the in-progress project can be accessed at: www.border-natures.xyz/ghost-habitats.
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Ghost Habitats - Herbarium Besfinense 







Herbarium Besfinense is a floristic survey of the plants growing inside the ruins of the Saint Athanasius 
church in the former village of Sfika/Besfina, on the Greek-Albanian border of Prespa. It comprises 33 
botanic samples, collected between May and August 2020. This collection, which includes a diversity 
of plant taxa, both wild and cultivated, prompts the information held in the vegetative matter of the young 
forest growing inside the church walls to interrogate the conditions which led to the abandonment of the 
village in the 1940s. As the forest expands across the village, the flora growing inside the church ruins 
serves as “ruderal evidence” to the recent existence of an extensive human community, as well as the 
violent processes that let the church collapse, and which today cast the Prespa mountains as a “green 
border”.  
 
The collection was assembled with Botanist Fanourios-Nikolaos Sakellarakis. It can be accessed in 
full at: www.border-natures.xyz/ghost-habitats.
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Sounding the Arcifinious 








Sounding the Arcifinious is an audio documentary which investigates the border region of the 
Evros/Meriç/Martisa river as a de-naturalised and expanded fluvial frontier. Braiding text with 
hydrophone recordings, interviews and field recordings, it considers the type of water and nature 
produced in the transboundary river at the border of the EU. Echoing the conception of rivers as 
“arcifinious” - geophysical characteristics deemed to be inherently defensive or “fit to keep the enemy 
out” - the piece renders audible the riverine overlaps between social and environmental processes 
(flooding, fence-building, unregulated pollution, deadly velocities, the dampness of the clothes worn by 
border crossers) to bring into focus the territorial and spatial politics of conflict at play in 
the Evros/Meriç/Martisa border region.  
 
The piece was commissioned by Onassis Stegi, in the context of Movement festival, February 2020, 




Report on the Agathonissi Shipwreck of 16/03/2018 







This 103-page long investigative report offers a cartographic analysis of the shipwreck that occurred in 
the waters off Agathonissi island, on the Greek/Turkish maritime border of the SE Aegean Sea, in March 
2018. The report scrutinizes evidence included in the case file against information gathered during a 
series of filmed interviews with the survivors and during fieldwork in the island of Agathonissi, as well 
as satellite photography, GPS, AIS, and oceanographic data to reconstruct the trajectory of the 
shipwrecked boat, the subsequent deadly drift of migrants at sea, and the patchy rescue operation that 
ensued. Through this analysis, the report confirms that the shipwreck occurred on March 16, 2018, as 
the survivors claim, a claim which the Greek authorities deny. The report features drift analysis that was 
undertaken with Dr. Richard Limeburner of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and satellite 
analysis, done in collaboration with Dr. Jamon Van Der Hoek. 
 
The report was commissioned by the Human Rights NGOs Refugee support Aegean and ProAsyl, and 
was submitted as evidence to the Maritime Court of Piraeus in July 2019, and the European Court of 
Human Rights in October 2020. It can be accessed in full at: border-natures.xyz/grey-rocks-black-
waves.
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Grey Rocks, Black Waves 





    
 
 
Grey Rocks, Black Waves (photo on the right, part of the plinth facing the wall) is an installation piece 
exhibited within the context of the “Hostile Environment”(s) group exhibition in Bolzano, Italy. The piece 
brings together different archival documents such as official communications of the Greek government 
to international legal fora, newspaper cut-outs, and maps to consider the ways in which the long history 
of disputed territories and geographies of exile spanning the entire Aegean Sea affect present-day 
territorial tensions and migration in the area.  
 
 
The exhibition was curated by Lorenzo Pezzani, for AR/GE Kunst Bolzano. The exhibition catalogue 
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